Opinion
J-A05045-17 No. 1367 WDA 2016
06-12-2017
CAROLYN H. LANKARD AND ROBERT M. LANKARD, HUSBAND AND WIFE Appellants v. LAUREL MOUNTAIN MIDSTREAM OPERATING, LLC Appellee
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered August 25, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County
Civil Division at No(s): A.D. 778-2013 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MOULTON, J. MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.:
Carolyn H. and Robert M. Lankard ("the Lankards") appeal from the August 25, 2016 order of the Greene County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Laurel Mountain Midstream Operating, LLC ("Laurel Mountain"). We affirm.
The Lankards own a 15-acre property in Franklin Township, Greene County. On March 27, 2014, the Lankards filed an amended complaint against Laurel Mountain alleging causes of action for: (1) breach of contract; (2) ejectment; (3) trespass/continuing trespass; (4) private nuisance; (5) conversion; (6) fraudulent misrepresentation; and (7) a demand for equitable accounting. The allegations stemmed from Laurel Mountain's installation of a natural gas pipeline on a portion of the Lankards' property. In their amended complaint, the Lankards sought a preliminary injunction requiring Laurel Mountain to relocate the pipeline to the correct location on the property in accordance with an easement and a separate letter agreement ("SLA") entered into by the parties in 2011.
The trial court comprehensively set forth the factual and procedural history of this case in its order and opinion granting summary judgment, which we adopt and incorporate herein. See Trial Ct. Op., 8/25/16, at 1-9 (unpaginated).
On January 29, 2016, following discovery, Laurel Mountain filed a motion for summary judgment, to which the Lankards filed a response. The trial court heard argument on the motion on May 2, 2016. On August 25, 2016, the trial court granted Laurel Mountain's motion for summary judgment. On September 19, 2016, the Lankards timely appealed to this Court.
In response to the Lankards' Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal, the trial court entered an order on October 11, 2016, adopting its August 25, 2016 opinion as its Rule 1925(a) opinion.
On appeal, the Lankards raise the following issues:
1. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or abused its discretion by fundamentally misapplying the parol evidence rule and refusing to consider clear and convincing record evidence establishing the parties' contractual intent, formation and modification?
2. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or abused its discretion by relying upon void, and ambiguous, purported receipts and releases in entering summary judgment on all claims in favor of the alleged releasee?Lankards' Br. at 7-8 (suggested answers omitted).
3. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or abused its discretion by failing to correctly apply the required standard of review to resolve a motion for summary judgment?
4. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or abused its discretion by allowing the movant to benefit from its spoliation of evidence directly relevant to the central issues in this case, which by itself should have precluded the entry of summary judgment?
5. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or abused its discretion by dismissing a properly pled cause of action for ejectment to compel the removal of an intentionally installed encroaching pipeline and valve?
Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is as follows:
[O]ur scope of review is plenary, and our standard of review is the same as that applied by the trial court. . . . [We] may reverse the entry of a summary judgment only [if we] find[] that the lower court erred in concluding that the matter presented no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is clear that the moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In making this assessment, we view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. As our inquiry involves solely questions of law, our review is de novo.Mull v. Ickes , 994 A.2d 1137, 1139 (Pa.Super. 2010); see Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2.
Preliminarily, we find that the Lankards have waived their fifth issue, which challenges the trial court's dismissal of their ejectment action, by failing to raise it in their Rule 1925(b) statement. The trial court dismissed the ejectment action in its June 9, 2014 order sustaining in part Laurel Mountain's preliminary objections to the amended complaint. In their Rule 1925(b) statement, the Lankards listed five separate issues, none of which challenged the June 9, 2014 order or the dismissal of the ejectment action. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii) (requiring that appellant identify "with sufficient detail" each ruling or error he or she intends to challenge on appeal). Because the Lankards failed to raise the ejectment claim in their Rule 1925(b) statement, it is waived.
We have reordered our discussion of the Lankards' issues for ease of disposition.
In their reply brief, the Lankards argue that this claim is not waived because the introductory paragraph of their Rule 1925(b) statement averred that it "should be deemed to include every subsidiary issue raised with the Court, including, without limitation, the issues raised in opposition to [Laurel Mountain's] preliminary objections." 1925(b) Stmt. at 1. This vague, boilerplate language, however, is insufficient to preserve a claim for appellate review. See Commonwealth v. Proctor , 156 A.3d 261, 267 (Pa.Super. 2017); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii).
In any event, even if the Lankards had properly preserved this issue in their Rule 1925(b) statement, we would still find it waived for their failure to develop it with pertinent legal argument. See Umbelina v. Adams, 34 A.3d 151, 161 (Pa.Super. 2011) ("[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.") (quoting In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 (Pa.Super. 2011)); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). In their brief, the Lankards merely assert that their complaint "averred that Laurel Mountain intentionally installed the encroaching Pipeline and aboveground valve on their Property, and otherwise pled a justiciable cause of action for ejectment." Lankards' Br. at 6768.
In their third issue, the Lankards contend that the trial court erroneously applied the applicable standard of review in ruling on Laurel Mountain's summary judgment motion. Specifically, they claim that "[t]he trial court incorrectly interpreted the record against the Lankards, the non-moving parties, and made fact-based and credibility assessments in favor of Laurel Mountain on a controlling issue in this case." Lankards' Br. at 60. We disagree.
The trial court began its legal analysis by setting forth the applicable standard of review for summary judgment motions. Trial Ct. Op., 8/25/16, at 9-10. After examining the language of the easement and the SLA, as well as "the lengthy and substantial record," the trial court determined that the Lankards could not establish that Laurel Mountain breached the agreements.
After careful review of the file, oral arguments, and in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court finds that the crux of the [Lankards'] averrments [sic] is that [Laurel Mountain] intentionally violated the Easement and the SLA, thus resulting in a breach of contract claim. This Court disagrees, and finds that [Laurel Mountain] did not breach said Contracts.Id. at 13, 17. The trial court granted summary judgment because it found no genuine issues of material fact with regard to any of the Lankards' claims. Based on our review of the trial court's decision, we conclude that the trial court correctly applied the standard of review.
The trial court addressed each of the Lankards' three remaining properly preserved issues in its August 25, 2016 opinion. Based on our de novo review of the certified record, the parties' briefs and oral arguments, and the relevant law, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in Laurel Mountain's favor. We reach this conclusion for the reasons stated in the trial court's cogent opinion, which we adopt and incorporate herein. See Trial Ct. Op., 8/25/16, at 10-20.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 6/12/2017
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