Appellee was entitled to foreclose, and to execute to itself, as purchaser, a deed under power conveying title subject only to the prior loan deed. Appellants, after the foreclosure sale, became tenants at sufferance and subject to being summarily dispossessed by the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. Lanier v. Dyer, 112 Ga. App. 558 (1) ( 145 S.E.2d 621) (1965); Remy v. Citicorp c. Financial Center, supra at 727. Appellee, as the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, could lawfully institute dispossessory proceedings against appellants.
As to the claim that no landlord/tenant relationship was shown to exist, it is well established that "[w]here the grantor, or his privy, in a security deed remains in possession of the premises after lawful foreclosure of the deed, he is a tenant at sufferance and is subject to be summarily dispossessed by the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, or by his privy." Lanier v. Dyer, 112 Ga. App. 558 ( 145 S.E.2d 621) (1965). See also Price v. Bloodworth, 55 Ga. App. 268 ( 189 S.E. 925) (1937); Collins v. Administrator of Veterans Affairs, 156 Ga. App. 374 ( 274 S.E.2d 760) (1980); Remy v. Citicorp c. Financial Center, 159 Ga. App. 726 ( 285 S.E.2d 76) (1981).
[Cit.]" Lanier v. Dyer, 112 Ga. App. 558 (1) ( 145 S.E.2d 621) (1965); accord, Collins v.Administrators of Veterans Affairs, 156 Ga. App. 374, 375 ( 274 S.E.2d 760) (1980). Applying the foregoing legal principle to the facts in the instant case, appellant was subject to dispossession to the same extent and in the same manner as was Henry Remy, grantor of the second deed to secure debt and the person through whom she claimed the right to possession of the premises.
Price v. Bloodworth, 55 Ga. App. 268 ( 189 S.E. 925)." Lanier v. Dyer, 112 Ga. App. 558 ( 145 S.E.2d 621) (1965); Hunter v. Ranitz, 88 Ga. App. 182, 184-185 ( 76 S.E.2d 542) (1953). The allegations of the petition, which, by virtue of appellant's default, must be taken as fact, formed an independent basis for the issuance of a writ of possession under Code § 61-301.
See also Garrick v. Tidwell, 151 Ga. 294 ( 106 S.E. 551). As to the propriety of this action against the grantor when she remained in possession after foreclosure, see Price v. Bloodworth, 55 Ga. App. 268 ( 189 S.E. 925); Lanier v. Dyer, 112 Ga. App. 558 ( 145 S.E.2d 621). The charge of fraud is unsupported. If the action could be treated as one for breach of contract, a directed verdict for the defendant was nevertheless proper, since plaintiff fails to show that the alleged contract to forbear foreclosure and to delay collection of arrearages was an enforceable one, and for the further reason that the only damages sought are under Code § 105-2003, being punitive or vindictive damages, and these are not recoverable for breach of contract.