Opinion
14-24-00197-CV
12-10-2024
PSHATOIA LAROSE, Appellant v. CITY OF MISSOURI CITY, Appellee
On Appeal from the 434th Judicial District Court Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 23-DCV-310213
Panel consists of Justices Zimmerer, Spain, and Hassan.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Charles A. Spain Justice
Appellant Pshatoia LaRose filed suit against the City of Missouri Cityalleging that the City was liable to her for the failure of its police department to investigate alleged crimes or criminal activity she reported, and sought monetary damages. After the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court dismissed LaRose's claims for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. We affirm.
LaRose named the "Missouri City Police Department" in her original petition. However, her suit is against the City of Missouri City, as its police department is not a separate legal entity but a department or subdivision within the City. See Missouri City, Tex., Code of Ordinances, ch. 2, art. IV, §2-166 (1999) ("A police department is hereby established to preserve order and to protect citizens from violence and injury and to protect property from damage and loss.").
I. Background
LaRose filed a petition against the City alleging a "Matter of Negligence and Failure to Properly Investigate Police Reports filed by Pshatoia LaRose. . . . Missouri City Police Department was Promptly notified of ongoing Stalking and Harassment, Theft of Phone Date, Unauthorized Phone Tapping, Premeditated Threats, Damages to Plaintiff Personal Property and Poisoning throughout February 2022-Current Date[.]" She further asserted the City failed to investigate or "adhere to the State of Texas Witness Law to give Plaintiff right to Fair investigation." With few other specifics, LaRose sought damages of $253,900 for the damages she alleged that she suffered.
The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction on the basis LaRose had not and could not establish the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction over her claims. The trial court granted the City's plea. On appeal, LaRose presents two issues and makes a number of arguments supporting her position that the trial court erred in dismissing her suit with prejudice for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.Although LaRose asserts the trial court had jurisdiction over her claims, she offers no legal authority to support her position. She maintains the City had a duty to investigate and act on her reports of crime and that its failure to do so has resulted in injustice.
We quote the grounds raised in her brief as follows:
This Case Brief is brought pursuant to the dismissal of the Plaintiff's complaint by the District Court. The Order of Dismissal dated March 7, 2024 is appealed on the grounds of (1) Judge Brane erred in closing the Case with ill regards to State Laws that Defendant, Missouri City Police did not adhere to, nor Judge did not adhere to, considered UnFair and UnReasonable or in Violation of Procedural rules and (2) Dismissing Case with Prejudice.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of review
Subject-matter jurisdiction is necessary to a court's authority to decide a case. Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). A plaintiff must allege facts affirmatively showing the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 446. Sovereign immunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225 (Tex. 2004). Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Texas Nat. Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002).
B. Governmental immunity
A trial court may not assume subject-matter jurisdiction over a suit against a municipality unless the suit fits within a valid statutory or constitutional waiver of governmental immunity. Suarez v. City of Tex. City, 465 S.W.3d 623, 631 (Tex. 2015); City of Watauga v. Gordon, 434 S.W.3d 586, 589 (Tex. 2014). We interpret statutory waivers of governmental immunity narrowly, as the legislature's intent to waive immunity must be clear and unambiguous. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. 2008).
Sovereign and governmental immunity are common-law concepts that generally protect the State and its political subdivisions from the burdens of litigation. Harris Cnty. v. Annab, 547 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex. 2018). "Sovereign immunity protects the state and its various divisions, such as agencies and boards, from suit and liability, whereas governmental immunity provides similar protection to the political subdivisions of the state, such as counties, cities, and school districts." Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Norman, 342 S.W.3d 54, 57-58 (Tex. 2011) (citing Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 694 n.3 (Tex. 2003)).
Governmental immunity has two components: "immunity from liability, which bars enforcement of a judgment against a governmental entity, and immunity from suit, which bars suit against the entity altogether." Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006). When a governmental defendant challenges jurisdiction on grounds of immunity from suit, the plaintiff has the burden to "affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction by alleging a valid waiver of immunity." Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003). Immunity is waived only by clear and unambiguous language. See Code Construction Act, Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.034 ("[A] statute shall not be construed as a waiver of [] immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language.").
C. Texas Tort Claims Act
The Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) provides limited waivers of immunity from liability against governmental entities for claims arising from three general areas: (1) injury caused by an employee's operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment; (2) injury caused by a condition or use of tangible property; or (3) injury caused by a condition or use of real property. TTCA, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021; see Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608, 611 (Tex. 2000). The TTCA also provides a list of governmental functions, including police "protection and control," for which a municipality may be liable. TTCA, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.0215(a)(1). Because this lawsuit arises out of a governmental function, the City is liable to LaRose to the extent the TTCA provides a limited waiver to its governmental immunity from liability and suit. See TTCA, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.025 (waiver of immunity from suit to extent liability and claim are created under TTCA).
There is a long-standing principle in Texas law that a distinction exists between municipalities and other governmental units for governmental-immunity purposes. See City of Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118, 126 (1884) ("Counties . . . are created by the legislature by general laws without reference to the wish of their inhabitants, and thus for essentially public purposes" whereas cities are incorporated through special charters and are "enacted at the request of those who are to be most directly benefited by them and with a view to this end."). Municipalities are an exception to the general rule of governmental immunity because a municipality is not immune for its proprietary functions. See Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 343.
Here, LaRose does not assert any claims that fall within the waiver of immunity. Her claims cannot be described as: (1) an injury caused by an employee's operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment; (2) an injury caused by a condition or use of tangible property; or (3) an injury caused by a condition or use of real property. TTCA, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021. LaRose offers no other statutory basis supporting a waiver of immunity for her claims and she seeks only damages for her alleged injuries.
Because she has not established a waiver of governmental immunity giving rise to subject-matter jurisdiction, we conclude the trial court did not err in dismissing her claims against the City for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.
We overrule both of LaRose's issues.
D. Writ of prohibition
On appeal, LaRose also suggests that this court could issue a writ of prohibition to "prevent the Judge from dismissing the case until the plaintiff has had the opportunity to present evidence and have a fair trial before an impartial jury." A writ of prohibition is a limited purpose remedy used to enable an appellate court to protect and enforce its jurisdiction and judgments. Holloway v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 767 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Tex. 1989). The writ of prohibition is used to prevent the commission of a future act and will not be granted when the act sought to be prevented is already done. State ex rel. Wade v. Mays, 689 S.W.2d 893, 897 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Shelvin v. Lykos, 741 S.W.2d 178, 182 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ). "The issuance of an extraordinary writ is not authorized when the relator has an adequate remedy by appeal." Holloway, 767 S.W.2d at 684. Here, there is no future act to prevent. Further, LaRose has concurrently appealed the trial court's dismissal of her claims, and therefore has not shown that she lacks an adequate remedy by appeal.
III. Conclusion
Having overruled both of LaRose's issues presented on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as challenged on appeal.