legedly sustained as a result of his exposure to lead paint while residing in an apartment rented to his mother by Scott Patrick and Kurt Roesner (defendants). Supreme Court granted in part defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against them, and we agree with defendants that the court should have granted their motion in its entirety. Defendants met their initial burden with respect to the claim that they did not have actual or constructive notice of the lead-paint condition, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition thereto ( see Joyner v. Durant, 277 A.D.2d 1014, 1014–1015, 716 N.Y.S.2d 221). With respect to actual notice, even assuming, arguendo, that defendants were aware of chipping or peeling paint in the apartment, we conclude that such knowledge does not constitute actual notice of a dangerous lead paint condition ( see id. at 1015, 716 N.Y.S.2d 221; Durand v. Roth Bros. Partnership Co., 265 A.D.2d 448, 449, 696 N.Y.S.2d 234; Lanthier v. Feroleto, 237 A.D.2d 877, 877–878, 654 N.Y.S.2d 531). With respect to constructive notice, defendants established that they did not retain the requisite right of entry to the apartment to sustain a claim for constructive notice ( see Chapman v. Silber, 97 N.Y.2d 9, 15, 734 N.Y.S.2d 541, 760 N.E.2d 329; cf. Charette v. Santspree, 68 A.D.3d 1583, 1584, 893 N.Y.S.2d 315). Patrick testified at his deposition that defendants did not have a rental agreement or lease with plaintiff's mother, and plaintiff's mother likewise testified at her deposition that she signed only a one-page “landlord/tenant agreement” with the Department of Social Services. Defendants submitted affidavits in which they averred that, although they retained a key to the apartment, their arrangement with plaintiff's mother was such that they were unable to enter the apartment “unless [they] gave notice and received permission from” plaintiff's mother.

The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that she did not have notice of the dangerous condition. Generally, to hold an out-of-possession owner liable for injuries caused by defective or dangerous conditions upon the property, the owner must have retained sufficient control over the premises and must have actual or constructive notice of the condition for such a period of time that, in the exercise of reasonable care, he or she could have corrected it (see, Putnam v. Stout, 38 N.Y.2d 607, 612; Carvano v. Morgan, 270 A.D.2d 222, 223; Lanthier v. Feroleto, 237 A.D.2d 877; Stark v. Port Auth. of N.Y. N.J., 224 A.D.2d 681; Stalter v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 220 A.D.2d 577, 578; Pirillo v. Long Is. R.R., 208 A.D.2d 818). "There must be some proof that the potential danger reasonably could have been neutralized and that its existence was or should have been discovered by the [landowner]" (Preston v. State of New York, 59 N.Y.2d 997, 999; see, Busto v. Tamucci, 251 A.D.2d 441, 442; Brown v. Marathon Realty, 170 A.D.2d 426, 427). The defendant established that she did not have actual or constructive notice of the presence of the rifle in the closet.

Supreme Court erred in denying that part of defendants' motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendants met their burden of establishing that they had no actual or constructive notice of the dangerous lead paint condition, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see, Boler v. Malik, 267 A.D.2d 998; Durand v. Roth Bros. Partnership Co., 265 A.D.2d 448, 449; Arnold v. Advantage Fed. Credit Union [appeal No. 2], 261 A.D.2d 939). Knowledge of chipping and peeling paint in the apartment does not constitute actual or constructive notice of a dangerous lead paint condition ( see, Boler v. Malik, supra, at 998-999; Durand v. Roth Bros. Partnership Co., supra, at 449; Lanthier v. Feroleto, 237 A.D.2d 877, 877-878). Plaintiff may not rely upon any alleged breach of the warranty of habitability to recover damages for personal injuries ( see, Richardson v. Simone, 275 A.D.2d 576 [decided Aug. 17, 2000]; Stone v. Gordon, 211 A.D.2d 881; Carpenter v. Smith, 191 A.D.2d 1036). Finally, the court did not err in denying that part of defendants' motion seeking reimbursement for costs incurred in purchasing a request for judicial intervention.

