The Defendants cite to our recent application of a "no set of circumstances" standard to an individual's facial equal protection challenge. Larimore Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 44 v. Aamodt , 2018 ND 71, ¶ 38, 908 N.W.2d 442 (citing U.S. v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ). The Defendants’ assertion that they can defeat all of these facial challenges at the outset by hypothesizing a constitutional application is unpersuasive and inconsistent with how we have analyzed facial challenges brought by taxpayers seeking to invalidate spending statutes under the constitution's gift clause and debt limit provisions.

[¶13] Continental Resources argues it has identified constitutional applications of S.B. 2344 which it contends defeat the facial challenge at the outset under the "no set of circumstances" standard we applied in Larimore Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 44 v. Aamodt, 2018 ND 71, ¶ 38, 908 N.W.2d 442 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). Specifically, Continental Resources argues S.B. 2344 can be constitutionally applied to units, pre-2009 conveyances of pore space, and situations where there is a disposal contract in place.

Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585, 601-02 (1980) (same), overruled on other grounds by In re Stephens , 867 N.E.2d 148, 156 (Ind. 2007) ; Murphy v. Edmonds , 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102, 106 & n.3, 118 (1992) (concluding that the damages cap does not infringe on the jury right that must be "inviolably preserved" as stated in Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights); English v. New England Med. Ctr. , 405 Mass. 423, 541 N.E.2d 329, 331-32 (1989) (concluding that the damages cap for charitable institutions in medical malpractice actions does not violate the jury right); Phillips v. Mirac, Inc. , 470 Mich. 415, 685 N.W.2d 174, 180-83 (2004) (concluding that the damages cap does not infringe the "inviolate" jury right); Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc. , 265 Neb. 918, 663 N.W.2d 43, 74-75 (2003) (per curiam) (concluding that the damages cap does not infringe the "inviolate" jury right); Tam v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. , 131 Nev. 792, 358 P.3d 234, 238 (2015) (same); Larimore Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 44 v. Aamodt , 2018 ND 71 ¶¶ 24, 27-28, 908 N.W.2d 442, 453-54 (concluding that the tort damages cap does not infringe the "inviolate" jury right); Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson , 116 Ohio St. 3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶¶ 32, 36-42 (concluding that the general tort damages cap does not infringe the "inviolate" jury right); Horton , 376 P.3d at 1036, 1044 (concluding that the damages cap does not infringe the "inviolate" jury right); Zauflik v. Pennsbury Sch. Dist. , 629 Pa. 1, 104 A.3d 1096, 1132-33 (2014) (same); McClay v. Airport Mgmt. Servs., LLC , 596 S.W.3d 686, 690-93 (Tenn. 2020) (same); Judd v. Drezga , 2004 UT 91, ¶ 35, 103 P.3d 135 (concluding that the cap on "quality of life" damages does not infringe the "inviolate" jury right); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps. , 237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525, 528-29 (1989) (concluding that the statutory limit on recovery "effects no impingement upon the right to a jury trial"); MacDonald v. City Hosp., Inc. , 227 W.Va. 707, 715 S.E.2d 405, 414-15 (2011) (

We have repeatedly recognized the right to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right subject to the intermediate standard of equal-protection analysis. Larimore Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 44 v. Aamodt , 2018 ND 71, ¶ 49, 908 N.W.2d 442 ; Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist. , 2002 ND 61, ¶ 17, 642 N.W.2d 864 ; Bouchard v. Johnson , 555 N.W.2d 81, 87-88 (N.D. 1996) ; Hanson , 389 N.W.2d at 328 ; Arneson , 270 N.W.2d at 135-36. The intermediate level of scrutiny applies to our analysis of the damage cap in N.D.C.C. § 32-42-02 and requires a close correspondence between the statutory classification and legislative goals.