Opinion
Case No. 2:02-CV-541 SA
June 11, 2004
ORDER
Before the Court is an action filed by Plaintiff, Michael Holmes Lash, asking the Court to reverse the final agency decision denying his application for Supplemental Security Income (hereafter referred to as "SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1381- 1383c (2003). Plaintiff's application was denied because the Administrative Law Judge (hereafter referred to as "ALJ") found that although Plaintiff is unable to return to his past relevant work, he is capable of making an adjustment to work which exists in significant numbers in the national economy, and therefore is not disabled. Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's decision by arguing that it is legally erroneous and it is not supported by substantial evidence.
Having carefully considered the parties' memoranda and the complete record in this matter, the Court concludes that the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence and that the ALJ did not make any legal errors requiring reversal. Therefore, Plaintiff's request for a reversal of the agency's decision is denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff applied for SSI in April 1998. (File Entry #11, The Certified Copy of the Transcript of the Entire Record of the Administrative Proceedings Relating to Michael Holmes Lash thereafter referred to as "Tr. __") at 56-58.) After his claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ, which hearing was held on October 14, 1999, and December 2, 1999. (Tr. 39-49, 240-87.) The ALJ issued his decision on March 28, 2000, in which he found that Plaintiff was not disabled because he was capable of performing a limited range of sedentary work. (Tr. 15-26.) The Appeals Council later denied Plaintiff's request for review. (Tr. 5-6.)
After receiving the Appeals Council's denial of his request for review, Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis was granted by the Court, Plaintiff filed his complaint on June 11, 2002, and the case was assigned to United States District Judge Tena Campbell. (File Entries #1-3.) Defendant then filed her answer and the administrative record on July 2, 2003. (File Entries #10, 11.) On October 17, 2003, Judge Campbell referred the case to United States Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (File Entry #15.)
Plaintiff filed his memorandum on January 27, 2004. (File Entry #22.) Defendant filed her memorandum on March 2, 2004. (File Entry #25.) Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant's memorandum on March 24, 2004. (File Entry 27.)
Because the parties jointly consented to the magistrate judge entering the final disposition in this case (File Entry #18), on March 25, 2004, Judge Campbell entered a new order of reference, referring the case to Magistrate Judge Alba pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (File Entry #28.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court reviews the Commissioner's decision "to determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether correct legal standards were applied." Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 2003); accord Angel v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1208, 1209 (10th Cir. 2003).
The Commissioner's findings, "if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (2003). "`Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."'"Doyal, 331 F.3d at 760 (citation omitted). "`Substantial evidence' requires `more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance,' and is satisfied by such relevant `evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support the conclusion.'" Gossett v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 802, 804 (10th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). "`"Evidence is not substantial `if it is overwhelmed by other evidence — particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians) — or if it really constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion.'"'" Id. at 805 (citations omitted); see also O'Dell v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 855, 858 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Evidence is insubstantial if it is overwhelmingly contradicted by other evidence."); Trimiar v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 1992) ("A finding of `"no substantial evidence" will be found only where there is a "conspicuous absence of credible choices" or "no contrary medical evidence."'" (citations omitted)).
In conducting its review, the Court "must examine the record closely to determine whether substantial evidence supports" the Commissioner's decision. Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1019 (10th Cir. 1996). The Court may "`neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the agency.'"White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 905 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). However, the Court is not required to mechanically accept the Commissioner's findings. See Ehrhart v. Secretary of Health Human Servs., 969 F.2d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 1992) ("By the same token, we must do more than merely rubber stamp the decisions of the [Commissioner]."). Rather, the Court must "`examine the record as a whole, including whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the [Commissioner's] decision and, on that basis, determine if the substantiality of the evidence test has been met.'" Glenn v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 983, 984 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). The Court's review of the record includes any evidence Plaintiff presented for the first time to the Appeals Council. See O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 858-59.
