Opinion
Supreme Court No. S-12092.
July 5, 2006
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Dan A. Hensley, Judge. Superior Court No. 3AN-04-07909.
Loren J. Larson, Jr., pro se, Florence, Arizona, Appellant.
John K. Bodick, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and David W. Márquez, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews, Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Entered pursuant to Appellate Rule 214.
I. INTRODUCTION
Loren Larson, a prisoner currently serving a lengthy sentence at a correctional facility in Arizona, was twice classified by the Department of Corrections (DOC) for transfer from Seward to Arizona — once in 2003 and once in 2005. This appeal concerns his original 2003 out-of-state transfer classification. Larson filed an administrative appeal with the superior court to challenge his 2003 transfer decision as a violation of his constitutional right to rehabilitation. Due to a procedural error and logistical problems with transcribing a recording of his 2003 hearing, the appeal process continued through 2005. Between 2003 and 2005, Larson's 2003 transfer to Arizona was cancelled. In 2005 a new out-of-state transfer decision was made, and this 2005 transfer decision resulted in Larson's ultimate transfer to Arizona. The State moved to dismiss Larson's administrative appeal of his 2003 transfer decision on the ground that it was moot because it was superseded by the 2005 transfer decision. The superior court agreed and dismissed the appeal. Larson appeals the dismissal, contending that the 2005 transfer decision merely repeated the violation of his constitutional rights made during the 2003 transfer classification. He also argues that his appeal should be heard under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.
We agree with the superior court that Larson's appeal of his 2003 transfer decision is moot. Because we do not believe that the issues raised by Larson will repeatedly evade review, we also decline to reverse the dismissal of his appeal of the 2003 transfer decision under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. But because, as DOC concedes, the constitutional issues raised by Larson in his 2003 appeal are the same as any issues he might have raised in an appeal of his 2005 transfer decision, we apply the doctrine of equitable tolling and remand to the superior court for an evaluation of Larson's 2005 transfer decision as a timely administrative appeal.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Loren Larson is currently serving a sentence for murder and burglary and is not scheduled to be released until 2129. Larson was serving his sentence at the Spring Creek Correctional Center in Seward but has been transferred to the Florence Correctional Center in Arizona. Larson was transferred to Arizona following DOC's denial of his internal appeal of a 2005 out-of-state transfer classification.
But Larson was first classified for transfer to the Arizona Correctional Center in 2003. Larson appealed this classification on November 29, 2003, asking that the classification decision be overturned because transfer to Arizona would devastate his family. Larson is married with three children who live in Fairbanks and they visited him monthly when he was serving his sentence in Seward.
Larson's internal appeal was rejected in 2003. The deputy commissioner told Larson that his family situation was similar to that of other prisoners. He informed Larson:
One aspect of family visitation that the department considers very important is the potential of these visits in helping a prisoner to transition back into society. Given the probability that you will spend the rest of your life in prison, the prospect of these visits contributing to your rehabilitation are extremely limited. Therefore, you are an ideal candidate for transfer to our contract facility.
The letter informed Larson that he had appealed to the highest administrative level within DOC and that he had thirty days to appeal to the superior court.
Larson filed a civil complaint in the superior court alleging that the transfer to Arizona was a violation of his constitutional right to rehabilitation. He requested a declaratory judgment that his right to rehabilitation was violated when he had shown that his strong family ties would be broken by the transfer and requested an injunction that would inform DOC that it could not transfer inmates out of state if the inmates could demonstrate strong family ties that would be broken by the transfer.
DOC filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that Larson was required to challenge DOC's decision to transfer him in the form of an administrative appeal. On May 19, 2004, Superior Court Judge Morgan Christen granted DOC's motion to dismiss, noting that Larson "must pursue his request for relief from the decision to transfer him to Arizona in an administrative appeal." Following the dismissal, Larson filed a motion to accept a late-filed notice of appeal in June 2004 to challenge the transfer decision as an administrative appeal, which was apparently granted. Due to alleged problems with the cassette recording of Larson's classification hearing, Larson requested multiple extensions of time to transcribe the recording, which extended the appeal process through 2005.
