Opinion
C.A. No: 98L-10-025.
Submitted: July 21, 2006.
Decided: July 25, 2006.
Upon Consideration of Ingrams' Motion for Re-Argument DENIED.
Stephen P. Doughty, Esq., Wilmington, Delaware, attorney for Lasalle National Bank. William P. Ingram, pro se.
OPINION
Defendants, William P. Ingram and Margaret Anne Ingram, make a timely request for reargument of the Court's decision, dated May 16, 2006, which granted the motions to dismiss and for summary judgment of Plaintiff, LaSalle National Bank. Defendants complain that the Court's decision contains numerous factual errors. LaSalle did not make a substantive response to Defendant's motion but relies on the factual and legal arguments set forth in the Court's decision. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is DENIED.
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(e).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 30, 1997, the Ingrams obtained a loan for $588,000 from American Investment Mortgage Inc. ("American Investment"), which was secured by a mortgage on property located at 272 Troon Drive, Dover, Delaware. On January 14, 1998, the mortgage was assigned to Alliance Funding Company, a division of Superior Bank FSB. Subsequently, the mortgage was assigned to LaSalle National Bank. LaSalle initiated the mortgage foreclosure action on October 27, 1998.The Ingrams asserted that LaSalle breached the mortgage agreement, inter alia, by failing to provide 30-days notice before accelerating the loan, as required by paragraph 21 of the mortgage agreement. In addition, the Ingrams claimed that American Investment breached an oral agreement to lend them $2.2 million, which American Investment purportedly knew the Ingrams needed to service the $588,000 mortgage. The Ingrams claimed that American Investment was aware that the Ingrams obtained the $588,000 mortgage to fund Stoney Creek, a real estate development project, and they would require additional funding to make payments on the mortgage. To that end, an agent of American Investment allegedly represented that he would arrange two additional loans for the Ingrams through American Investment/Bank West and Eastern Savings Bank, which never materialized. The Ingrams blamed their failure to make the mortgage payments on American Investment's breach of its oral agreement to secure the additional loans.
In the scire facias sur mortgage action, the Ingrams asserted counterclaims against LaSalle for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and RICO violations related to the oral agreement to secure additional funding. On May 19, 2005, this Court dismissed the Ingrams' counterclaims pertaining to the oral agreement from the scire facias sur mortgage action. However, the Ingrams revived those claims by filing the second lawsuit. The Ingrams' lawsuit was consolidated with the scire facias sur mortgage action on November 4, 2005.
Although the oral agreement for the additional loans was allegedly made by American Investment, the Ingrams did not name American Investment as a party in the second action. The Ingrams filed suit against LaSalle, reasoning that LaSalle, American Investment Mortgage and Superior Bank were under control of the same principal owners. On July 27, 2001, Superior Bank of Hinsdale, Illinois was closed by the United State Treasury's Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was named Receiver.
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/superior.html (Last viewed on April 12, 2006).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The purpose of a motion for reargument is to request that the Trial Court reconsider its findings of fact, conclusions of law, or judgment in order to correct errors prior to appeal. A motion for reargument should not rehash the arguments already decided by the Court. Moreover, a motion for reargument is not a "`device for raising new arguments or stringing out the length of time for making an argument.'" Generally, reargument will be denied unless movant can demonstrate that the Trial Court "`overlooked a precedent or legal principle that would have controlling effect, or that it has misapprehended the law or the facts such as would affect the outcome of the decision.'"DISCUSSION
Defendants' cite numerous facts that they claim this Court misapprehended in the May 16, 2006 decision. The majority of the Defendants' arguments merely rehash those made in response to LaSalle's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment. Without analyzing the laundry list of those alleged factual discrepancies, which are not appropriate for reconsideration under Rule 59(e), the only facts that this memo addresses are those that, if incorrect, may affect the outcome of the decision.The Court's decision granted LaSalle's Motion for Summary Judgment for Defendants' failure to join American Investment and Superior Bank as indispensable parties. Defendants do not dispute that American Investment, the entity that originated the mortgage at issue, was not joined as a party in this matter. However, Defendants claim that American Investment has been a "defunct company" since 2000, and has no assets. Defendants further attempt to bypass this problem by making the unsupported statement that they believe the actual funds ($588,000) came from Superior Bank/LaSalle. Defendants complain that their inability to engage in meaningful discovery in this matter has thwarted their efforts to prove the latter point.
Defendants argument is not persuasive. In the first instance, this litigation was initiated in 1998, before the date in which Defendants claim that American Investment went out of business. Further Defendants' logic for not naming American Investment does not comport with their reason for naming LaSalle in their counterclaims for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and RICO violations. If Defendants believed that American Investment was defunct, they could have determined what entity, if any, such as the FDIC, acted as receivor or trustee for American Investment. Accordingly, Defendants' argument does not cure the Defendants' failure to join American Investment.
Defendants also argue that LaSalle, in its role as trustee for Superior Bank, had the authority to litigate matters on behalf of Superior Bank. Presumably, Defendants believe that the Court was incorrect in finding that they should have made a claim with the FDIC, which was acting as receivor for Superior Bank, or, in the alternative, file a lawsuit in the appropriate federal court. In support, Defendants attach the Limited Power of Attorney, dated June 4, 2002, which grants EMC Mortgage Corporation the power to act on behalf of LaSalle in connection those mortgage loans in which LaSalle acts as the trustee under certain Pooling and Servicing Agreements. The Limited Power of Attorney grants EMC the ability respond to potential litigation on behalf of the Trust. This exhibit does not support Defendants' claim that LaSalle could litigate matters for Superior Bank. Nor does it negate the Court's finding that Superior Bank was an indispensable party.
Finally, Defendants argue that the Court erred in determining that the statute of limitation had expired for bringing a claim against American Investment for RICO violations. Defendants argue that their RICO cause of action is still viable, because the statute of limitations under the federal RICO Act is ten (10) years. Defendants' statement of the law is incorrect. Civil actions under RICO are subject to a four (4) year statute of limitations. The addition of a year to the statute of limitations does not help Defendants' case, since eight years have passed since American Investment allegedly broke its promise. Accordingly, the Court's determination that American Investment was an indispensable party that could not be joined was not in error.
In re Merrill Lynch Ltd. Partnerships Litigation, 7 F.Supp.2d 256, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ( citing Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987)).
Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Reargument is DENIED.