The Court typically defers to the ALJ on issues of witness credibility. See Hamilton v. Secretary of Health Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, "`[f]indings as to credibility should be closely and affirmatively linked to substantial evidence.'" Winfrey, 92 F.3d at 1020 (citation omitted).
The Court's review also extends to determining whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1371 (10th Cir. 2000). Besides the lack of substantial evidence, reversal may be appropriate where the Commissioner uses the wrong legal standards or the Commissioner fails to demonstrate reliance on the correct legal standards. See Glass v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1392, 1395 (10th Cir. 1994); Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993); Andrade v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 985 F.2d 1045, 1047 (10th Cir. 1993).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff makes six main arguments in his memoranda. The Court addresses each of those arguments in turn.
1. Examining Doctor's Findings
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by giving little or no weight to the diagnostic findings of Plaintiff's treating physicians, by substantially ignoring the findings of the Commissioner's two examining consultants, and by, instead, relying on the conclusions of the nonexamining consultant.Generally, an ALJ must give more weight to the opinions of a claimant's treating sources than to the opinions of nontreating sources. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (2003); Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003). The ALJ must first consider whether the medical opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. If it is not, then the opinion is not given controlling weight. If it is so supported, then the ALJ must determine whether the opinion is consistent with other substantial evidence in the record. If the opinion is not inconsistent with such record evidence, then the opinion is given controlling weight. See Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004); Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300. If it is inconsistent, then the opinion is not given controlling weight. However, "`[w]hen a treating physician's opinion is inconsistent with other medical evidence, the ALJ's task is to examine the other physicians' reports to see if they outweigh the treating physician's report, not the other way around.'" Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1215 (citations omitted.)
Even if a treating doctor's opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, "`[t]reating source medical opinions are still entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the factors provided in 20 C.F.R. [§§] 404.1527 and 416.927.'"Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300 (quoting SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *4). Those factors are:
(1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of the examination; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, including the treatment provided and the kind of examination or testing performed; (3) the degree to which the physician's opinion is supported by relevant evidence; (4) consistency between the opinion and the record as a whole; (5) whether or not the physician is a specialist in the area upon which an opinion is rendered; and (6) other factors brought to the ALJ's attention which tend to support or contradict the opinion.Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1301 (quoting Drapeau v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2)-(6).
After considering all of the factors, the ALJ must "`give good reasons in [the] notice of determination or decision' for the weight he ultimately assigns the opinion." Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1301 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). "[I]f the ALJ rejects the opinion completely, he must then give `"specific, legitimate reasons'" for doing so." Id. (quoting Miller v. Chater, 99 F.3d 972, 976 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir. 1987))). "If an ALJ intends to rely on a nontreating physician or examiner's opinion, he must explain the weight he is giving to it." Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1215 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(f)(2)(ii)).
Plaintiff argues, using general, broad language, that the ALJ gave little or no weight to the diagnostic findings of Plaintiff's treating physicians. However, Plaintiff fails to specifically point out which diagnostic findings of which treating physicians were ignored by the ALJ. Plaintiff summarizes the medical records included in the administrative record, but the Court is unable to glean from Plaintiff's summary which findings made by treating doctors the ALJ failed to address. The Court particularly is perplexed by Plaintiff's general argument regarding his treating physicians because the court cannot find any statement by a treating physician during the relevant time period declaring that Plaintiff was disabled or had limitations more restrictive than those found by the ALJ.
Instead, the only specific findings made by a doctor that Plaintiff argues were not properly considered by the ALJ were findings made by Dr. Schreiner, the clinical psychologist who examined Plaintiff at the request of the Social Security Administration. (Tr. 200-06.) In discussing Dr. Schreiner's findings, Plaintiff's main argument appears to be that the ALJ erred by substituting his own speculative judgment for that of Dr. Schreiner.
