Opinion
Appellate Case No. 2014-002296 Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-314
07-26-2017
Lloyd Lash, Appellant, v. Seneca Police Department, Respondent.
Elizabeth Anne Franklin-Best, of Blume Norris & Franklin-Best LLC, of Columbia; and E. Charles Grose, Jr., of Grose Law Firm, of Greenwood, both for Appellant. James D. Jolly, Jr. and Stacey Todd Coffee, both of Logan Jolly & Smith, LLP, of Anderson, for Respondent.
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. Appeal From Oconee County
R. Lawton McIntosh, Circuit Court Judge
AFFIRMED
Elizabeth Anne Franklin-Best, of Blume Norris & Franklin-Best LLC, of Columbia; and E. Charles Grose, Jr., of Grose Law Firm, of Greenwood, both for Appellant. James D. Jolly, Jr. and Stacey Todd Coffee, both of Logan Jolly & Smith, LLP, of Anderson, for Respondent. PER CURIAM : Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: S. Glass & Plastics Co. v. Kemper, 399 S.C. 483, 490, 732 S.E.2d 205, 208-09 (Ct. App. 2012) ("When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, this court applies the same standard that governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP; summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); Law v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 368 S.C. 424, 435, 629 S.E.2d 642, 648 (2006) ("[T]o maintain an action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings; (2) by or at the instance of the defendant; (3) termination of such proceedings in plaintiff's favor; (4) malice in instituting such proceedings; (5) lack of probable cause; and (6) resulting injury or damage." (quoting Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 321, 143 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1965))); id. ("An action for malicious prosecution fails if the plaintiff cannot prove each of the required elements by a preponderance of the evidence, including malice and lack of probable cause."); id. at 436, 629 S.E.2d at 649 ("Probable cause means 'the extent of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor that the person charged was guilty of a crime for which he has been charged . . . .'" (quoting Parrott, 246 S.C. at 322, 143 S.E.2d at 609)); id. at 436-37, 629 S.E.2d at 649 (holding in an action for malicious prosecution, a true bill of indictment is prima facie evidence of probable cause). AFFIRMED. SHORT, WILLIAMS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. --------