Hawthorne v. Village of Olympia Fields, 204 Ill.2d 243, 253-54, 274 Ill.Dec. 59, 790 N.E.2d 832 (2003) (since zoning action was taken by village's board of trustees rather than its zoning board of appeals, it was not subject to the Administrative Review Law).           This court has stated that “when the act conferring power on the agency does not expressly adopt the Administrative Review Law," a plaintiff seeking review of an administrative act may file a petition for writ of certiorari.Lapp v. Village ofWinnetka, 359 Ill.App.3d 152, 166, 295 Ill.Dec. 777, 833 N.E.2d 983 (2005) . Thus, following the dictates of our decision in Lapp, a petition for writ of certiorari was the correct vehicle for review.           The ordinance in Lapp was similar to the ordinance in the case at bar.

Putting aside for the moment any question of the standard of review applicable to legislative acts under section 11-13-25(a), which shall be discussed below, our review of a summary judgment, in any event, is de novo. Lapp v. Village of Winnetka, 359 Ill. App. 3d 152, 160, 833 N.E.2d 983, 990 (2005). A. Dunlap's Right of Action Under the Zoning Enabling Act

"Administrative decisions are against the manifest weight of the evidence when the court, viewing the evidence in light most favorable to the administrative agency, determines that no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the agency's decision and that an opposite conclusion is clearly evident." Lapp v. Village of Winnetka, 359 Ill. App. 3d 152, 167 (2005). "The mere fact that an opposite conclusion is reasonable *** will not justify the reversal of administrative findings."

"Administrative decisions are against the manifest weight of the evidence when the court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the administrative agency, determines that no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the agency's decision and that an opposite conclusion is clearly evident." Lapp v. Village of Winnetka, 359 Ill. App. 3d 152, 167 (2005). " 'The mere fact that an opposite conclusion is reasonable * * * will not justify the reversal of administrative findings.' "

"A common law writ of certiorari is a general method for obtaining court review of administrative actions when the act conferring power on the agency does not expressly adopt the Administrative Review Law [citation], and provides for no other form of review." Lapp v. Village of Winnetka, 359 Ill. App. 3d 152, 166, 833 N.E.2d 983 (2005), citing Dubin v. Personnel Board, 128 Ill. 2d 490, 497-99, 539 N.E.2d 1243 (1989). The standard of review of a writ of certiorari is identical to that under the Administrative Review Law ( 735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2006)).

Further, zoning has been immemorially held to be a legislative function exercised by a municipality. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388, 71 L. Ed. 303, 311, 47 S. Ct. 114, 118 (1926); La Salle National Bank v. City ofEvanston, 57 Ill. 2d 415, 428 (1974); Lapp v. Village ofWinnetka, 359 Ill. App. 3d 152, 170 (2005). Additionally, it is similarly well established that, where there is room for a difference of opinion concerning the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance, the determination of the legislative body of the municipality is conclusive.

We agree that the special use at issue here does not run with the land. Summary judgment should be granted where the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, admissions, and exhibits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005'c) (West 2004); Home Insurance Co. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 213 Ill. 2d 307, 315, 821 N.E.2d 269 (2004); Lapp v. Village of Winnetka, 359 Ill. App. 3d 152, 160, 833 N.E.2d 983 (2005). The grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Home Insurance Co., 213 Ill. 2d at 315; Lapp, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 160.

Plaintiffs, for example, could have sought administrative review in the Circuit Court of Cook County, like the Petersen plaintiffs did. Seeid. at 463, 707 N.E.2d 150, 155, 236 Ill.Dec. 305, 310; see alsoLapp v. Village of Winnetka, 359 Ill.App.3d 152, 166, 833 N.E.2d 983, 995, 295 Ill.Dec. 777, 789 (1st Dist.2005). In a similar vein, Plaintiffs' argument that Amended PD–98 violates the City's other ordinances and plans does not establish a constitutional violation because “a unit of state or local government does not violate the federal Constitution just because it violates a state or local law.”

We find that the Board's findings of fact were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where there was evidence of specific instances where Gallardo performed poorly and engaged in unprofessional conduct. ¶ 38 The findings and conclusions by the Board on questions of fact are accepted as "prima facie true and correct" and must be upheld on review unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Lapp v. Village of Winnetka, 359 Ill. App. 3d 152, 167 (2005). "Administrative decisions are against the manifest weight of the evidence when the court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the administrative agency, determines that no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the agency's decision and that an opposite conclusion is clearly evident."

On review, this court accords great deference to the Board's determinations on these issues. Lapp v. Village of Winnetka, 359 Ill. App. 3d 152, 167, 833 N.E.2d 983 (2005). After careful consideration of Dr. Lanoffs testimony, we do not believe that his opinion can be characterized as so lacking in credibility that the Board's acceptance of that opinion is against the manifest weight of the evidence.