Plaintiff also appears to argue that the ALJ erred by ignoring the findings of Dr. Ingebretsen, the other agency doctor who examined Plaintiff. However, as with Plaintiff's argument regarding his treating doctors, Plaintiff has failed to point out to the Court specifically which of Dr. Ingebretsen's findings the ALJ ignored, and the Court is unable to discern from its own review of the record which findings Plaintiff is arguing were "substantially ignore[d]." (File Entry #22, at 28.)
However, contrary to Plaintiff's suggestion, the ALJ based his decision to discount the opinion of Dr. Schreiner on the findings and conclusion of the agency's nonexamining physician, not on the ALJ's own speculative judgment. Dr. Schreiner's examination of Plaintiff included the administration of psychological assessment tests. Dr. Schreiner's findings from those tests included that Plaintiff had significant memory and concentration problems. (Tr. 204-06.) However, in his report, the nonexamining agency physician wrote that Plaintiff had a long history of very heavy drinking and that he appears to have replaced his alcohol consumption with prescription pain medication. (Tr. 218.) The nonexamining medical expert opined that part of Plaintiff's memory, cognitive, and motor deficits noted in Dr. Schreiner's evaluations were the result of narcotic use. (Tr. 218-19.)
The ALJ examined Dr. Schreiner's examination report. In his decision, the ALJ noted that Dr. Schreiner did not make a diagnosis of a cognitive disorder, but instead made a "rule out cognitive disorder" diagnosis. (Tr. 23.) The ALJ noted that a cognitive disorder diagnosis would thus have to be borne out by a review of Plaintiff's medical history to rule out other explanations for the test result, which Dr. Schreiner did not do. Instead, Dr. Schreiner relied on Plaintiff's own subjective report of his medical history in reaching his diagnosis. The ALJ wrote, "Had Dr. Schreiner reviewed the claimant's medical history he would have had to confront the claimant's prescription drug seeking behavior as the state medical expert did." (Tr. 23.) In addition, the ALJ noted that he was giving Dr. Schreiner's findings regarding Plaintiff's concentration and memory problems some deference in his RFC determination regarding Plaintiff. (Tr. 23.)
In determining whether the ALJ erroneously discounted Dr. Schreiner's findings and opinion, the threshold question is whether Dr. Schreiner was a "treating physician" within social security disability law. The Tenth Circuit has explained:
The treating physician's opinion is given particular weight because of his "unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations." 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2)). This requires a relationship of both duration and frequency. "The treating physician doctrine is based on the assumption that a medical professional who has dealt with a claimant and his maladies over a long period of time will have a deeper insight into the medical condition of the claimant than will a person who has examined a claimant but once, or who has only seen the claimant's medical records." Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court recently observed, "the assumption that the opinions of a treating physician warrant greater credit tha[n] the opinions of [other experts] may make scant sense when, for example, the relationship between the claimant and the treating physician has been of short duration." Black Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, No. 02-469, slip op. at 9, 2003 WL 21210418 (U.S. May 27, 2003). Moreover, a longstanding treatment relationship provides some assurance that the opinion has been formed for purposes of treatment and not simply to facilitate the obtaining of benefits.
A physician's opinion is therefore not entitled to controlling weight on the basis of a fleeting relationship, or merely because the claimant designates the physician as her treating source. . . . the opinion of an examining physician who only saw the claimant once is not entitled to the sort of deferential treatment accorded to a treating physician's opinion.Doyal, 331 F.3d at 762-63. Because Dr. Schreiner only examined Plaintiff twice, and only for purposes of evaluating him for disability benefit purposes rather than for treatment purposes, Dr. Schreiner was not a "treating physician," as defined by Tenth Circuit law and the regulations, and his opinion is not entitled to controlling weight.
