Furthermore, two reported district court decisions have construed A.R. 802 as imposing no limitation upon the discretion of prison officials in changing work assignments or security classifications. See Watts v. Morgan, 572 F. Supp. 1385, 1391 (N.D.Ill. 1983); Larson v. Mulcrone, 575 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D.Ill. 1982), aff'd, 723 F.2d 914 (7th Cir. 1983). It is obvious that in the absence of imperatives such as "shall," "will," or "must," the language of A.R. 802(II)(C)(1) cannot be considered as "unmistakenly mandatory [in] character."

Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590, 594 (4th Cir. 1994) ("The federal constitution itself vests no liberty interest in inmates in retaining or receiving any particular security or custody status `[a]s long as the [challenged] conditions or degree of confinement is within the sentence imposed . . . and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution.'" (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468, 103 S.Ct. at 869 (internal quotation omitted))), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 235, 130 L.Ed.2d 158 (1994); Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 883 (6th Cir. 1992) (same), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 127, 126 L.Ed.2d 91 (1993); Larson v. Mulcrone, 575 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D.Ill. 1982) (same), aff'd, 723 F.2d 914 (7th Cir. 1983); cf. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9, 97 S.Ct. 274, 279 n. 9, 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976). Accordingly, any due process claim predicated on such an interest fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Furthermore, courts do not easily find statutorily-created liberty interests. For example, in Larson v. Mulcrone, 575 F. Supp. 1 (N.D.Ill. 1982), aff'd without op., 723 F.2d 914 (7th Cir. 1983), the court rejected plaintiff's argument that a policy statement from the "general purposes" section of the Illinois Code of Corrections gave rise to a protectible liberty interest. See also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (The mere fact that a state created a careful procedural structure to regulate the use of administrative segregation did not indicate the existence of a protected liberty interest.)

Such general policies "do not give rise to a protectible `liberty interest' of entitlement." Larson v. Mulcrone, 575 F. Supp. 1 at 3 (N.D.Ill. 1982). Likewise, sections 1003-8-3 and 1003-12-1 do not create an entitlement sufficient to invoke due process safeguards.