Magistrate Judge Jeffrey T. Gilbert Dated: September 28, 2018 See, e.g., Stagman, 176 F.3d at 994 (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to compel deposition of Illinois Attorney General where evidence did not indicate a need for the deposition); Olivieri, 122 F.3d at 409-10 (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to compel deposition of police superintendent where the record indicated that interrogatories served on the superintendent would have been a sufficient means of developing evidence); LaPorta v. City of Chi., 2016 WL 4429746, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2016) (denying motion to compel deposition of city mayor in case involving Monell claim because there was no reason to think the deposition would lead to admissible evidence that could not be obtained through interrogatories).

Magistrate Judge Jeffrey T. Gilbert Dated: May 11, 2018 See, e.g., Stagman, 176 F.3d at 994 (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to compel deposition of Illinois Attorney General where evidence did not indicate a need for the deposition); Olivieri, 122 F.3d at 409-10 (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to compel deposition of police superintendent where the record indicated that interrogatories served on the superintendent would have been a sufficient means of developing evidence); LaPorta v. City of Chi., 2016 WL 4429746, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2016) (denying motion to compel deposition of city mayor in case involving Monell claim because there was no reason to think the deposition would lead to admissible evidence that could not be obtained through interrogatories).

At this point, the Court is only concerned with the propriety and scope of discovery. So Plaintiffs' theory may be that the Mayor was the final policymaker for the City with regard to police practices at Homan Square or that the City's well-settled custom or practice was the moving force behind Plaintiffs' injury. Either is a viable theory under Monell and discussions internal to the Mayor's office about Homan Square would be relevant to those theories. See Valentino, 575 F.3d at 675-76 (addressing plaintiff's two theories of Monell liability on summary judgment); see also LaPorta v. City of Chi., No. 14 C 9665, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111297, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2016) ("[T]he Court does not intend to say that Emanuel is the final policymaker for Monell purposes; that issue is beside the point, because LaPorta need not identify an individual with 'final policymaking authority' to succeed on his Monell claim.") and Marcavage v. City of Chi., 467 F. Supp. 2d 823, 830 (N.D. Ill. 2006) ("this Court simply cannot say without further development of the record that Mayor Daley does not make official policy in Chicago...as to police enforcement...that could run afoul of plaintiffs' constitutionally protected rights."). The City also relies on LaPorta, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111297, in which plaintiffs claimed the City had a practice of condoning a code of silence in the CPD. The LaPorta court denied plaintiff's motion to compel the Mayor's deposition. Relying on Olivieri v. Rodriguez, 122 F.3d 406, 409-10 (7th Cir. 1997), which stated that public officials "should not have to spend their time giving depositions in cases arising out of the performance of t