Opinion
CL 2019-4116
07-01-2019
Re: Sarah N. Laryea v. INOVA Health System & Virginia Employment Commission
Matthew T. Sutter Sutter & Terpak, PLLC 7540A Little River Turnpike Annandale, VA 22003 Elizabeth B. Peay Senior Assistant Attorney General 202 N. Ninth Street Richmond, VA 23219 Lauren Frederickson Randall Blankenship & Keith, P.C. 4020 University Drive, Suite 300 Fairfax, VA 22030
OPINION LETTER
BRUCE D. WHITE, CHIEF JUDGE RANDY I. BELLOWS ROBERT J. SMITH BRETT A. KASSABIAN MICHAEL F. DEVINE JOHN M. TRAN GRACE BURKE CARROLL DANIEL E. ORTIZ PENNEY S. AZCARATE STEPHEN C. SHANNON THOMAS P. MANN RICHARD E. GARDINER DAVID BERNHARD DAVID A. OBLON DONTAÈ L. BUGG JUDGES THOMAS A. FORTKORT J. HOWE BROWN F. BRUCE BACH M. LANGHORNE KEITH ARTHUR B. VIEREGG KATHLEEN H. MACKAY ROBERT W. WOOLDRIDGE, JR. MICHAEL P. McWEENY GAYLORD L. FINCH, JR. STANLEY P. KLEIN LESLIE M. ALDEN MARCUS D. WILLIAMS JONATHAN C. THACHER CHARLES J. MAXFIELD DENNIS J. SMITH LORRAINE NORDLUND DAVID S. SCHELL JAN L. BRODIE RETIRED JUDGES Matthew T. Sutter
Sutter & Terpak, PLLC
7540A Little River Turnpike
Annandale, VA 22003 Elizabeth B. Peay
Senior Assistant Attorney General
202 N. Ninth Street
Richmond, VA 23219 Lauren Frederickson Randall
Blankenship & Keith, P.C.
4020 University Drive, Suite 300
Fairfax, VA 22030 Dear Mr. Sutter, Ms. Peay, and Ms. Randall:
This matter came before the court on June 10, 2019 for argument on Petitioner's petition to overrule the determination of the Virginia Employment Commission ("Commission") that Petitioner was ineligible for unemployment compensation, or, in the alternative, to remand the matter to the Commission for further proceedings. For the reasons that follow, the court remands the matter to the Commission for further proceedings.
Factual Background
The Commission found the following:
[Petitioner] was employed [by INOVA Health System ("INOVA")] as a laboratory technical assistant I, from June 2, 2014 to January 29, 2018. She was assigned to the Central Processing Department of INOVA Laboratories in August of 2016 and attended training in September and
October 2016 on departmental procedures and policies. . . .Decision of Commission at 2.
While assigned to Central Processing, Petitioner registered patient blood and tissue specimens collected at network hospitals and clinics. Starting in May of 2017, she switched some patients' first and last names during the registration process and was given a documented verbal warning in July 2017. She repeated this offense several times over the next month or so and was issued a written warning on September 1, 2017.
[Petitioner] switched 3 patients' first and last names during the next two weeks, prompting her receipt of a final warning on October 16, 2017. She transposed a patient's first and last names while registering a biopsy specimen on January 19, 2018. For her ongoing patient identification errors after several warnings, Petitioner was discharged on January 29, 2018.
The Commission also found that INOVA:
expects its employees to perform their duties in an accurate manner, especially with patient identification. Its Progressive Discipline Policy divides unacceptable conduct into groups based on severity. Misidentifying a patient is a Group I offense, which if repeated, subjects the offending employee to progressive discipline leading to discharge. The claimant was made aware of these expectations and rules at the time of hire.Decision of Commission at 2.
The Commission heard no evidence, and thus made no findings of fact, about the number of blood and tissue specimens Petitioner registered from the time she began working at the Central Processing Department in 2016 until May of 2017, and from May of 2017 until she was terminated on January 29, 2018, nor did the Commission hear any evidence, and thus did not make findings of fact, about the complexity and time requirements of the registration process.
The Commission's Conclusions
In light of the facts recited above, the Commission concluded that Petitioner:
violated a policy regarding the accurate recording of patient information, which is reasonably designed to protect its legitimate interests in ensuring proper patient identification, patient confidentiality and safety. . . .
Despite being issued a number of warnings, she continued to switch patients' first and last names during the registration process.