The issue, then, is whether the ALJ erred by relying on statements made by the nonexamining agency medical expert to discount the opinion of Dr. Schreiner, an examining, but not a treating, physician. The regulations explain that generally more weight is given to the opinion of an examining source than to that of a non-examining source. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(1). However, ALJs may give greater weight to the opinions of non-examining physicians than to those of examining physicians after carefully evaluating those opinions and the entire record. Even though Dr. Schreiner is not a treating physician, it is helpful to examine the six factors listed above that ALJs use to determine the degree of deference to give to treating physician's opinions that are not given controlling weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(f). First, Plaintiff and Dr. Schreiner's length of treatment relationship was very short and consisted of only two visits. Second, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship between Plaintiff and Dr. Schreiner was very limited. Although Dr. Schreiner performed a few tests on Plaintiff, he did not review Plaintiff's past medical records, but instead, as the ALJ noted in his decision, Dr. Schreiner received Plaintiff's medical history solely from Plaintiff's subjective account. Third, the record contains very little information, other than Dr. Schreiner's report, addressing Plaintiff's memory and concentration problems. Fourth, the ALJ noted inconsistencies between Plaintiff's alleged severe memory and concentration problems and Plaintiff's everyday activities. Fifth, Dr. Schreiner is a clinical psychologist and is therefore a specialist in his area. Examining these factors reveals that the ALJ did not err in discounting Dr. Schreiner's opinion and findings based on the opinion of the non-examining doctor because it was made from two examinations, a limited relationship, and it was formed without reviewing the Plaintiff's medical records.
Moreover, in his decision, the ALJ set forth information from the record that supports the nonexamining medical expert's conclusion that Plaintiff engaged in drug-seeking behavior and that his memory and concentration were affected by his narcotic use. For example, the ALJ explained that in 1998, Plaintiff was given either Lortab, Hydrocodone, a prescription for Lortab, or an injection of pain medication on April 23, May 3, May 10, June 15, June 18, June 20, June 23, July 14, July 21, August 14, August 16, October 5, October 16, and October 22. Also, Plaintiff sought, but was denied, pain medication on May 13, 1998. The ALJ further explained, regarding Plaintiff's November 9, 1998 visit to the Health Clinic of Utah, where he was seen by the attending nurse practitioner Kathleen Hogan:
Ms. Hogan noted that the claimant wanted a refill of Lortab and refused Ibuprofen and Ultram. The claimant received 30 Darvocet (narcotic derivative and Acetaminophen) tablets. Ms. Hogan instructed that he should take Darvocet only at night, that 30 should last him a month, and that no more medication would be given through the clinic. The claimant again appeared at the Health Clinic of Utah on November 30, 1998, complaining of toothache pain. Ms. Hogan noted the claimant had some swelling and prescribed 15 Lortab tablets. . . . On December 16, 1998, [Plaintiff] reported to Ms. Hogan again with pain. . . . Ms. Hogan gave the claimant Norvasc and two Lortab until the claimant could see a dentist. Ms. Hogan informed the claimant that she could not give any more medication for tooth pain and that the claimant would need to follow up with the dental clinic. . . .
(Tr. 20.) Thus, the ALJ noted that the record well supported the nonexamining medical expert's opinion regarding Plaintiff's frequent use of narcotic drugs, and the ALJ accepted the nonexamining medical expert's explanation that Plaintiff's memory and concentration were likely impaired by his use of narcotic drugs. Notably, the ALJ still gave some deference to Dr. Schreiner's opinion that Plaintiff's memory and concentration were impaired, as is reflected in the ALJ's RFC determination. As a result, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not err by relying on the opinion of the nonexamining medical expert in discounting the findings of Dr. Schreiner, an examining but not a treating physician, because the ALJ gave specific, legitimate reasons for so doing.
In the section of his memorandum addressing his argument regarding the treating and examining physicians, Plaintiff also appears to assert two other arguments. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ was obligated to obtain additional information from Dr. Ingebretsen and Dr. Schreiner "before rejecting their reports outright." (File Entry #22, at 29.) However, this argument is based on erroneous assumptions and is unsupported. The ALJ did not reject the reports of these two doctors "outright." As noted above, Plaintiff has failed to show the Court specifically how the ALJ rejected Dr. Ingebretsen's report at all, and the ALJ explicitly gave some deference to Dr. Schreiner's opinion. Furthermore, the inconsistencies between Dr. Schreiner's report and that of the nonexamining physician, as discussed above, were carefully examined by the ALJ and properly reconciled by a thorough review of Plaintiff's medical record. Those inconsistencies did not give rise to the ALJ's duty to further develop the record. See White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 908-09 (10th Cir. 2001); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2), (3).
