The cause of action arose upon the creation of the nuisance on September 10, 1960, and must have been brought within the four-year period under Code § 3-1001. Mobley v. Murray County, 178 Ga. 388 (1) ( 173 S.E. 680); Clark v. Lanier, 104 Ga. 184 ( 30 S.E. 741); City Council of Augusta v. Lombard, 101 Ga. 724 ( 28 S.E. 994); Lawrence v. City of LaGrange, 63 Ga. App. 587 ( 11 S.E.2d 696); City of LaFayette v. Hegwood, 52 Ga. App. 168, 170 ( 182 S.E. 860); Georgia Power Co. v. Moore, 47 Ga. App. 411 ( 170 S.E. 520). Appellant's amendment to his petition alleging "that said building in its present condition, is a continuing nuisance from day to day, until same be abated" does not aid the petition.
" See, also, Mid-Co Gasoline Co. v. Back, 95 Okl. 29, 217 Pac. 1041; Risher v. Acken Coal Co., 147 Iowa, 459, 124 N.W. 764; Hollenbeek v. City of Marion, 116 Iowa, 69, 89 N.W. 210; Ridley v. Seaboard R. R. Co., 118 N.C. 996, 24 S.E. 730, 32 L.R.A. 708; Id., 124 N.C. 34, 32 S.E. 325; Smith v. City of Sedalia, 182 Mo. 1, 81 S.W. 165; Kellogg v. City of Kirksville, 132 Mo. App. 519, 112 S.W. 296; Id., 148 Mo. App. 1, 129 S.W. 57; Clark v. Lanier, 104 Ga. 184, 30 S.E. 741. The case at bar is not to be classified with those nuisance cases wherein the removal of the cause will abate the nuisance.
Galveston, H. S.A. Ry. Co. v. Bell, 110 Tex. 104, (proximate cause); Farmers' M. Natl. Bank v. Novich, 89 Tex. 383; First Natl. Bank of Newsom v. Walling, 218 S.W. 1080 (altered checks); approved. Lanier v. Clark, 133 S.W. 1094, disapproved. (Pp. 214, 215).
" Numerous authorities are cited by the author as supporting the rule announced, in addition to which may be cited the following: Ottawa Gas, etc., Co. v. Graham, 28 Ill. 73, 81 Am. Dec. 263; Chicago North Shore St. Ry. Co. v. Payne, 192 Ill. 239, 61 N.E. 467; Denison F. S. Ry. Co. v. O'Malley, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 200, 45. S.W. 227; Porter v. Midland Ry. Co., 125 Ind. 476, 25 N.E. 556; Fowler v. Des Moines K. C. Ry. Co., 91 Iowa, 533, 60 N.W. 116; Jeffersonville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Esterle, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 667; Clark v. Lanier, 104 Ga. 184, 30 S.E. 741. In City of Ardmore v. Orr, 35 Okla. 305, 129 P. 867, negligent construction of storm sewers, whereby surface waters were diverted from their accustomed course and on account of which plaintiff's property was overflowed and damaged, was under consideration. It was held that the city in grading the streets and constructing the sewers was acting within its lawful authority; that the wrong consisted in negligently constructing the sewers with a capacity inadequate to carry off the surface waters; that if said sewers were enlarged, or additional sewers built sufficiently large to carry off the surface waters, no further injury would result, and it would not be presumed, its liability having been determined, that the negligent construction of said sewers would not be remedied so as to prevent further injury.
Therefore, assuming that appellees Schlenz and Fraser are entitled to claim the benefit of the 1975 general release, summary judgment was properly granted to them. See Clark v. Lanier, 104 Ga. 184 ( 30 S.E. 741) (1898); Mulligan, 115 Ga. 337, supra. Appellants having apparently conceded that the appellees are protected by the general release to the full extent of its ambit and having argued only that the instant action does not come within that ambit, we conclude that it was not error to grant summary judgment to Schlenz and Fraser.
"A nuisance, permanent and continuing in its character, the destruction or damage being at once complete upon completion of the act by which the nuisance is created, gives but one right of action, which accrues immediately upon the creation of the nuisance ... Where the original nuisance to land is of a permanent character, so that the damages inflicted thereby are permanent, a recovery not only may, but must, be had for the entire damages, in one action; and such damages accrue from the time the nuisance is created, and from that time the statute of limitations begins to run." City Council of Augusta v. Lombard, 101 Ga. 724, 727 ( 28 S.E. 994); Clark v. Lanier, 104 Ga. 184 ( 30 S.E. 741). The appropriate measure of damages for a permanent injury to the property, as was pleaded and proved in the Savannah case, is the diminution in market value of the property occasioned from the wrongful acts of defendants. Hodges v. Pine Product Co., 135 Ga. 134 (3) ( 68 S.E. 1107). If the injury were only temporary, or abatable, the measure would be the diminution in rental value.
Thus where a petition alleged that by the erection and maintenance of a dam certain land of the plaintiff and the timber thereon had been rendered worthless and of no value, and a recovery was had, the plaintiff could not maintain against the defendant another action again alleging the same facts as to the injuries sustained and their cause. Clark v. Lanier, 104 Ga. 184; Allen v. Macon R. Co., 107 Ga. 839. But if the nuisance was of such a character as could be abated and terminate the injury, the plaintiff would not be limited to a single action resulting from its creation, but might sue for injuries resulting from its maintenance. In that event, if he so desired, he might bring successive suits for damages resulting up to the time of bringing each suit, provided they were not covered by a former action and were within the statute of limitations Massengale v. Atlanta, 113 Ga. 966; Southern Ry. Co. v. Cook 117 Ga. 286; Langley v. Augusta, 118 Ga. 590; Southern Ry. Co. v. Morris, 119 Ga. 234. Although the nuisance may have been created more than four years before the action was brought, if it be maintained as a continuing nuisance, this is a renewal of the wrong, and therefore actionable.