Opinion
07-20-00117-CV
07-01-2021
DALE LANGSTON AND SUE LANGSTON, APPELLANTS v. GARY C. YOKUM, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 87th District Court Leon County, Texas Trial Court No. 17-0091CV; Honorable Deborah Oakes Evans, Presiding
Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PATRICK A. PIRTLE JUSTICE.
Appellants, Dale and Sue Langston, appeal the trial court's take-nothing judgment in their action for recovery of possession of a residential lot they purchased in 1978. Appellee, Gary C. Yokum, an adjoining landowner who never purchased and never owned an interest in the lot in question, contends the effect of the trial court's judgment was to vest him with fee simple title to the Langstons' property because, according to his theory of the case, the Langstons failed to establish their title in accordance with certain pleading requirements pertaining to suits brought in accordance with a trespass-to-try-title cause of action. Yokum further contends, by way of a counterclaim postured as a trespass-to-try-title claim, that he was the rightful owner of the property in question by virtue of the operation of the doctrine of adverse possession. The matters in controversy were submitted to the trial court which entered judgment in favor of Yokum "on his affirmative defenses of adverse possession, laches, and estoppel." The judgment also divested the Langstons of all their right, title, and interest in and to the property in question and ordered that Yokum recover from the Langstons title to and possession of that property.
The Langstons have challenged the judgment of the trial court through four issues questioning whether (1) Yokum acquired title to the property in question by virtue Langston's failure to prove or establish their own title, (2) Yokum acquired title to the property in question by adverse possession under the ten-year statute of limitations pursuant to the counterclaim, (3) the Langstons' claim for recovery of the property is barred by laches, and (4) the Langstons' claim for recovery of the property is barred by estoppel. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment establishing that the Langstons hold fee simple title to the property in controversy, that Yokum did not acquire title to the disputed property by adverse possession, and that the Langstons' claim for recovery of their property is not barred by laches or estoppel. We further remand this proceeding to the trial court in order that it might consider Yokum's claim for mistaken improvement of the Langstons' property, pursuant to section 22.021 of the Texas Property Code and Rule 788 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, on the theories of unjust enrichment, restitution, and equitable relief.
Originally appealed to the Tenth Court of Appeals, sitting in Waco, this appeal was transferred to this court by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 73.001 (West 2013). Should a conflict exist between precedent of the Tenth Court of Appeals and this court on any relevant issue, this appeal will be decided in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court. Tex.R.App.P. 41.3.
More specifically, Rule 791 provides that, "[a]fter answer filed, either party may, by notice in writing, duly served on the opposite party or his attorney of record, not less than ten days before the trial of the cause, demand an abstract in writing of the claim or title to the premises in question upon which he relies." The rules further provide for an extension of time and for a remedy for failure to comply:
Such abstract of title shall be filed with the papers of the cause . . . within thirty days after the service of the notice, or within such further time that the court on good cause shown may grant; and in default thereof, the court may, after notice and hearing prior to the beginning of trial, order that no written instruments which are evidence of the claim or title of such opposite party be given on trial.Tex. R. Civ. P. 792.
Background
In 1978, the Langstons purchased the property in controversy, an unimproved lot legally described as: Lot 24, Block 2, Section 24 of the Hilltop Lakes subdivision in Leon County, Texas, according to the map or plat depicted below. On July 26, 2000, Yokum purchased Lot 23. Yokum's Lot 23 lies immediately adjacent to Lot 24. For reasons that remained unexplained in the record, Yokum mistakenly built a home on Lot 24 and a garage on Lot 33.
Although tax records show Yokum as owning Lots 23 and 34, he never produced a copy of his deed.
Here, the Langstons do not argue they had superior title out of a common source, title by limitations, or title by prior unabandoned possession. Rather, they posit that, "because they provided evidence of a Deed to the located and surveyed Lot 24 which was not controverted by Appellee," the trial court erred in denying them ownership.
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Plaintiffs Exhibit 10
After Yokum purchased his lot, he began mowing and caring for Lot 24 while apparently under the mistaken impression it was the lot he had purchased—Lot 23. So too did he clear bushes and weeds and perform "dirt work" of an undescribed nature on Lot 24 between the years 2000 and 2007. Throughout the years he mowed it, he also posted signs and permits on the lot and, at some undetermined point, he placed a wrought-iron stick man on the property. (See photo below.)
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Eventually, on May 19, 2007, Yokum executed a Builder Contract and commenced construction of a home on Lot 24. The home was completed in June or July 2008. Nine years later, on March 23, 2017, the Langstons filed a trespass-to-try-title action, claiming that Yokum wrongfully dispossessed them of their realty. Yokum answered and counterclaimed, asserting the affirmative defenses of adverse possession by ten-year statute of limitations, laches, and estoppel. Yokum also asserted his own counterclaim sounding in trespass-to-try-title based on a theory of adverse possession.
Pursuant to Rule 791 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Yokum demanded that the Langstons file an abstract of title to Lot 24. The Langstons did not do so within the thirty-day time period prescribed by Rule 791 but rather, moved for an extension of time to file one. The trial court granted the Langstons an extension, giving them until September 15, 2017, to file the abstract. They again allowed the deadline to lapse without compliance. Nevertheless, on May 24, 2018, they filed two documents purporting to satisfy Yokum's demand. Those documents consisted of a Developer's Dedication and a General Warranty Deed from the developer to the Langstons.
