Opinion
23A-CR-2784
06-20-2024
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Mark K. Leeman Logansport, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Caroline G. Templeton Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Cass Superior Court The Honorable Lisa L. Swaim, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 09D02-2212-F2-11
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Mark K. Leeman Logansport, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General
Caroline G. Templeton Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ALTICE, CHIEF JUDGE
Case Summary
[¶1] Jina LaOrange appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea, claiming that (1) the judge should have disqualified herself before ruling on the motion, (2) the trial court was required by statute to grant her motion because withdrawal of the plea was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice, and (3) even if granting the motion was not statutorily required, the court abused its discretion in denying it.
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts &Procedural History
[¶3] One night in December 2022, Logansport Police Department (LPD) Detective Andrew Strong initiated a traffic stop of a car in which LaOrange was a passenger. According to the probable cause affidavit, Detective Strong saw LaOrange moving around inside the vehicle as it was coming to a stop. Detective Strong spoke to the driver and LaOrange, both of whom appeared nervous, and he observed in the middle console a styrofoam cup that was partially crushed and spilling its contents. As other officers were arriving on the scene, both occupants exited the car, and a canine exterior sniff alerted to narcotics.
[¶4] While standing on the passenger side of the vehicle, Detective Strong saw a white crystal substance scattered on the passenger seat that he believed to be methamphetamine. He also recovered a baggie on the ground near LaOrange's feet as she was being arrested. The baggie's contents later tested positive for nearly 400 grams of methamphetamine. The officers also field tested the ice still in the smashed cup, which tested positive for methamphetamine.
[¶5] After receiving her Miranda warnings, LaOrange admitted to Detective Strong that, as he was stopping their car, she stuffed a bag of methamphetamine into the styrofoam cup but it would not fit. She further admitted to purchasing a pound of methamphetamine in Indianapolis earlier that night from a source she had used since 2022 and admitting to dealing methamphetamine. Officers retrieved $3,454 in cash from LaOrange's purse.
[¶6] The State charged LaOrange on December 7, 2022, with Level 2 felony dealing methamphetamine, Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 felony obstruction of justice, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. LaOrange hired private counsel to represent her, and at a June 15, 2023 pretrial hearing, her counsel advised the court that LaOrange was going to plead guilty. The court then went off the record for over an hour, and, when the hearing resumed, LaOrange and the State submitted a signed plea agreement, under which she would plead guilty to the Level 2 dealing charge and testify truthfully at her co-defendant's trial. In exchange, the State would dismiss the remaining charges. The agreement capped the sentence at twenty years.
[¶7] The court proceeded with a guilty plea hearing at which LaOrange, age fifty-one, testified that she was entering into the agreement freely and voluntarily, her attorney had reviewed the plea agreement with her before she signed it, she understood the agreement, and she was satisfied with her counsel. In providing a factual basis, LaOrange admitted that she and the driver were returning from Indianapolis where she had picked up approximately a pound of methamphetamine and that she intended to deal it. She also admitted that she had sought to hide and destroy some of the methamphetamine by putting it in the styrofoam cup with ice. The court took the plea agreement under advisement and set a sentencing hearing for September 26, 2023.
[¶8] On July 12, 2023, LaOrange's trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw his appearance. The judge granted the motion and continued the sentencing hearing at LaOrange's request to October 24, 2023. A public defender filed an appearance on her behalf in August 2023.
[¶9] On October 23, LaOrange filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea, alleging that her guilty plea was not knowingly given because discovery had not been received and that the police "ha[d] been harassing her" and mistreated her during the arrest. Appendix at 108. LaOrange filed an accompanying affidavit, averring that she believed her arrest was improper, the LDP had a history of harassing her, the methamphetamine found near her was not hers, and her previous attorney did not provide her with all the discovery she requested and coerced her into taking the plea.
[¶10] At the October 24 hearing, originally set for sentencing, the court first received evidence and argument on LaOrange's motion to withdraw her guilty plea. LaOrange's counsel argued that (1) prior counsel was ineffective for failing to provide discovery to LaOrange, which allegedly would have showed a discrepancy between the officers' respective reports as to where the methamphetamine was found, (2) prior counsel coerced her into taking the plea while they were off the record at the hearing, and (3) the trial judge had a conflict of interest because, as a prosecutor, she had filed charges against LaOrange in 2018 and 2019. LaOrange's counsel also advised the court that LaOrange had filed, pro se, a disciplinary complaint against the judge asserting a conflict of interest due to the prior charges.
[¶11] LaOrange submitted as an exhibit a typed document, which she personally had prepared, stating that her prior counsel performed incompetently and was grossly negligent in his representation of her. In the document, she provided "examples" that she maintained "show[ed] that his representation me[t] the requirements of the Strickland Test," including that counsel failed to interview two officers to inquire about discrepancies between their reports, did not investigate or engage in discovery, "pushed [her] to sign a plea deal," failed to timely file motions, which "was a malicious tactic to put [her] outside of appropriate filing deadlines," neglected to assert appropriate defenses, and misled her regarding possible outcomes at trial by telling her that "there was 'so much' evidence against her that . . . the judge and jury would not believe her innocence." Exhibit Vol. at 23-24. LaOrange also submitted an exhibit of snapshots of portions of text messages with her prior attorney.