Although the claimant was confused with names that could be given or family names (i.e. Bailey or Taylor), she had merely to enter these names in the same order in which they were presented to her, which negates the impact of her professed unfamiliarity with the English language. . . . Thus, the employer has established a prima facie
case of misconduct, shifting the burden to the claimant to present mitigating circumstances for her conduct.Decision of Commission at 4-5.
Finally, the Commission found that Petitioner "has not offered sufficient evidence of mitigating circumstances or adequate justification for her conduct." Decision of Commission at 6.
Scope of Review
In reviewing a decision of the Commission, the "sole determination as to factual issues" is:
whether substantial evidence exists in the agency record to support the agency's decision. The reviewing court may reject the agency's findings of fact only if, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable mind would necessarily come to a different conclusion.Johnston-Willis v. Kenley, 6 Va. App. 231, 242 (1988).
The court finds that the Commission's factual findings, as far as they go, are supported by "substantial evidence exist[ing] in the agency record . . . ."
Analysis
Code § 60.2-618(2) provides in pertinent part that an employee is "disqualified for benefits . . . if the Commission finds such individual is unemployed because he has been discharged for misconduct connected with his work." In Branch v. Employment Comm., 219 Va. 609 (1978), the Supreme Court, for the first time, construed the phrase "misconduct connected with his work," holding that an employee is guilty of "misconduct connected with his work" when:
he deliberately violates a company rule reasonably designed to protect the legitimate business interests of his employer, or when his acts or omissions are of such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest a willful disregard of those interests and the duties and obligations he owes his employer. (Citation omitted). Absent circumstances in mitigation such conduct, the employee is "disqualified for benefits" and the burden of proving mitigating circumstances rests upon the employee.219 Va. at 611-612 (emphasis in original).
Although the Commission did not expressly state that Petitioner's acts or omissions were of "such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest a willful disregard" of the employer's interests and the duties and obligations, the Commission also does not appear to have concluded that Petitioner's acts or omissions were "deliberate." Accordingly, the court concludes that the Commission based its conclusions solely on a finding that Petitioner's acts or omissions were of such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest a willful disregard of the employer's interests and the duties and obligations; the court's analysis will thus focus only on the willful disregard prong of Branch.
Following Branch, the Court of Appeals, in Va. Employment Commission v. Sutphin, 8 Va. App. 325 (1989), adopted the holding of Schappe v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 38 Pa. Comwlth. 249, 392 A.2d 353 (1978), that "misconduct" involves "'manifest culpability, wrongful intent, evil design, or intentional and substantial disregard for the employee's interests. . . .'" 8 Va. App. at 329 (citing 38 Pa. Comwlth. at 253, 392 A.2d at 355-56).
Five years later, in Borbas v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 17 Va. App. 720, 440 S.E.2d 630 (1994), the Court of Appeals recognized that an employee's "behavior which is involuntary, unintentional or the product of simple negligence does not rise to the level necessary to justify a denial of unemployment benefits." 17 Va. App. at 722. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded:
Virginia Employment Commission v. Gantt, 7 Va. App. 631 (1989), is inapposite to the case at bar because the issue was whether the circuit court erred in finding that the rule that was violated by the employee "was reasonably designed to protect a legitimate business interest." 7 Va. App. at 636. There was no dispute that "the employer established a deliberate violation of a company rule . . . ." Id. By contrast, in the case at bar, there is no dispute that the rule which was violated was reasonably designed to protect a legitimate business interest.
[T]here was simply no evidence that appellant's acts were volitional, and none of the reprimands involved the same behavior. Although all three incidents involved breaches of prison security, appellant violated three otherwise unrelated procedures. Finally, the record contains no evidence that appellant ever demonstrated an ability to perform her job satisfactorily.17 Va. App. at 723.
In Whitt v. Ervin B. Davis & Co., Inc., 20 Va. App. 432 (1995), the Court of Appeals, applying Branch, and considering the claimant's prior satisfactory performance of identical duties and the provision of counseling and warnings received from employer, held:
[T]he nature of claimant's lapses in satisfactory performance, combined with their frequency, supports the VEC's determination that the decline in her job performance was the result of a willful disregard of the interests of her employer and, thus, constituted misconduct connected with her employment.20 Va. App. at 437-438.
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals did not articulate the specific instances, or numerical frequency of, the claimant's lapses in satisfactory performance, stating only that the claimant:
repeatedly made similar errors when performing routine duties, which she had previously accomplished without error. Claimant was repeatedly counseled about her job performance during this period.
