Lankford v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.

34 Citing cases

  1. Progressive Mountain Ins. Co. v. Bishop

    338 Ga. App. 115 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 28 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Progressive, the notice provision did not expressly specify that notice had to be as soon as possible after the accident, and instead provided generally that a person seeking coverage must “promptly report each accident or loss[.]” Progressive, supra at 116, 790 S.E.2d 91. Moreover, the court in Progressive distinguished its facts from Lankford, noting that despite the nearly eleven-month delay, notice was given to the insurance company more than a year before the insured underwent surgery for the injuries in question.

    Id. A general provision that no action will lie against the insurer unless the insured has fully complied with the terms of the policy will suffice to create a condition precedent. See Lankford v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 307 Ga.App. 12, 14, 703 S.E.2d 436 (2010) (noting policies at issue provided that “[t]here is no right of action against” the insurance company “until all the terms of this policy have been met”); see also Plantation Pipe Line Co. , 335 Ga.App. at 312(2) n. 14, 780 S.E.2d 501 (citing cases). Bishop's policy contained a general provision requiring his full compliance with the policy's terms: “We may not be sued unless there is full compliance with all the terms of this policy.”

  2. Silva v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.

    344 Ga. App. 81 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 7 times

    (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Lankford v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 307 Ga. App. 12, 14, 703 S.E.2d 436 (2010). "[T]he issue of whether notice is timely and meets the policy provisions is usually a question of fact for the jury.

  3. Hyde v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

    356 Ga. App. 533 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 4 times

    Hyde argues that State Farm received notice of her potential claim when Massey Restoration Group's State Farm agent received the December 7, 2016 letter notifying Massey Restoration Group of Hyde's potential uninsured motorist claim. We rejected a similar argument in Lankford v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. , 307 Ga. App. 12, 15-16, 703 S.E.2d 436 (2010). In that case, Lankford first provided written notice to State Farm that he had been involved in an accident and first raised the issue of uninsured motorist coverage under his own insurance policies almost two years after the accident.

  4. TransWorld Food Serv. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.

    Civil Action 1:19-cv-03772-SDG (N.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2022)

    TransWorld waited nearly two years to notify Nationwide of its claim, which is unreasonable as a matter of law, and TransWorld's belief that it could recover from the contractor's insurer is an insufficient justification for such an extensive delay. Lankford v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 307 Ga.App. 12, 14-15 (2010) (failure to notify for nearly two years based on belief that other insurance would cover claim was unreasonable as a matter of law). “To hold otherwise ‘would allow an insured to delay notifying the insurer for months or even years, so long as the insured thought that other insurance existed to cover the loss. Such an interpretation is contrary to the obvious intent of the policy, which is to require notice [within a reasonable period] after the occurrence of a covered event.

  5. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Breffle

    355 Ga. App. 276 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 4 times
    Reversing denial of summary judgment based on concluding that insured's 13-month delay in providing insurer notice of accident because, while he was aware of the policy, he did not think he would need to use his uninsured coverage, and thus the delay was unreasonable as a matter of law

    Such an interpretation is contrary to the obvious intent of the policy, which is to require notice [as soon as possible] after the occurrence of a covered event."Lankford v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. , 307 Ga. App. 12, 15, 703 S.E.2d 436 (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted) (holding that an insured's failure to provide notice until almost two years after the collision was not, as a matter of law "as soon as reasonably possible") (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Richmond v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. , 140 Ga. App. 215, 220-221 (2), 231 S.E.2d 245 (1976) ("Under all of the facts and circumstances of a particular case it may be found that an insured's delay in giving notice of an accident to his insurer was unjustified and unreasonable. In such event, on a motion for summary judgment, the court may rule on the question as a matter of law.").

  6. Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. Stonewall Insurance

    335 Ga. App. 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)

    The ordinary principle of contract law, that a party seeking to recover under a contract must perform any applicable condition precedent before the contract becomes absolute and obligatory upon the other party,10 applies to contracts of insurance. Lankford v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 307 Ga. App. 12 , 14 (703 SE2d 436 ) (2010); Blackburn v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 174 Ga. App. 157 , 158 (329 SE2d 284 ) (1985). Therefore, a forfeiture of insurance coverage may result when an insured fails to satisfy a condition precedent to coverage under the contract.

  7. Geico Indem. Co. v. Smith

    338 Ga. App. 455 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that insured's failure for nearly six months before notifying her mother's UM carrier of collision was not justified by her attorney's initial belief that UM coverage would not apply and was unreasonable

    We disagree.The holding in our case is controlled by the case law cited therein, as well as the binding authority set forth in Lankford v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 307 Ga. App. 12, 703 S.E.2d 436 (2010), which rejected the very argument made by Smith in this case. Smith argues that her six-month delay in giving notice of the accident did not violate the policy requirement that she give notice “as soon as possible after [the] accident” because her attorney initially did not believe the uninsured motorist coverage would apply, but later thought her claim might exceed the liability limits available.

  8. Barclay v. Stephenson

    337 Ga. App. 365 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 10 times
    Stating that a notice provision expressly made a condition to coverage must be satisfied and finding that "[a]n unjustified failure to give such notice ends the insurer's coverage obligations"

    Although issues of justification and timely notice often raise factual questions, “the facts and circumstances of a particular case may render an insured's delay in giving notice of an occurrence to his insurer unjustified and unreasonable as a matter of law.”Lankford v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. , 307 Ga.App. 12, 14, 703 S.E.2d 436 (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted). Id.

  9. Grange Ins. Co. v. Martin

    Civil Action 3:23-cv-00145-TES (M.D. Ga. Sep. 24, 2024)

    See [Doc. 31, p. 12]. Also, to the extent that any case dealing with an underinsured motorist policy is persuasive in this case, Bishop is less like this case than Lankford v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 703 S.E.2d 436 (Ga.Ct.App. 2010). In Bishop, the court distinguished Lankford on the grounds that the two-year delay in Lankford was found unreasonable as a matter of law, as opposed to in Bishop, where the insured delayed for “less than 11 months” and “provided notice more than a year before undergoing surgery for his injuries.”

  10. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jones

    CASE NO. 3:17-CV-92 (CDL) (M.D. Ga. Mar. 20, 2018)

    Id. § II - Conditions ¶ 6, ECF No. 1-6 at 40. See, e.g., Lankford v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 703 S.E.2d 436, 438-39 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that a similar provision made notice provisions a condition precedent to coverage). Neither Jones nor Sutton notified Travelers about the shooting incident or requested coverage under the policy—not after Jones received a letter from the Blackwells' lawyer in April 2016 stating that litigation was contemplated, not after the Blackwells filed the underlying lawsuit and served Jones in August 2016, and not after Sutton was added as a defendant to the underlying lawsuit in March 2017. Jones did tell the Blackwells' lawyer about the Travelers policy during her November 2016 deposition in the underlying lawsuit, and the Blackwells' lawyer immediately contacted Travelers to provide notice of the shooting incident and the underlying lawsuit.