The only ground for denying the right to incorporate in the transcript additional parts of the record or additional report of proceedings on a supplemental praecipe for record would be a showing of actual prejudice to the opposing party. ( Harris v. Sovereign Camp W.O.W. 302 Ill. App. 310, affirmed 374 Ill. 47; Landquist v. Grossman, 282 Ill. App. 181.) No such showing has been made in the instant case.

A second notice of appeal is a nullity. Lanquist v. Grossman, 282 Ill. App. 181. We find that a proper notice of appeal was filed on April 3, 1965, that it should not be stricken from the record, that the record was not filed in proper time, and therefore defendants' appeal is dismissed.

Following the adoption of the Civil Practice Act, our Supreme and Appellate Courts have consistently held that where a notice of appeal has been filed, there was no provision in the statute for filing a second notice of appeal. Corrigan v. Von Schill College of Chiropody Pedic Surgery, 277 Ill. App. 350. We note that in Lanquist v. Grossman, 282 Ill. App. 181 (1935), and in Cullinan v. Cullinan, 285 Ill. App. 272, 1 N.E.2d 921 (1936), it was contended that the appellant had the option to abandon or disregard the appeal perfected by filing the first notice of appeal and could proceed under a second notice of appeal. The Court held, however, that the second appeal should be dismissed for want of statutory sanction. Again, in People ex rel. Bender v. Davis, 365 Ill. 389, 6 N.E.2d 643, the appellants perfected an appeal by notice of appeal to the Appellate Court but failed to comply with the rules in completing such appeal, and the appeal was dismissed.

The five-day requirement for filing notice of appeal and bond under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act has frequently been held by our courts to be jurisdictional. Chicago Housing Authority v. Frank, 335 Ill. App. 456; Kruse v. Ballsmith, 332 Ill. App. 301; Gholston v. Terrell, 292 Ill. App. 192; Lanquist v. Grossman, 282 Ill. App. 181. With respect to motions to vacate judgments within the thirty-day period, as regulated by the Civil Practice Act, section 50, subsection 7, chap. 110 [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 104.050, subd. (7)], the pertinent provision of which is:

" If the jurisdiction of the reviewing court does not attach, it follows that the jurisdiction to dismiss the purported appeal must remain in the trial court. In Lanquist v. Grossman, 282 Ill. App. 181, where the appellant filed a second notice of appeal, this court said (p. 191): "The trial court, however, should have sustained defendants' motion to dismiss what purported to be a notice of appeal filed by plaintiff July 17, 1934, because there was no legal sanction for filing same under the act or the rules of court." The trial court did not err in exercising jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal to the Supreme Court.

As appellee expresses it, the parties to this suit, and other attorneys and litigants in this State, are entitled to know whether such rule is to be applied inflexibly or, if not, when and under what circumstances it will not be so applied. The interpretation of the rule, under the facts and circumstances here before the court, seems to raise a problem not heretofore considered in either the Supreme or Appellate Courts of this State. Appellee points to the case of Lanquist v. Grossman, 282 Ill. App. 181, in which case the appellant had filed one notice of appeal and failed to file his praecipe for record on appeal within the 10-day period specified in the rules. Fearing that he had forfeited his rights under such appeal, and that the appeal would be dismissed for that reason, appellant became anxious and filed a second notice of appeal, with a praecipe for record on such second appeal.

" In Lanquist v. Grossman, 282 Ill. App. 181, this court further said: "The filing of the notice of appeal June 15, 1934, was jurisdictional and constituted a pending perfected appeal which was a continuance of the proceeding in the court below, and we are at a loss to understand how, under the terms of the act, when the jurisdiction of the court had attached by an appeal already perfected and pending, a subsequent notice of appeal could have any force or effect." In McCoy v. Acme Automatic Printing Co., 278 Ill. 276, the Supreme Court said: "When plaintiff in error prayed and perfected its appeal it waived and abandoned its motion to vacate the judgment and could not longer rely on it. The appeal removed the cause to the Appellate Court, and the trial court lost all jurisdiction and had no power thereafter to enter any order on the motion to vacate the judgment.

In the case of Corrigan v. Von Schill College of Chiropody Pedic Surgery, 277 Ill. App. 350, where a defendant filed a second notice of appeal, Mr. Presiding Justice O'Connor said: "There is no provision in the rules of court for allowing a second notice of appeal, so that the second notice of appeal filed by defendant was a nullity." Recently, in the case of Lanquist v. Grossman, 282 Ill. App. 181, a situation almost identical with the case at bar was presented to our Appellate Court for the First District. In an exhaustive opinion written by Mr. Justice Sullivan, which sets out in detail all of the provisions of the Civil Practice Act which pertain to appeals, this matter is discussed at great length.