Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-10338.
February 3, 2010.
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Palmer, Gregory Heath, Judge. Trial Court No. 3PA-08-605 Cr.
Alexandra G. Foote-Jones, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Trina Sears, Assistant District Attorney, and Roman J. Kalytiak, District Attorney, Palmer, and Daniel S. Sullivan, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Bolger, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Arthur Larue appeals the 1-year sentence of imprisonment that he received for the crime of fourth-degree assault. According to the facts found at the sentencing hearing by District Court Judge Gregory Heath, Larue intentionally slammed a door against a two-year-old child, knocking the child to the ground. Larue not only planned the assault, but he also set up a video camera to capture the assault, and the resulting video of the crime was available to Judge Heath. Judge Heath stated:
AS 11.41.230(a)(1).
The Court: [This was] an assault on an innocent little boy. [It was] premeditated [and] just cruel. It was just a cruel thing to see. It was — and it was very disturbing to be honest with you. Just watching that video was very, very disturbing. It wasn't accidental. . . . I don't know if [Larue was] trying to cover up for something else, or [if he] got some weird kick out of doing it. But we have a [victim who] was . . . particularly vulnerable and [who was] subject[ed] to intense cruelty.
Judge Heath found that Larue's conduct was among the worst within the definition of fourth-degree assault, and he sentenced Larue to the maximum penalty for this offense: 1 year in prison.
See AS 11.41.230(b) (declaring that fourth-degree assault is a class A misdemeanor) and AS 12.55.135(a) (specifying a maximum sentence of 1 year's imprisonment for class A misdemeanors).
Larue contends that this sentence is excessive. We have reviewed the record, and we conclude that it supports Judge Heath's characterization of Larue's conduct as among the worst within the definition of fourth-degree assault. In particular, the record supports Judge Heath's findings that the victim was particularly vulnerable, that the assault was premeditated, and that Larue's conduct was deliberately cruel.
However, one aspect of Judge Heath's sentencing decision gives us pause. In his sentencing remarks, Judge Heath specifically found that Larue's criminal conduct likely stemmed from Larue's substance abuse:
The Court: All I can . . . infer from the facts presented to me [is] that there was some sort of bizarre drug-induced thinking . . . going on.
. . .
Why is [Larue] doing this . . . premeditated [and] sadistic conduct . . . to this boy[?]. . . . I'm finding, . . . based on the circumstances presented to me, that it was most likely caused by . . . the drugs that were being used in the home.
. . .
They're obviously using [drugs] at the same time that this occurred, because it's on [the] video. They're obviously selling it. So I can infer from those facts that there's a lot going on in that home, and drugs make people do very different things.
(Emphasis added)
Larue was a first offender. If, indeed, Larue's criminal behavior stemmed from his drug abuse, then it is conceivable that substance abuse treatment may provide the key to his rehabilitation. But even though Judge Heath found that Larue's criminal conduct was "most likely" caused by his drug use, nowhere in Judge Heath's sentencing remarks did he consider the possibility that Larue might be rehabilitated with appropriate treatment.
Rehabilitation of the offender is one of the sentencing goals originally adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court in State v. Chaney, and now codified in AS 12.55.005. We acknowledge that, under Alaska law, decisions regarding the weight or emphasis to be given the various Chaney criteria in a particular case are primarily entrusted to the discretion of the sentencing judge. But given Judge Heath's express finding regarding the likely cause of Larue's criminal behavior, we conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for Judge Heath to fail to address the goal of rehabilitation in his sentencing remarks.
477 P.2d 441, 443 (Alaska 1970).
McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813 (Alaska 1974); Asitonia v. State, 508 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Alaska 1973); Leavitt v. State, 806 P.2d 342, 345 (Alaska App. 1991).
We express no opinion on the question of whether Judge Heath might properly again sentence Larue to serve 1 year in prison after the judge affirmatively considers the possibility of rehabilitative treatment.
The sentencing decision of the district court is VACATED, and the district court is directed to reconsider Larue's sentence in light of this opinion.