During this time, it appears that Larson's transfer to Arizona was cancelled allegedly due to pending litigation in another matter. Larson was subsequently reclassified for out-of-state transfer in 2005, and he again filed an internal appeal. In a letter dated July 20, 2005, DOC denied Larson's appeal of his 2005 classification, informing Larson:
The vast majority of prisoners housed in Arizona are also separated from their families with whom they share a close bond. In addition to visiting privileges at the facility in Arizona, you will have access to the telephone and mail service. With on-going overcrowding in the State of Alaska we must continue to send offenders outside the state for housing.
The letter noted that the transfer to Arizona would not substantially impair Larson's access to rehabilitation or treatment. Larson was informed that the denial of his appeal was a final agency decision and he would have thirty days to appeal the decision to the superior court.
Following the 2005 transfer decision, the State moved to dismiss Larson's appeal of his 2003 transfer decision. On September 9, 2005, Superior Court Judge Dan A. Hensley dismissed Larson's 2003 appeal on mootness grounds because his reclassification had been superseded by the 2005 administrative transfer decision.
Larson appeals. Larson argues that the 2005 transfer decision was a violation of his constitutional rights because it repeated the violation of his rights during the 2003 classification. He asks that the court order a classification that would remedy the constitutional violations alleged with respect to the 2003 transfer decision. He further argues that his case should be considered under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.
Larson claims that he did not appeal the 2005 transfer decision because the appeal of the 2003 transfer decision was already pending in the superior court and he was under the impression that the very issues that he would raise through the 2005 appeal were already before the superior court.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review decisions granting or denying motions to dismiss de novo. We review issues of mootness using our independent judgment because, as a matter of judicial policy, they are questions of law.
Varilek v. City of Houston, 104 P.3d 849, 851 (Alaska 2004).
Ulmer v. Alaska Restaurant Beverage Ass'n, 33 P.3d 773, 776 (Alaska 2001).
B. Larson's Appeal of His 2003 Transfer Decision Is Moot.
We will not ordinarily "decide questions of law where the facts render the legal issues moot." A case is moot if the party bringing the action would not be entitled to any relief even if he prevailed. Larson acknowledges that the only relief he would be entitled to if he were to prevail in his challenge to the 2003 transfer decision would be a new out-of-state transfer classification, which he already received in 2005. He argues, though, that he is entitled to a new out-of-state transfer classification that addresses the constitutional violations of his 2003 transfer decision. He claims that the 2005 classification merely repeats the constitutional violations committed during his 2003 transfer classification, and does not remedy them.
Taylor v. Gill St. Invs., 743 P.2d 345, 347 (Alaska 1987).
Maynard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 902 P.2d 1328, 1329 n. 2 (Alaska 1995).
The July 20, 2005 letter denying Larson's appeal of his 2005 out-of-state transfer decision makes clear that the 2005 classification was undertaken independently of the 2003 classification. Since Larson was transferred pursuant to the 2005 transfer decision, and not the vacated 2003 transfer decision, the appropriate procedural avenue of redress for any alleged constitutional violations would be an appeal of the 2005 transfer decision. Therefore, it was not error for the superior court to dismiss Larson's appeal on mootness grounds.
C. We Decline To Consider Larson's Appeal Under the Public Interest Exception to the Mootness Doctrine.
We "will consider a moot issue if it falls within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine." "The three factors in determining whether the public interest exception applies are (1) whether the disputed issues are capable of repetition, (2) whether application of the mootness doctrine will repeatedly circumvent review of the issues, and (3) whether the issues are of important public interest." The determination whether to address an issue that is moot "rests in the discretion of this court."
Taylor, 743 P.2d at 347.
Id. (citing Hayes v. Charney, 693 P.2d 831, 834 (Alaska 1985)).
Taylor, 743 P.2d at 347 (citing Hayes v. Charney, 693 P.2d at 834; Witt v. Watkins, 579 P.2d 1065, 1071 n. 19 (Alaska 1978)).
The issues raised by Larson are certainly capable of repetition. As the July 20, 2005 letter denying Larson's internal appeal acknowledges, "[t]he vast majority of prisoners housed in Arizona are also separated from their families with whom they share a close bond." Therefore, Larson's claim that his out-of-state transfer is a violation of his right to rehabilitation because it would impair the ability of his family to visit him is one that is frequently implicated.
