Larson v. State and Dept. of Revenue

29 Citing cases

  1. Powder River County v. State

    312 Mont. 198 (Mont. 2002)   Cited 34 times
    Discussing Roosevelt

    ¶ 81 Notwithstanding the limitations in their analysis, we will address the Appellants' concerns. The Appellants first direct this Court to Larson v. State (1975), 166 Mont. 449, 534 P.2d 854, for the proposition that the mere exclusion of the extractive minerals from this state's statutory classification system is, by itself, a violation of the Appellants' equal protection and due process rights. In Larson, the state attempted to tax property in Lewis and Clark County via an appraisal plan not applied to any other county in the state, resulting in higher assessed property values compared to similarly situated property in neighboring counties.

  2. City of Great Falls v. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local #8

    2024 MT 302 (Mont. 2024)

    nicipal land use restriction which included the asserted administrative variance remedy was facially unconstitutional); Jarussi v. Board of Trustees, 204 Mont. 131, 134-36, 664 P.2d 316, 317-18 (1983) (common law exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine not applicable to independent statutory claim for invalidation of school board acts in violation of open meeting law and Mont. Const. art. II, § 9 (right to observe public body deliberations), where invalidation claim independently provided by statute without administrative remedy); Keller v. Dep't of Revenue, 182 Mont. 478, 481-84, 597 P.2d 736, 738-40 (1979) (exhaustion of state tax appeal board process for review of accuracy of property tax assessment valuations not required as condition precedent for independent action for declaratory relief regarding pure question of law as to whether state erroneously failed to apply statutory property tax benefit triggered by local taxing entity action to which taxpayers were not parties); Larson v. State, 166 Mont. 449, 456-57, 534 P.2d 854, 858 (1975) (exhaustion of county tax appeal board process for review of accuracy of property tax assessment valuations not required as condition precedent to independent action for declaratory relief regarding pure question of law challenge to constitutionality of statewide property tax appraisal methodology). ¶17 As a preliminary matter, the express exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement of § 2-4-702(1)(a), MCA, "applies equally to the ultimate case decision, constituent or related issues adjudicated therein or thereby, as well as any other related issue that could have been timely raised and adjudicated by the agency pursuant to the available administrative process

  3. K & J Invs. v. Flathead Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs

    402 Mont. 33 (Mont. 2020)   Cited 4 times

    ¶14 The statute's plain language and context thus make clear that the administrative pathway for property assessment, reassessment, and assessment appeals generally is a person's exclusive remedy for alleged excessive or erroneous assessments. See Keller v. Dep't of Revenue , 182 Mont. 478, 484, 597 P.2d 736, 739-40 (1979) (citing Larson v. State , 166 Mont. 449, 456-57, 534 P.2d 854, 858 (1975) ); Dep't of Revenue v. Countryside Vill. , 205 Mont. 51, 64-66, 667 P.2d 936, 942-43 (1983). Although we have recognized limited exceptions where fraud or the adoption of a "fundamentally wrong principle of assessment" is shown, those exceptions do not apply where, as here, "the principal thrust of the complaint is aimed at the amount of valuation and not the method of valuation."

  4. Montana Dept. of Revenue v. Barron

    245 Mont. 100 (Mont. 1990)   Cited 11 times
    In Barron, without conducting a traditional equal protection analysis, this Court held that the stratified sales assessment ratio violated equal protection because the statute required some taxpayers to "bear a disproportionate share of Montana’s tax burden."

    Patterson, 557 P.2d at 803. In Larson v. State and DOR of Revenue (1975), 166 Mont. 449, 534 P.2d 854, we had a case where the DOR had assumed its new responsibilities under the 1973 legislative acts for statewide appraisal, but the DOR had determined to use a county-financed appraisal (called the Laird appraisal) for 1974 Lewis and Clark County assessments. The District Court had found that the real estate appraisals under the Laird procedure were not conducted as a part of a uniform plan for appraisal within the state of Montana, and that the appraisals were not equalized with other counties in the state.