The document was "part of a [disciplinary] Complaint" that LaOrange had filed, pro se, against her prior attorney. Transcript at 56.
[¶12] Because there was nothing in the guilty plea transcript to indicate alleged coercion by prior counsel, LaOrange testified to explain how and when it occurred. She stated that "from the get-go" she wanted to take the matter to trial, but that during the hearing her attorney took her out of the courtroom twice and told her that "the jury would never believe" her that the methamphetamine was not hers given the admissions she made at the scene, which LaOrange maintained the officers "made her" say. Id. at 58.
[¶13] The State presented no evidence but argued that allowing LaOrange to withdraw her guilty plea would be unjust as the State had relied on the plea and that "it would result in a substantial burden on the State to begin preparing for trial again." Id. at 50.
[¶14] The trial court determined that it had no conflict of interest, as there was no connection between the facts or evidence in the prior cases to the present case, nor did the judge remember LaOrange. The court added that LaOrange "has the right to file any complaints she wants, and I wouldn't hold that against her." Id. at 53.
[¶15] The trial court denied LaOrange's motion to withdraw her guilty plea, determining that, although the record indicated that LaOrange and her counsel may have had a disagreement, LaOrange was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. The court also found that the plea "was knowingly and voluntarily made," expressly noting that she found LaOrange's testimony at the guilty plea hearing to be "very sincere and very believable," that withdrawal of the plea "definitely" was not necessary to correct a manifest injustice, and that it would not be fair to the State to allow LaOrange to withdraw the plea at this point. Id. at 67, 68.
[¶16] The court accepted the previously submitted plea agreement and imposed a sixteen-year sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction, with four years suspended to probation. LaOrange now appeals. Additional facts will be supplied as necessary.
Discussion &Decision
I. Judicial Disqualification
[¶17] LaOrange asserts that the trial judge should have disqualified herself prior to ruling on LaOrange's motion to withdraw her guilty plea. She argues that recusal was warranted because the trial judge previously had filed charges against LaOrange, which were methamphetamine-related and of "the same character" as the present case, and because LaOrange had recently filed a judicial complaint against the trial judge associated with the current criminal matter. Appellant's Brief at 11. LaOrange maintains that these circumstances created "a reasonable basis for questioning the judge's impartiality." Id.
[¶18] Judges are presumed impartial and unbiased. Mathews v. State, 64 N.E.3d 1250, 1253 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016), trans. denied. "Ordinarily in a criminal case, parties seeking to overcome the presumption of judicial impartiality must move for a change of judge under Rule 12 of the Indiana Rules of Criminal Procedure." Id. This rule allows either the State or the defendant to request a change of judge for bias or prejudice by timely filing an affidavit that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice that states the facts and reasons for the belief. Crim. R. 12(B). The motion must be filed within thirty days of the initial hearing, unless a defendant exercising due diligence could not have discovered the reasons for recusal within that period. Crim. R. 12(D)(1). "'The law is settled that a defendant is not entitled to a change of judge where the mandates of . . . Rule 12 have not been followed.'" Mathews, 64 N.E.3d at 1253 (quoting Flowers v. State, 738 N.E.2d 1051, 1060 (Ind. 2000)).
Effective January 1, 2024, the requirements governing a change of venue or judge are now found in Ind. Crim. Rule 2.4.
[¶19] LaOrange did not move for a change of judge under Crim. R. 12 but nevertheless argues that the judge should have disqualified herself under Ind. Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11(A)(1), which provides, in part, that "[a] judge shall disqualify . . . herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including . . . circumstances [where] . . . [t]he judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding." However, we have held that the obligations under the Code of Judicial Conduct "do not create freestanding rights of enforcement in private parties." Mathews, 64 N.E.3d at 1255. Accepting a contrary position "would effectively nullify Rule 12 by creating a new species of recusal motion that could be brought at any time, in any manner, on grounds far broader than those contemplated by Rule 12" and "would allow litigants, trial courts, and indeed this court to usurp the exclusive supervisory authority of our supreme court over judicial conduct." Id. Accordingly, on the record before us, the trial court did not err in declining to recuse herself before ruling on LaOrange's motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
II. Statute - Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
[¶20] Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b) provides:
After entry of a plea of guilty . . ., but before imposition of sentence, the court may allow the defendant by motion to withdraw [her] plea . . . for any fair and just reason unless the state has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea.... The ruling of the court on the motion shall be reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.
However, the court shall allow the defendant to withdraw [her] plea . . . whenever the defendant proves that withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.