The issues are also of important public interest. Under the Alaska Constitution, there is a fundamental right to rehabilitation. When determining whether a prisoner transfer is appropriate, DOC must take into account the impact that a transfer would have on the prisoner's right to rehabilitation. Visitation is a significant component to the right to rehabilitation. In Brandon v. State, Department of Corrections, we discussed the importance of visitation to the right to rehabilitation in a footnote, noting:
Alaska Const. art. 1, § 12; Abraham v. State, 585 P.2d 526, 530 (Alaska 1978).
By statute, DOC "may designate a facility without regard to whether it is maintained by the state, is located within the judicial district in which the prisoner was convicted, or is located in the state." AS 33.30.061(a). However, DOC may designate an out-of-state facility "only if the commissioner determines that rehabilitation or treatment of the prisoner will not be substantially impaired." AS 33.30.061(b). The Alaska Administrative Code similarly provides that "[a] prisoner will, in the department's discretion, be transferred to a contract facility outside Alaska . . . if the prisoner is provided a classification hearing as set out in 22 AAC 05.216 and a determination is made that the prisoner's rehabilitation or treatment would not be substantially impaired by the transfer." 22 AAC 05.252(a).
That visitation is important to rehabilitation has been widely recognized. Visiting is the most direct link for the inmate with the world left behind. Indeed, visiting is indispensable to any realistic program of rehabilitation. No single factor has been proven to be more directly correlated with the objective of a crime-free return to society than visiting. The reason for this is almost too obvious to state: "Strained ties with family and friends increase the difficulty of making the eventual transition back to the community." If those ties are to be preserved, visiting is imperative.
Prison visits have long been recognized as critically important to inmates as well as the communities to which the inmates ultimately will return.
Preservation of the family unit is important to the reintegration of the confined person and decreases the possibility of recidivism upon release.
Virtually every statement on visitation by prison officials . . . every national study . . . and every major textbook on corrections stresses the critical nature of visitation both in terms of the reduction of tension inside the prison and the facilitation of the ultimate rehabilitation of the prisoner by strengthening his ties with the "free world."
Brandon v. State, Dep't of Corr., 938 P.2d 1029, 1032 n. 2 (Alaska 1997) (internal citations omitted).
But as DOC argues, Brandon established that prisoners have a right to superior court review of their transfer decisions if their constitutional right to rehabilitation is impacted. Therefore, Larson's argument that his case should be considered under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine fails because dismissing Larson's claim as moot will not result in the issue continually evading review. Prisoners with close family ties like Larson's can timely challenge their operative transfer decisions as a violation of their constitutional right to rehabilitation. If Larson had appealed his 2005 transfer decision, the same issues that he raised in the appeal of his cancelled 2003 transfer decision could have been addressed.
Id. at 1033.
D. Under the Doctrine of Equitable Tolling, We Remand to the Superior Court for Consideration of Larson's 2005 Transfer Decision.
Although we decline to consider Larson's appeal of his 2003 transfer decision independently because it is moot, we remand to the superior court for consideration of Larson's 2005 transfer decision, which ultimately resulted in his transfer, under the doctrine of equitable tolling. Larson acknowledges that he did not file an appeal of his 2005 transfer decision as required within thirty days. But the doctrine of equitable tolling "relieve[s] a plaintiff from the bar of the statute of limitations when he has more than one legal remedy available to him so that after the plaintiff adopts a single course of action which is dismissed or otherwise fails, courts generally allow the plaintiff to pursue a second remedy based on the same right or claim." The statute will be equitably tolled if "(1) pursuit of the initial remedy gives defendant notice of plaintiff's claim, (2) defendant's ability to gather evidence is not prejudiced by the delay, and (3) plaintiff acted reasonably and in good faith."
Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey, 100 P.3d 881, 886 (Alaska 2004) (internal citations omitted).
Id. (citing Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, Inc., 772 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Alaska 1989)).
1. Pursuit of Larson's 2003 transfer decision gave DOC notice of Larson's constitutional claims with respect to his 2005 transfer decision.
Throughout the appeal of Larson's 2003 transfer decision, DOC was on notice that Larson objected to being transferred to Arizona on the grounds that it interfered with his constitutional right to rehabilitation because it deprived him of visitation with his family. And DOC conceded at oral argument that the same visitation issues raised in the appeal of the 2003 transfer decision would be raised in any subsequent appeal of Larson's transfer.