Second, Plaintiff appears to raise the argument that the ALJ erred by not including, at step two of his analysis, that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of headaches, memory deficits, or concentration problems. (File Entry #22, at 31.) However, Plaintiff fails to properly develop this argument, and the Court therefore does not address it. See Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n. 13 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that reviewing court will not craft a party's argument for him), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1110, 120 S.Ct. 1964 (2000).
2. Listed Impairment
Plaintiff's second argument is that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's findings that Plaintiff's severe impairments did not meet a listed impairment. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that his impairments meet the requirements of listings 1.04 and 12.02.First, Plaintiff argues that, contrary to the ALJ's findings, his impairments meet the requirements of listing 1.04 (disorders of the spine). Plaintiff points to specific findings made on various examinations that suggest Plaintiff may meet some of the requirements for listing 1.04. However, although a few medical findings in the record appear to lend support to Plaintiff's argument, Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ's finding is not supported by substantial evidence. An agency medical doctor determined that Plaintiff did not satisfy the criteria of a listed impairment and completed an RFC assessment (Tr. 40, 220-27), which opinion the ALJ was entitled to rely upon. See 20 C.F.R. § 916.927(f)(2)(iii); SSR 96-6p, at *3 (explaining that signature of an agency medical consultant on a Disability Determination and Transmittal Form ensures that the question of medical equivalence to a listed impairment was considered). The Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding regarding listing 1.04, and therefore rejects Plaintiff's argument.
The ALJ wrote an evaluation of listing 1.05C in his decision. It is evident that the ALJ made a typographical error and meant to write listing 1.04C based on his discussion. In addition, listing 1.05C addresses amputation, an impairment not at issue in this case.
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by failing to further develop the record before finding Plaintiff did not meet a listed impairment. The Court disagrees because it concludes that the record was adequately developed for the ALJ to make his decision.See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(1), (3).
Second, Plaintiff argues that his impairments met the requirements of listing 12.02 (organic mental disorders). The Court similarly rejects this argument. Plaintiff fails to acknowledge that an agency psychologist determined that Plaintiff did not meet a listed impairment (Tr. 207), a determination the ALJ was entitled to rely upon and which provided substantial evidence for the ALJ's decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(f)(2)(i), (iii). As with Plaintiff's above argument, although Plaintiff mentions one or two medical findings from the record that suggest support for Plaintiff's argument, those findings alone do not show that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's finding. Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ's finding is "overwhelmingly contradicted by other evidence." See O'Dell v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 855, 858 (10th Cir. 1994).
3. Consideration of All of Plaintiff's Impairments
Plaintiff's third argument is that the ALJ performed no analysis of Plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain and headaches despite that Plaintiff has consistently argued that he suffers from back and neck problems, headaches, and deficits of memory and concentration, as well as debilitating pain and headaches. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to make all the detailed findings required at step four and did not explain the conflicts between his findings and the medical record.
As in the above section, in this section of his memorandum, Plaintiff appears to argue that he is challenging the ALJ's determination at step two regarding severe impairments. (File Entry #22, at 35.) However, as in the previous section of his memorandum, Plaintiff fails to develop this argument, so the Court does not address it.
The Court rejects Plaintiff's argument. The ALJ's decision contains a thorough examination of Plaintiff's medical record, including an evaluation of Plaintiff's allegations of pain and subjective symptoms. (Tr. 22.) Further, the ALJ's RFC determination contains numerous allowances for Plaintiff's impairments, including restrictions in Plaintiff's ability to lift, carry, stand, walk, sit, and twist. (Tr. 23, 25.)
