Opinion
Case No. 2D04-1786.
Opinion filed October 7, 2005.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County, Roger Allan Alcott, Judge.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Heather M. Gray, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Tiffany Gatesh Fearing, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Cameron Lanier challenges his convictions for driving without a license, possession of cocaine, and resisting an officer without violence. Because all of the evidence supporting the convictions was obtained during an illegal detention of Lanier, we reverse his convictions and remand for discharge. Lanier also challenges the revocation of his probation based, in part, on these new law violations. Because the evidence allegedly supporting the revocation of Lanier's probation was either wholly inadmissible or legally insufficient, we also reverse the revocation of Lanier's probation and remand for his probation to be reinstated.
On September 25, 2003, Polk County Sheriff's deputies obtained information that an individual with outstanding warrants was riding as a passenger in a gray Ford Contour bearing a specific license plate number. During routine traffic patrol, Officer Ryan Shea located the Ford, and after confirming that the passenger in the car was the individual being sought, he effected a traffic stop of the Ford. Shea testified that the driver of the car had not committed any traffic infractions and pulled over immediately after Shea activated his lights and siren.
After stopping the car, Shea went immediately to the passenger door and ordered the passenger out of the car. He then arrested the passenger on the outstanding warrants. Only after the arrest was completed did Shea walk to the driver's side of the car and first encounter Lanier, who was driving. Upon reaching the driver's door, Shea asked Lanier for some type of identification. When Lanier produced a State of Florida identification card, Shea took the card from him and ordered him to stay in the car while Shea "ran his identification." As Shea testified, "I told him to stay in the seat and we were just going to run his name and make sure that he didn't have any outstanding warrants. Make sure that his license was good and then he'd be on his way."
While another officer began running Lanier's identification through the computer system, Shea remained near the driver's side of Lanier's car. At some point during the wait for the computer check, Lanier got out of the car. Shea told Lanier to get back in the car, but Lanier refused. Lanier then reached into the waistband of his pants. Shea ordered Lanier to remove his hand from his pants, but Lanier did not comply. Shea then grabbed Lanier's arm, wrestled him to the ground, and handcuffed him. While a pat-down search of Lanier did not reveal any contraband, a subsequent search of the area of the struggle revealed a baggie that contained cocaine. These events ultimately gave rise to the charges of driving without a license, possession of cocaine, and resisting an officer without violence in case number CF03-006501.
At the time of his arrest, Lanier was on probation in case numbers CF01-08037A and CF02-02806A. In response to this new arrest, the Department of Corrections filed an affidavit of violation of probation. In addition to the allegations based on the new law violations, the affidavit alleged that Lanier had made a false report to his probation officer by claiming that he was employed when he was not. The affidavit also alleged that Lanier had made a second false report when he reported that he was enrolled in and attending "NCTI" school when he was not.
At a revocation hearing, Lanier objected to the proceeding itself, arguing that the trial court should consider his motion to suppress in case number CF03-006501 before considering the revocation of his probation. The trial court overruled this objection. Shea then testified to the facts of Lanier's arrest over Lanier's objection that such evidence was inadmissible because it was the product of an illegal detention. In addition, Lanier's probation officer, Ricky Brooks, testified to the alleged false reports made by Lanier. Brooks testified that Lanier had told him that he was working for a firm called Labor Ready. Brooks testified that he called Labor Ready and was informed that Lanier had not worked there since 2002. Brooks also testified that he had contacted the school coordinator for the NCTI school, and she told him that Lanier had never enrolled and was not attending the school. Lanier objected to all of this testimony on the grounds that it was hearsay.
Despite Lanier's objections, at the conclusion of the revocation hearing, the trial court found that Lanier had violated his probation by committing new crimes and by providing false reports to his probation officer concerning his employment and his schooling. The trial court revoked Lanier's probation and sentenced him to ten years in prison in case CF01-08037A and to a concurrent five years in prison in case number CF02-02806A.
Shortly after the revocation hearing, the trial court held a hearing on Lanier's motion to suppress the evidence against him in case number CF03-006501. Officer Shea again testified to the facts surrounding Lanier's arrest. After hearing this testimony, the trial court denied Lanier's motion, stating that it believed that Shea could validly request Lanier's driver's license because he had been driving at the time of a valid traffic stop. Lanier then pleaded guilty to the charges while specifically reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, which the State conceded was dispositive. The trial court then sentenced Lanier to five years in prison, to run concurrently with the sentences resulting from the revocation of probation.