  5. Devoe v. Missoula County

    226 Mont. 372 (Mont. 1987)   Cited 7 times

    Appellant did not comply with the Section 15-1-402, MCA, statutory conditions for bringing suit and, therefore, the motion to dismiss was properly granted. Appellant, citing Larson v. State (1975), 166 Mont. 449, 534 P.2d 854, argues that his complaint comes within an exception to the exhaustion of remedies rule. Addressing the exhaustion of administrative remedies in a tax appeal case, the Larson court quoted Belknap Realty Co. v. Simineo (1923), 67 Mont. 359, 365, 215 P. 659, 662:

  6. Department of Revenue v. State Tax Appeal Board

    613 P.2d 691 (Mont. 1980)   Cited 10 times

    Section 15-6-134, MCA. The constitutional and statutory requirements for equalization or uniformity within a legislative classification cannot be questioned. See Article VIII, Sections 3 and 7, 1972 Montana Constitution; section 15-7-103(1), MCA; section 15-9-101(1), MCA; Larson v. State and Dept. of Revenue (1975), 166 Mont. 449, 454-455, 534 P.2d 854, 857; State ex rel. Schultz-Lindsay Constr. Co. v. Board of Equalization (1965), 145 Mont. 380, 393, 403 P.2d 635, 641-642. Failure to adhere to the uniformity rule also offends due process and equal protection principles.

  7. Keller, Selstad v. Dept. of Revenue

    182 Mont. 478 (Mont. 1979)   Cited 6 times

    The second applies to this issue. In Larson v. State (1975), 166 Mont. 449, 534 P.2d 854, the Court held that a plaintiff need not exhaust administrative remedies before the Tax Appeal Board if the question to be determined involved an allegation that the Department of Revenue had used a "fundamentally wrong principle" of appraisal: "The statutes having made ample provision whereby a taxpayer may have any alleged excessive or erroneous assessment or valuation of his property reviewed by the county and state board of equalization, this remedy is exclusive except in cases where fraud or the adoption of a fundamentally wrong principle of assessment is shown.' (Emphasis supplied.)

  8. Shoemaker v. Denke

    319 Mont. 238 (Mont. 2004)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that pure legal question exception not applicable where aggrieved party challenged both findings of fact and questions of law

    ¶ 21 Shoemaker argues that this exception to the exhaustion doctrine applies to his case because he has raised an issue of constitutional dimension. In further support of this assertion, Shoemaker cites this Court's decisions in Belknap Realty Co. v. Simineo (1923), 67 Mont. 359, 215 P. 659; Larson v. State (1975), 166 Mont. 449, 534 P.2d 854; Jarussi; and Mitchell. In Belknap, a Montana corporation brought an action in district court against the Yellowstone County Treasurer for taxes paid that the plaintiff alleged were improperly assessed.

  9. Rocky Mount. Oil v. Bd. of Equalization

    749 P.2d 221 (Wyo. 1988)   Cited 32 times
    In Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Bd. of Equalization, 749 P.2d 221 (Wyo. 1987), we held unconstitutional the statutory provisions adopted for taxing real property.

    The decision of this court is based on an adequate and independent state ground and any reference to federal law is for illustrative purposes only and in no way compels the result obtained. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), Stevens, J., dissenting; Montana v. Jackson, 460 U.S. 1030, 103 S.Ct. 1418, 75 L.Ed.2d 782 (1983), and see same case after remand, State v. Jackson, 206 Mont. 338, 672 P.2d 255 (1983); Larson v. State, 166 Mont. 449, 534 P.2d 854 (1975); State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983); Comment, Ohio v. Johnson: The Continuing Demise of the Adequate and Independent State Ground Rule, 57 U.Colo.L.Rev. 395 (1986); Shapiro, State Constitutional Doctrine and the Criminal Process, 16 Seton Hall L.Rev. 630 (1986). See also Utter and Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 Ind.L.Rev. 635 (1987); Judge Richard Arnold, The Relationship of State and Federal Courts in Our Constitutional System, N.Y.U. Institute of Judicial Administration; Baker, The Ambiguous Independent and Adequate State Ground in Criminal Cases: Federalism Along a Mobius Strip, 19 Geo.L.Rev. 799 (1985).

  10. Evans Products Co. v. Missoula County

    654 P.2d 523 (Mont. 1982)   Cited 6 times
    In Evans Products Co. v. Missoula County (Mont. 1982), [ 201 Mont. 337,] 654 P.2d 523, 39 St.Rep. 2149, this Court applied Section 15-8-601(1), MCA, to an erroneous assessment.

    The bulk of authority and prior Montana case law suggest that appraisal, the setting of market value, is an integral part of the taxation process. Am.Jur.2d State and Local Taxation, Section 704; and Larson v. State (1975), 166 Mont. 449, 534 P.2d 854. In Larson, we stated that the suggested distinction between the statutory use of the word "tax" and the operative fact of an "appraisal" was without substance because the appraisal would have been used as the basis for the tax computation.