Opinion
March 27, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaccaro, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the complaint is dismissed.
The plaintiff allegedly entered into an oral employment agreement with the defendants on March 23, 1991, which he claimed included a guarantee of an initial term of employment of one year. In making an offer of employment to the plaintiff, the defendants' vice president signed an "offer sheet" which contained such items as salary, bonus, and health insurance, but did not include an express period of employment. The plaintiff commenced working for the defendants on March 25, 1991, and was discharged on June 14, 1991. This action for breach of contract ensued.
The trial court concluded that a statement in the offer sheet "full review 1 year, then every August" was ambiguous and, at the trial, parol evidence was admitted to determine its meaning. The trial court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff was offered a guarantee of one year of employment and awarded him damages.
Since the alleged oral agreement was made before the plaintiff's employment was to commence and was to be performed for one full year thereafter, the agreement was covered by the Statute of Frauds (see, Tallini v. Business Air, 148 A.D.2d 828; Ginsberg v. Fairfield-Noble Corp., 81 A.D.2d 318; Gottlieb v Gins, 102 Misc. 686; General Obligations Law § 5-701 [a] [1]). For a writing to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, it must contain all of the material terms of the agreement (see, Cohon Co. v. Russell, 23 N.Y.2d 569, 575). In an employment agreement, the duration of employment is a material term. Since the offer sheet did not include the duration of the plaintiff's employment, the Statute of Frauds was not satisfied. Furthermore, parol evidence may not be used to prove that a writing constitutes the parties' agreement if the writing is insufficient on its face to satisfy the Statute of Frauds (see, Scheck v Francis, 26 N.Y.2d 466; 61 N.Y. Jur 2d, Statute of Frauds, § 321). "It is settled law in New York that, absent an agreement establishing a fixed duration, an employment relationship is presumed to be a hiring at will, terminable at any time by either party" (Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, 69 N.Y.2d 329, 333; see also, Mayer v. Publishers Clearing House, 205 A.D.2d 506; Doynow v. Nynex Publ. Co., 202 A.D.2d 388). Consequently, the plaintiff was employed at will, and his complaint should have been dismissed (see, Mayer v. Publishers Clearing House, supra; Doynow v. Nynex Publ. Co., supra).
In view of our determination, we need not reach the defendants' remaining contention. Miller, J.P., O'Brien, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.