DOC further acknowledged at oral argument that the decisions to transfer Larson in both 2003 and 2005 were made pursuant to a consistent policy of DOC to factor into its assessment of a prisoner's right to rehabilitation the length of the prisoner's sentence. Specifically, DOC was asked at oral argument about language in the 2003 denial of Larson's internal appeal, which stated that "[g]iven the probability that you will spend the rest of your life in prison, the prospect of these visits contributing to your rehabilitation are extremely limited" and the language in the 2005 denial which stated "[t]he vast majority of prisoners housed in Arizona are also separated from their families with whom they share a close bond. In addition to visiting privileges at the facility in Arizona, you will have access to the telephone and mail service." Counsel for DOC noted that
those are just two ways of saying the same thing. That when you have such [a] lengthy sentence your need for rehabilitation and the benefits from family visitation given the department's resource limitations are not going to benefit you as much as the person who gets out next month. So therefore vis a vis your lengthy sentence your rehabilitative needs can be addressed adequately by telephone or mail contact.
Since DOC concedes that the same issues would be raised through any appeal of the 2005 transfer decision, and DOC was aware of the nature of Larson's challenge, the first condition for the application of equitable tolling has been satisfied.
2. The defendant's ability to gather evidence is not prejudiced by the delay.
Since Larson did not appeal the 2005 classification, it is unclear to what extent the record has been preserved. At oral argument, counsel for DOC noted that he was uncertain whether tapes of the 2005 classification hearing had been preserved, but he noted that written records from the 2005 hearing would be available in the ordinary course. Since DOC has recognized that the constitutional issues raised by the 2005 transfer decision are the same as those raised by the 2003 decision, any potential prejudice to either party in connection with missing information from the 2005 transfer hearing can be alleviated through supplementation of the record with the record from the 2003 appeal, as well as any record that might be developed in connection with Larson's annual classification hearing scheduled for June or July 2006. 3. Larson acted reasonably.
While Larson's appeal of the 2003 decision is moot because the transfer decision was vacated, an appeal of his 2005 transfer decision should not be considered moot when his 2006 classification hearing takes place because the 2005 transfer decision ultimately resulted in Larson's transfer to Arizona. While the record with respect to the 2006 classification may be considered by the superior court in addition to whatever documentation remains from the 2005 classification hearing and the record from the appeal of the 2003 transfer decision, the new classification hearing should not be found to supersede the 2005 transfer decision.
Finally, we believe that Larson acted reasonably and in good faith when he did not appeal the 2005 transfer decision because the appeal of the 2003 transfer decision was already pending in the superior court and the same issues he would raise in any appeal of the 2005 transfer decision were already before the superior court.
We therefore remand to the superior court for consideration of Larson's 2005 transfer decision as a timely administrative appeal because, under the doctrine of equitable tolling, "[t]he statute of limitations is . . . tolled during the pendency of the initial defective action, giving the plaintiff the full statutory period to file once tolling ceases." Because Larson already incurred costs in connection with the filing of an administrative appeal of his 2003 transfer decision, we also note that he should not be required to pay any additional fees that would otherwise be associated with the commencement of his appeal.
Fred Meyer, 100 P.3d at 886.
We note that DOC concurs that this is an appropriate result. At oral argument, counsel for DOC stated:
Larson has admitted that his issues from his first appeal are the same as his issues in the 2005 classification and therefore he should be able to litigate and challenge those issues he has with those decisions in either a remand to the superior court . . . [or through a motion for a consideration of a late] appeal.
We also note that DOC stated at oral argument that it had "no problem with" allowing Larson's appeal of his 2005 transfer decision to proceed without Larson incurring the costs of bringing another case.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Larson's 2003 transfer decision was cancelled and Larson was transferred to Arizona pursuant to a final agency decision made in July 2005, we AFFIRM the superior court's dismissal of his administrative appeal of his 2003 transfer decision as moot. Because the issues raised by Larson would not repeatedly evade review, we decline to reverse the superior court's decision under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. But we apply the doctrine of equitable tolling, and REMAND to the superior court for a consideration of Larson's claims in connection with DOC's 2005 decision to transfer Larson to Arizona.