Thus, while the court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if necessary to correct a manifest injustice, it must deny the motion if withdrawal of the plea would substantially prejudice the State. Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ind. 2001) (quotations omitted). In all other cases, the court may grant the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea "for any fair and just reason." Id. The defendant has the burden of establishing her grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 35-35-1-4(e).
[¶21] A trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed with "'a presumption in favor of the ruling.'" Brightman, 758 N.E.2d at 44 (quoting Coomer v. State, 652 N.E.2d 60, 62 (Ind. 1995)). An appellant seeking to overturn the court's ruling "faces a high hurdle." Turner v. State, 843 N.E.2d 937, 945 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006).
II.A. Manifest Injustice
[¶22] LaOrange argues that the trial court was required to grant her motion because withdrawal of her plea was necessary to correct a manifest injustice, and thus the court committed reversible error when it denied it. Our Supreme Court has recognized that "[m]anifest injustice" is necessarily an imprecise standard. Coomer, 652 N.E.2d 62. However, instances of manifest injustice may include where a defendant is denied the effective assistance of counsel or the plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily. Jeffries v. State, 966 N.E.2d 773, 778 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012), trans. denied.
[¶23] Here, LaOrange argues that her counsel was ineffective and coerced her into accepting the plea agreement. We agree with the trial court that LaOrange established neither. As to coercing her into accepting the plea, she testified that her counsel told her the jury would not believe her, given the strength of the State's evidence; as the State observes, "There is nothing misleading or improper about that assessment." Appellee's Brief at 15.
[¶24] To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, LaOrange must prove that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on the prevailing professional norms and that the deficient performance prejudiced her. Ward v. State, 969 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ind. 2012). A strong presumption exists that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Id. To show prejudice in the context of guilty pleas, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, she would have rejected the plea and insisted on going to trial. Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1284 (Ind. 2019). "Defendants cannot simply say they would have gone to trial" and, rather, "must establish rational reasons supporting why they would have made that decision." Id.
[¶25] Here, LaOrange did not present testimony from her prior counsel, provide or specify what evidence counsel failed to gather, or otherwise specifically explain how she would have benefitted from further investigation or what defenses counsel should have presented. We again agree with the State that "LaOrange's unsupported assertions do not overcome the presumption of effective representation." Appellee's Brief at 16. In sum, LaOrange has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that withdrawal of her guilty plea was necessary to correct a manifest injustice such that the court's denial of her motion constituted reversible error.
II.B. Abuse of Discretion
[¶26] We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying LaOrange's motion to withdraw her guilty plea. See I.C § 35-35-1-4(b). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Rhoades v. State, 675 N.E.2d 698, 702 (Ind. 1996). LaOrange argues that the denial of her motion was an abuse of discretion given her specific allegations and testimony which, she maintains, established her claim that her plea "was the product of coercion from an ineffective lawyer" and that the judge was biased, or at a minimum, had an appearance of such. Appellant's Brief at 13.
[¶27] Our Supreme Court has instructed that "[i]n determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we examine the statements made by the defendant at his guilty plea hearing to decide whether his plea was offered 'freely and knowingly.'" Brightman, 758 N.E.2d at 44. Here, at the guilty plea hearing, LaOrange met with counsel off the record to discuss the plea, and thereafter presented a plea agreement to the court and testified that her attorney had reviewed the terms with her, she understood and agreed with them, was satisfied with her counsel's representation, and desired to plead guilty. The court reviewed and confirmed with LaOrange that she understood the various constitutional rights she was giving up by pleading guilty.
[¶28] Further, in the factual basis provided to the trial court, LaOrange admitted to purchasing a pound of methamphetamine in Indianapolis earlier that evening with the intention of dealing it to others. In denying her motion to withdraw her plea, the trial court specifically noted that it found LaOrange's guilty plea hearing testimony to be very sincere and believable. Ultimately, the evidence of coercion was limited to LaOrange's self-serving statement, which the court was free to reject.
[¶29] As to LaOrange's claim that the trial court's denial of her motion was an abuse of discretion because the judge was biased against her, we are unpersuaded. LaOrange's basis for bias and prejudice was the charges filed against her four and five years prior, when the judge was a prosecutor, as well as LaOrange's recent filing of a disciplinary complaint against the judge. The trial court took a recess to review relevant Canons from the Code of Judicial Conduct, as well as Advisory Opinions involving similar circumstances of a presiding judge who was formerly a prosecutor. Upon resuming the hearing, the trial court thoroughly explained to LaOrange why under those principles and Canons no conflict of interest existed, as the facts and evidence of the prior cases were entirely unrelated to the current one, nor was she required to recuse herself, noting that she did not have recollection of the previous charges involving LaOrange. See Transcript at 63-66. The court also assured LaOrange that she was "not upset" that LaOrange filed a disciplinary complaint, it was her right to do so, and she was not "going to be unfair to her" because of it. Id. at 65.
[¶30] For these reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to deny LaOrange's motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
[¶31] Judgment affirmed.
Bradford, J. and Felix, J., concur.