But the evidence showed, and Harris admitted, that no promissory note existed, and there was no evidence that Harris advanced funds to Adcock. See, e.g., Beasley v. Paul, 223 Ga.App. 706, 711, 478 S.E.2d 899 (1996) (deed void where underlying promissory note unenforceable); compare Lanier v. Anthony, 261 Ga.App. 848, 851–852(1), 583 S.E.2d 893 (2003) (deed valid where evidence showed existence of debt, promissory note, and that funds were advanced). Had the parties intended the performance of obligations under the APW operating agreement to constitute consideration for the grant of a security interest in the property, they could have so provided. It is true that “[e]quity may intervene and reform a conveyance when the instrument fails to express accurately the intention of the parties.”
See Ga. L. 2002, p. 141, §§ 2, 3. “OCGA § 18–2–22 was repealed on July 1, 2002, when Georgia enacted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, OCGA § 18–2–70 et seq.” Gerschick v. Pounds, 281 Ga.App. 531, 532(1)(a), n. 8, 636 S.E.2d 663 (2006); Miller v. Lomax, 266 Ga.App. 93, 96(2)(b), n. 1, 596 S.E.2d 232 (2004) (noting that “OCGA § 18–2–22, entitled, ‘Conveyances by debtors deemed fraudulent,’ was repealed effective July 1, 2002.”).Lanier v. Anthony, 261 Ga.App. 848, 852(1), 583 S.E.2d 893 (2003).Jones v. Spindel, 239 Ga. 68, 69(1), 235 S.E.2d 486 (1977) (citations omitted).
Section 4 of the act also states that “[a]ll laws and parts of laws in conflict with this Act are repealed.”Lanier v. Anthony, 261 Ga.App. 848, 852(1), n. 8, 583 S.E.2d 893 (2003); Kipperman v. Onex Corp., 411 B.R. 805, 827 (N.D.Ga.2009) ( “Georgia prohibits fraudulent transfers which occurred prior to July 1, 2002, under OCGA § 18–2–22, and transfers which occurred after July 1, 2002, under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer[s] Act codified in OCGA §§ 18–2–70, et seq.” (citation and footnote omitted))..OCGA §§ 18–2–74(a)(1); 18–2–79(1).
" Lanier v. Anthony, 261 Ga. App. 848, 852 (1), n. 8 (583 SE2d 893) (2003); Kipperman v. Onex Corp., 411 B. R. 805, 827 (ND Ga. 2009) ("Georgia prohibits fraudulent transfers which occurred prior to July 1, 2002, under O.C.G.A. § 18-2-22, and transfers which occurred after July 1, 2002, under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act codified in O.C.G.A. §§ 18-2-70, et seq." (citation and footnote omitted)).
Further, as Hannah no longer owned the property previously conveyed to McBryar, she could not convey that property to Moore. See Lanier v. Anthony, 261 Ga. App. 848, 853 (1) ( 583 SE2d 893) (2003) ("A grantee in a deed takes no greater title than that held by the grantor. . . ."). The trial court, therefore, properly granted summary judgment to the McBryars on Moore's claims.
We note that it is unclear whether MM Motors was a corporation or other legal entity separate from Gray. See Lanier v. Anthony, 261 Ga. App. 848, 852 (1) ( 583 SE2d 893) (2003) (the Statute of Frauds requires a promise to pay the debt of another to be reduced to writing). In his testimony, Hardy King refers to the loan as if it were made to MM Motors, to both MM Motors and Gray, and to Gray, but the trial court could conclude the loan was made to Gray.