Significantly, New York City has enacted legislation which, in effect, provides for constructive notice to landlords of hazardous lead conditions in those apartments erected prior to 1960 where landlords know that they are occupied by children six years old or younger (see, Administrative Code of City of N Y § 27-2056.1 (a) (2); § 27-2056.4; see also, Juarez v. Wavecrest Mgt. Team, 88 N.Y.2d 628, 647). In lead paint cases arising outside of New York City, however, it is now well established that knowledge by a landlord that a leased premises contains peeling and chipping paint is not constructive notice that a lead hazard exists on that premises (see, Powell v. Mason, 267 A.D.2d 1025;Boler v. Malik, 267 A.D.2d 998; Roberts v. Pius, 267 A.D.2d 292; Hines v. RAP Realty Corp., 258 A.D.2d 440, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 812; Busto v. Tamucci, 251 A.D.2d 441, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 815; Lanthier v. Feroleto, 237 A.D.2d 877). To the extent that plaintiffs suggest that this Court should reject the rationale of these cases, as decided by the Second and Fourth Departments, we decline to do so.

ng of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact that the respondents had actual or constructive notice of a lead-based paint hazard in the demised premises prior to 1995 when the condition was discovered by the Westchester County Department of Health (see, Durand v. Roth Bros. Partnership Co., 265 A.D.2d 448; Hines v. RAP Realty Corp., 258 A.D.2d 440; Andrade v. Wong, 251 A.D.2d 609; Brown v. Marathon Realty, 170 A.D.2d 426). Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, constructive notice cannot be imputed based on evidence that the respondents were told about peeling and chipping paint within the demised premises, and had been placed on notice, inter alia, that older dwellings may contain lead-based paint (see, Durand v. Roth Bros. Partnership Co., 265 A.D.2d 448, supra;Smith v. Saget, 258 A.D.2d 641; Hines v. RAP Realty Corp., 258 A.D.2d 440, supra; Busto v. Tamucci, 251 A.D.2d 441; Lanthier v. Feroleto, 237 A.D.2d 877). Constructive notice may be found where an out-of-possession landlord reserves a right under the terms of the lease to enter the premises for the purpose of inspection and maintenance or repair and a specific statutory violation exists (see, Juarez v. Wavecrest Mgt. Team, 88 N.Y.2d 628, 646-648; Guzman v. Haven Plaza Hous. Dev. Fund Co., 69 N.Y.2d 559, 566-567; Deebs v. Rich-Mar Realty Assocs., 248 A.D.2d 185; Velasquez v. Tyler Graphics, 214 A.D.2d 489). Here, however, there was no specific statutory violation.

Defendants met their initial burden, and "plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether defendant[s], as plaintiff's landlord[s], had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous lead paint condition for a sufficient period of time to have remedied it" ( Arnold v. Advantage Fed. Credit Union [appeal No. 2] , 261 A.D.2d 939 [decided May 7, 1999]). We reject plaintiff's contention that actual or constructive notice of the dangerous lead condition may be imputed to defendants because defendants were aware of chipping and peeling paint; defendants are both real estate brokers and landlords of other properties; defendant Paramjeet K. Malik is a registered nurse; and, before purchasing the subject property, she received mortgage documents for another property that referred to Federal lead based paint regulations ( see, Smith v. Saget, 258 A.D.2d 641, 641-642; Leeper v. Brady Burgess Mgt. Corp., 254 A.D.2d 695; Andrade v. Wong, 251 A.D.2d 609, 609-610; Lanthier v. Feroleto, 237 A.D.2d 877, 877-878).

Defendants met their initial burden, and "plaintiff[s] failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether defendant[s], as plaintiff[s'] landlord[s], had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous lead paint condition for a sufficient period of time to have remedied it" ( Arnold v. Advantage Fed. Credit Union [appeal No. 2], 261 A.D.2d 939 [decided May 7, 1999]; see, Boler v. Malik, 267 A.D.2d 998 [decided herewith]). Defendants' knowledge of the existence of peeling paint does not constitute actual or constructive knowledge of a hazardous lead paint condition ( see, Lanthier v. Feroleto, 237 A.D.2d 877). Defendants transferred the property to the mortgagee before receiving notice of the presence of lead based paint at the premises, and thus we reject plaintiffs' contention that defendants are liable for their failure to correct the condition pursuant to Public Health Law § 1373.