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ's determination of Plaintiff's mental functional abilities was not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ substituted his lay opinion for that of the examining physician, Dr. Schreiner. The Court has already concluded in section 1 above that this argument lacks merit. The ALJ properly relied upon the nonexamining doctor's opinion and review of the record in discounting Dr. Schreiner's opinion, which was not based on a review of Plaintiff's medical records and was a rule-out diagnosis. Furthermore, an agency psychologist performed a mental RFC assessment that the ALJ was entitled to rely upon in completing the psychiatric review technique form. (Tr. 216-19.) Therefore, contrary to Plaintiff's argument, the ALJ did not substitute his own opinion for that of psychological experts.
4. Credibility
Fourth, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's credibility finding, which discredited Plaintiff's subjective allegations. "`Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and [this Court] will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.'" Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Diaz v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 898 F.2d 774, 777 (10th cir. 1990)). Credibility findings must be "`closely and affirmatively linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings.'" Kepler, 68 F.3d at 391 (citation omitted).
The Court has carefully reviewed the ALJ's credibility finding and analysis and finds that, as required, the ALJ linked his credibility finding to specific, substantial evidence in the record, including Plaintiff's medical records, Plaintiff's testimony regarding his activity level, Plaintiff's ability to recall information, and Plaintiff's treatment record.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not specifically address Plaintiff's headache complaints, but "lumped [those] complaints in with numerous other subjective complaints and then rejected those en masse, without specifically addressing his headaches." (File Entry #22, at 37.) The Court's review of the ALJ's decision belies Plaintiff's claim. In his decision, the ALJ wrote, "The claimant's testimony regarding the debilitating nature of his headaches and need to lie down is all out of proportion with the medical record, which though full of emergency room visits often notes that the claimant was in no acute distress." (Tr. 22.) This statement specifically addresses Plaintiff's complaints regarding his headaches.
The ALJ closely and affirmatively linked his credibility finding to substantial evidence. Therefore, this Court rejects Plaintiff's argument challenging that finding.
5. RFC Finding
Fifth, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's RFC finding that Plaintiff possessed the RFC to perform a significant range of light work. Plaintiff argues that this finding is not supported by substantial evidence. In making this claim, Plaintiff relies on his previous arguments in asserting that the ALJ failed to link his RFC finding to specific evidence in the record. The Court has reviewed the record and found this argument lacks merit. Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, the ALJ carefully examined the evidence in the record and explained his RFC findings through his thorough evaluation of the evidence and proper credibility analysis. See Howard v. Barnhart, No. 03-7094, slip op. at 3-5 (10th Cir. June 2, 2004). The Court therefore rejects Plaintiff's argument.6. DOT Descriptions
The vocational expert (hereafter referred to as "VE") testified, based on a hypothetical question presented by the ALJ, that someone possessing Plaintiff's abilities could perform the jobs of telephone quotation clerk, charge-account clerk, and surveillance-system monitor. Plaintiff argues in his reply memorandum that the ALJ's RFC determination is inconsistent with the requirements of these three jobs as they are defined by the Department of Labor. Because of that inconsistency, Plaintiff argues, the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff can perform a significant number of jobs that exist in the national economy is not supported by substantial evidence.
The Court has carefully reviewed the descriptions of the jobs provided by Plaintiff as an addendum to his reply brief, as well as the RFC determination made by the ALJ. Having reviewed this information, the Court concludes that a conflict does not exist between the descriptions of the jobs listed by the VE and the RFC determination made by the ALJ. Although certain versions of the jobs listed would be incompatible with the ALJ's RFC determination, the VE accounted for such inconsistencies by reducing those jobs by a certain percentage. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's reliance on the VE's testimony and substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that a substantial number of jobs exist in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Court rejects the Plaintiff's arguments and finds that the ALJ's decision that Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence. As a result, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS that Plaintiff's request for reversal be DENIED and that the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED.