Opinion
No. CV 03-040 10 22 S
September 14, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY DEFENDANT WILLIAM POWELL (MOTION DATED JUNE 25, 2004)
Before this court is the defendant William Powell Company's June 25, 2004 Motion for Summary Judgment. The plaintiff William Laposka alleges that he was exposed to asbestos from the defendant's product, valves.
Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact, a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact, together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue. Practice Book §§ 17-45, 17-46; Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 455, 472 A.2d 1257 (1984). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 193 Conn. 313, 317, 477 A.2d 1005 (1984). Summary judgment is "designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue where there is no real issue to be tried." Wilson v. City of New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989).
"In a products liability action, the plaintiff must plead and prove that the product was defective and that the defect was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries." Haesche v. Kissner, 229 Conn. 213, 220, 640 A.2d 89 (1994). "In a products liability/asbestos claim a plaintiff must 1) identify an asbestos-containing product for which a defendant is responsible, 2) prove that he has suffered damages, and 3) prove that defendant's asbestos-containing product was a substantial factor in causing his damages." Roberts v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 726 F.Sup. 172, 174 (W.D.Mich. 1989). Although other jurisdictions have struggled with the issue in relation to asbestos-related claims, there is no settled law in Connecticut concerning any of these three critical elements.
Here the plaintiff testified that he was exposed to asbestos-containing products manufactured by the defendant. It is not the function of this court to determine the credibility of the plaintiff's product identification. Furthermore, the second key issue in this case is not whether there should be a presumption of causation if a plaintiff merely shows that asbestos products manufactured by the defendant were in use at a particular job site but whether a reasonable jury could accept that the plaintiff's expert testimony theory that any exposure is a proximate cause of this plaintiff's injury. A reasonable jury, giving all reasonable inferences to the plaintiff for purposes of this motion, could find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff was exposed to defendant's product and, according to his expert, this exposure was a substantial contributing factor that caused his illness.
The motion for summary judgment is denied
Dewey, J.