The Supreme Court denied the cross motion, and we reverse. After Roth made out a prima facie case for summary judgment, the plaintiff attempted to establish prior notice by Roth primarily by relying upon evidence that the building superintendent was aware of chipping and peeling paint in the apartment and that the hazards of lead paint were widely publicized before the plaintiff's injury. However, notice of chipping and peeling paint is not the equivalent of notice of a dangerous lead paint condition, and the fact that lead paint hazards frequently were the subject of media reports did not place Roth on notice that a dangerous condition existed in the plaintiff's apartment (see, Smith v. Saget, 258 A.D.2d 641 [2d Dept., Feb. 22, 1999]; Hines v. Rap Realty Corp., 258 A.D.2d 440 [2d Dept., Feb. 1, 1999]; Andrade v. Wong, 251 A.D.2d 609; Busto v. Tamucci, 251 A.D.2d 441; Lanthier v. Feroleto, 237 A.D.2d 877; Brown v. Marathon Realty, 170 A.D.2d 426). Moreover, since neither the notations in the plaintiff's medical records nor evidence of a subsequent case of lead poisoning in the same building established that Roth knew or should have known of the dangerous condition prior to the plaintiff's hospitalization, Roth's motion for summary judgment should have been granted. In view of the foregoing, we have no occasion to consider Roth's alternative argument that its cross claim against the current owner of the premises, the defendant 88-44 Realty Corp., should be reinstated.

Present — Lawton, J. P., Hayes, Wisner, Hurlbutt and Scudder, JJ. Amended order unanimously reversed on the law without costs, motion granted and complaint against defendant Advantage Federal Credit Union dismissed. Memorandum: Supreme Court erred in denying the motion of Advantage Federal Credit Union (defendant) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it. Defendant met its initial burden, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether defendant, as plaintiff's landlord, had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous lead paint condition for a sufficient period of time to have remedied it ( see, Smith v. Saget, 258 A.D.2d 641; Leeper v. Brady Burgess Mgt. Corp., 254 A.D.2d 695; Andrade v. Wong, 251 A.D.2d 609; Lanthier v. Feroleto, 237 A.D.2d 877). Although Monroe County Health Department records show that previous owners were cited for lead paint violations between 1980 and 1982, there is no proof that defendant was aware of those records. The Department of Health closed its file in 1982 following a final inspection and abatement of the problem.

As a general rule, liability for dangerous conditions does not extend to a prior owner of the premises ( see, e.g., Bittrolff v. Ho's Dev. Corp., 77 N.Y.2d 896; Mullen v. Zoebe, Inc., 205 A.D.2d 597; see also, Stevens v. Northern Lights Assocs., 229 A.D.2d 1001). A narrow exception exists, however, and liability may be imposed where a dangerous condition existed at the time of the conveyance, and the new owner has not had a reasonable time to discover the condition if it was unknown, or to remedy the condition once it became known ( see, e.g., Bittrolff v. Ho's Dev. Corp., supra; Fisher v. Braun, 227 A.D.2d 586; Slominv. Skaarland Constr. Corp., 207 A.D.2d 639; Brown v. O'Connor, 193 A.D.2d 1088). There is no evidence that Tobias either created a dangerous condition or concealed it from Woodbine ( see, Lanthier v. Feroleto, 237 A.D.2d 877; O'Rourke v. Sachel Hardware, 178 A.D.2d 134; Perez v. City of New York, 168 A.D.2d 227). Accordingly, Tobias is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cross claim insofar as asserted against him ( see, Jackson v. Endo Labs., 175 A.D.2d 798; Camillery v. Getty Ref Mktg. Co., 170 A.D.2d 567). S. Miller, J. P., Thompson, Friedmann and Florio, JJ., concur.