Florida law is clear that an officer may not detain a driver following a traffic stop once the initial alleged purpose for the stop has been satisfied and removed. State v. Diaz, 850 So. 2d 435, 437 (Fla. 2003); Blackwelder v. State, 853 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); State v. Klein, 736 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). "[O]nce a police officer has totally satisfied the purpose for which he has initially stopped and detained a motorist, the officer no longer has any reasonable grounds or legal basis for continuing the detention of the motorist." Diaz, 850 So. 2d at 438. The officer may not approach the driver and ask to see a driver's license and registration after he has satisfied the initial reason for the stop. Id. at 439. Instead, the only contact permitted after the reason for the initial stop has been satisfied is to tell the motorist the reason for the stop and that the motorist is free to go. Id. at 440; Blackwelder, 853 So. 2d at 480.
This general proposition is true even when the police have reasonable suspicion to continue to detain a passenger in the car. For example, in Klein, Klein was pulled over for speeding. 736 So. 2d at 10. He was removed from his car and given field sobriety tests, which he passed. Klein was not given any citations; however, while Klein was undergoing the field sobriety tests, another officer determined that there was an outstanding warrant for Klein's passenger. The passenger was arrested, and cocaine was found in his pockets during a subsequent search. An officer then searched Klein's car but found nothing. At that point, rather than permitting Klein to leave, the officers called for a canine unit. Ultimately, drugs were found in the passenger compartment of the car. Klein moved to suppress the drugs found in the car on the basis that the search of his car was illegal. The trial court granted the motion, noting that once Klein had passed the field sobriety tests, the reason for the initial stop was over and the police no longer had any reason to hold Klein at the scene. The trial court specifically rejected the State's argument that Klein could have been held longer because of his passenger's infractions. Id. On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed, noting that once Klein passed the sobriety tests and the officer decided not to issue any citations, there was no longer any legal reason for detaining Klein. Id.
In this case, as in Klein, once Lanier's passenger was arrested, there was no longer any legal reason for detaining Lanier. There is no dispute that the only reason for the stop was to effectuate the arrest of Lanier's passenger, and there is no dispute that that reason was completely satisfied before Shea approached Lanier and requested identification. Once the passenger was arrested, the reason for the initial stop was satisfied, and the only contact Shea was permitted was to tell Lanier the reason for the stop and allow him to be on his way. By requesting Lanier's identification and requiring him to remain in his vehicle while Shea checked for outstanding warrants, Shea violated the provisions of the Fourth Amendment and the supreme court's clear holding in Diaz. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Lanier's motion to suppress. Because that motion was dispositive, we reverse Lanier's convictions for driving without a license, possession of cocaine, and resisting an officer without violence and remand for discharge.
As to the revocation of Lanier's probation, the evidence of the alleged new law violations was not properly considered by the court. Evidence discovered during an unlawful detention and search is not admissible during a hearing to revoke probation.State v. Scarlet, 800 So. 2d 220, 221 (Fla. 2001) (quotingScarlet v. State, 766 So. 2d 1110, 1111 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000));Williams v. State, 791 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). As discussed above, all of the evidence against Lanier supporting the alleged new law violations was gathered during an unlawful detention. Therefore, the trial court should not have considered Shea's testimony at the revocation hearing, and Shea's testimony cannot support the revocation of Lanier's probation.
Moreover, the only evidence supporting the other alleged violations of Lanier's probation was hearsay. Although it is true that hearsay evidence is admissible at a revocation hearing, a revocation may not be based solely on hearsay evidence. Thompson v. State, 890 So. 2d 382, 383 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Clemons v. State, 388 So. 2d 639, 640 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). In Thompson, this court held that testimony from Thompson's probation officer as to what the officer was told by "someone" at a drug treatment program about Thompson's attendance was pure hearsay that could not support the revocation of Thompson's probation. 890 So. 2d at 383. Similarly, in Clemons, this court noted that the only evidence of Clemons' alleged violation was "the hearsay testimony of the probation supervisor about what appellant's employer had said in a telephone conversation." 388 So. 2d at 640. This court held that this type of testimony, which was pure hearsay, was insufficient to support the revocation of Clemons' probation.Id.
Here, as in Thompson and Clemons, the only evidence of Lanier's alleged violations concerning his employment and schooling was the testimony of his probation officer concerning what Lanier's employer allegedly said in a telephone conversation about his employment and what a school coordinator allegedly said in a telephone conversation about his attendance. As hearsay, this testimony was insufficient, standing alone, to support the revocation of Lanier's probation. Because the State presented no other testimony concerning these alleged violations, the trial court erred in revoking Lanier's probation based on this testimony.
Reversed and remanded for discharge in case number CF03-006501; reversed and remanded for reinstatement to probation in case numbers CF01-08037A and CF02-02806A.
CASANUEVA and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.