Three months prior to her termination, claimant was advised that her continued employment was contingent upon improvement in her job
performance. Claimant's work product continued to be unsatisfactory. On August 20, 1992, claimant's supervisor gave her written instructions concerning a specific assignment to be performed. Claimant completed the assignment later that day and her work product was checked by the supervisor. The supervisor discovered that claimant had not followed the instructions she had been given.20 Va. App. at 435 (emphasis added).
In a case outside of the employment context, the Virginia Supreme Court, in Osman v. Osman, 285 Va. 384 (2013), cited with approval the discussion in the United States Supreme Court case of Safeco Ins. Co. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007) of the "differences between the term 'willful' in a criminal context versus a civil one" (285 Va. at 391):
[W]here willfulness is a statutory condition of civil liability, we have generally taken it to cover not only knowing violations of a standard, but reckless ones as well. (Citations omitted). This construction reflects common law usage, which treated actions in "reckless disregard" of the law as "willful" violations.551 U.S. at 57.
In another case outside the employment context, Pilli v. Virginia State Bar, 269 Va. 391 (2005), the Court equated "reckless disregard" with "utter indifference . . ." 269 Va. at 397. See also Griffin v. Shively, 227 Va. 317, 321 (1984) ("Willful and wanton negligence is . . . acting with reckless indifference to the consequences").
While not an oft-quoted legal authority, reckless disregard is probably best described as the attitude expressed by Rhett Butler toward Scarlett O'Hara in the 1939 film classic Gone With The Wind: "Frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn."
Accordingly, while trial courts know that they must determine if there is substantial evidence in the agency record to support the agency's decision that the employee's acts or omissions were of such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest a willful disregard of the employer's interests and the duties and obligations, trial courts have been given no guidance, other than errors must be "repeated" (Whitt, 20 Va. App. at 435), on what specific set of facts rise to the level of "willful" or "reckless" disregard, or "utter indifference" or "reckless indifference" (although we know that "willful" disregard does not include simple negligence).
Given that the applicable standard for "willful" disregard requires a showing of utter or reckless indifference, it was impossible for the Commission, as a matter of law, to determine whether Petitioner acted with such indifference without knowing the context of her actions. That is, did her errors constitute a significant percentage of the registrations she processed so as to manifest an utter indifference to her task, or did they constitute such a minuscule percentage of such registrations that there was no such manifestation? And was the registration process so difficult, or the time pressure so severe, that errors had to be expected, or was the process so simple, and the time pressure so moderate, that errors were possible only a result of indifference? Without this information, the Commission (and the court upon review) could not have reached any meaningful legal conclusions.
As a result of the absence of material information, the court, pursuant to Jones v. Willard, 224 Va. 602 (1983), will remand the matter to the Commission to take further evidence and to make additional findings concerning the number of blood and tissue specimens Petitioner registered from the time she began working at the Central Processing Department in 2016 until May of 2017, and from May of 2017 until she was terminated on January 29, 2018, the complexity and time requirements of the registration process, and any other facts which would demonstrate Petitioner's indifference (or lack thereof) to her duties.
"Code § [60.2-625] does not expressly empower a reviewing court to remand a cause to the Commission. But, absent a specific mandate to the contrary, a statutory grant of appellate jurisdiction necessarily implies such a power." 224 Va. at 606-607. --------
An appropriate order will enter.
Sincerely yours,
[Redacted]
Richard E. Gardiner
Judge
VIRGINIA
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
SARAH N. LARYEA Petitioner v. INOVA HEALTH VIRGINIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION Respondents
ORDER
THIS MATTER came before the court on Petitioner's petition to overrule the determination of the Virginia Employment Commission ("Commission") that Petitioner was ineligible for unemployment compensation, or, in the alternative, to remand the matter to the Commission for further proceedings.
THE COURT, for the reasons set forth in the court's letter opinion of today's date, hereby remands the matter to the Commission for further proceedings.
ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2019.
[Redacted]
Richard E. Gardiner
Judge
ENDORSEMENT OF THIS ORDER BY COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR
THE PARTIES IS WAIVED IN THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT
PURSUANT TO RULE 1:13 OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
Copies to: Matthew T. Sutter Counsel for Petitioner Elizabeth B. Peay Lauren Frederickson Randall Counsel for Respondents