Opinion
A-13731 0318
04-05-2023
LOREN J. LARSON JR., Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Loren J. Larson Jr., in propria persona, Wasilla, Appellant. Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Michael P. McConahy, Judge Trial Court No. 4FA-01-00511 CI
Loren J. Larson Jr., in propria persona, Wasilla, Appellant.
Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
In 1998, Loren J. Larson Jr. was convicted of a double homicide, and this Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. In 2001, Larson filed an application for post-conviction relief in which he asserted that he was entitled to a new trial because of juror misconduct. The superior court dismissed this application because all of Larson's claims of juror misconduct were based on juror affidavits that were inadmissible under Alaska Evidence Rule 606(b), and this Court affirmed this dismissal on appeal. In the years since then, Larson has pursued numerous collateral attacks on his convictions based on these claims of juror misconduct.
Larson v. State, 2000 WL 19199 (Alaska App. Jan. 12, 2000) (unpublished).
Larson v. State, 79 P.3d 650, 652 (Alaska App. 2003).
Id. at 652-53.
See Larson v. Superior Court, 2020 WL 5946629, at *1 & n.1 (Alaska App. Oct. 7, 2020) (unpublished) (collecting Larson's numerous post-conviction litigation efforts related to juror misconduct allegations).
This appeal is from the denial of an Alaska Civil Rule 60(b) motion seeking relief from the 2001 judgment dismissing Larson's first application for postconviction relief. Larson argues that the Alaska Supreme Court's recent decision in Alvarez-Perdomo v. State has changed the law on the admissibility of juror affidavits and that this change in the law entitles him to relief.
Alvarez-Perdomo v. State, 454 P.3d 998 (Alaska 2019).
In Alvarez-Perdomo, the supreme court held that it is structural error (i.e., error requiring reversal on appeal without a showing of prejudice) for a court to compel a defendant to testify in a criminal trial. As Larson notes, one court in another jurisdiction has cited Alvarez-Perdomo in support of its holding that it is structural error for a court making factual findings to consider a defendant's decision not to testify.Larson uses this to argue that, because jurors are fact-finders, an affidavit alleging that a juror considered Larson's decision not to testify in determining his guilt - such as the affidavits he presented in his 2001 post-conviction relief action - is evidence of structural error.
Id. at 1008.
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 2021 WL 3206496, at *8 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 29, 2021) (unpublished).
We conclude that Alvarez-Perdomo did not create a new rule that would entitle Larson to relief. This Court was aware of the nature of the allegations in the juror affidavits when we denied Larson's appeal from his first application for post-conviction relief. There, we extensively surveyed the law governing the admissibility of juror affidavits before concluding that the information in the affidavits could not be considered under Evidence Rule 606(b) and that the application of Rule 606(b) in Larson's case was constitutional. Because Alvarez-Perdomo did not create a change in controlling law that would have affected the outcome of Larson's first application for post-conviction relief, we conclude that the superior court did not err in denying Larson's Civil Rule 60(b) motion.
Larson, 79 P.3d at 655-59.
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.