More specifically, Rule 791 provides that, "[a]fter answer filed, either party may, by notice in writing, duly served on the opposite party or his attorney of record, not less than ten days before the trial of the cause, demand an abstract in writing of the claim or title to the premises in question upon which he relies." The rules further provide for an extension of time and for a remedy for failure to comply:
Such abstract of title shall be filed with the papers of the cause . . . within thirty days after the service of the notice, or within such further time that the court on good cause shown may grant; and in default thereof, the court may, after notice and hearing prior to the beginning of trial, order that no written instruments which are evidence of the claim or title of such opposite party be given on trial.Tex. R. Civ. P. 792.
Holding otherwise would lead to interesting results. Indeed, obtaining a deed to realty does not ipso facto establish that the grantor owned or had title to the property conveyed; the deed may well be from a fraudulent source, for instance. He may not, and if he did not, then the grantee certainly did not obtain title superior to that of the actual owner simply because he has a document saying the property was transferred to him. This may well be why establishing a chain back to the sovereign is necessary; such a chain serves to establish that all previous owners were actual owners with the ability to convey title to the parcel.
A bench trial was held in November 2019. On December 11, 2019, the trial court signed its judgment placing title in Yokum. The Langstons appealed.
Issue One—The Langstons' Failure to Establish Title to Lot 24
The first issue we must address is the attack on the trial court's conclusion of law that the Langstons "did not prove or establish their title to Lot 24." The trial court's conclusion of law appears to be based on the court's finding that "an abstract of title to Lot 24 . . . showing a regular chain of conveyances . . . from the sovereign was not produced . . . ." This, however, is a misstatement of the law applicable to trespass-to-try-title proceedings being asserted as an affirmative cause of action. Here, the trial court granted Yokum's affirmative counterclaim for trespass-to-try-title. The pleading and proof requirements in a trespass-to-try-title action are strict and formal; they also require a claimant to prevail on the superiority of his title, as opposed to the weakness of his opponent's title. Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262, 265 (Tex. 2004). See Lance v. Robinson, 543 S.W.3d 723, 735 (Tex. 2018) (noting that trespass-to-try-title actions "involve detailed pleading and proof requirements"). That is to say, "[a] plaintiff is not entitled to recover unless the plaintiff's own title is effectively disclosed." Ramsey v. Grizzle, 313 S.W.3d 498, 505 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (emphasis added). Therefore, in order to maintain an action of trespass-to-try-title the person bringing the suit must have title to the land sought to be recovered. Id. (citing Brownlee v. Sexton, 703 S.W.2d 797, 799-800 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). As such, Yokum could only prevail based on the strength of his own title, not based on the failure of the Langstons to establish their title to Lot 24. At best, Yokum could argue that the trial court should not grant the Langstons the relief they requested. This, however, would be unnecessary because the Langstons did prove their title by one of the accepted means: superior title out of a common source. Lance, 543 S.W.3d at 735; 2027 S. Austin St., LLC v. Latour Condos., Inc., No. 07-19-00395-CV, 2021 Tex.App. LEXIS 2005, at *10- 11 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 17, 2021, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
The Langstons offered into evidence, without objection, two critical documents: (1) a Developer Dedication, dated March 14, 1967, filed of record on June 13, 1967, under Clerk's File No. 87867, and recorded in Volume 344, Page 94, of the Official Public Records of Leon County, Texas, setting forth the dedication of the Hilltop Lakes Subdivision and (2) a General Warranty Deed, dated June 15, 1978, filed of record on November 21, 1978, under Clerk's File No. 129290, and recorded in Volume 455, Page 423, of the Official Public Records of Leon County, conveying Lot 24, Block 2, of the Hilltop Lakes Subdivision, Section 24, a subdivision in Leon County, Texas, to Dale Langston, in fee simple. The only evidence offered regarding Yokum's title was proof of payment of taxes on Lots 23 and 34, Block 2, of the Hilltop Lakes Subdivision, Section 24, a subdivision in Leon County, Texas. Additional evidence showed that in June 2015, Yokum was advised that his home had been built on Lot 24, when the lot he had purchased was Lot 23. As such, because both parties acquired their respective titles from a common source, to-wit: J.B. Land Co., Inc., by and through its President, J.B. Belin, Jr., the developer of the Hilltop Lakes Subdivision, and because the Langstons established superior title to Lot 24, and because Yokum established title to Lot 23 (and not Lot 24), Yokum failed to establish superior title to Lot 24. Accordingly, we resolve the Langstons' first issue in their favor and against Yokum.
Issue Two—Adverse Possession Under the Ten-Year Statute of Limitations
By their second issue, the Langstons contend Yokum failed to establish title under the ten-year statute of limitations. When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue that the opposing party had the burden to prove at trial, we will sustain that challenge if (a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (d) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Dallas Nat'l Ins. Co. v. De La Cruz, 470 S.W.3d 56, 57-58 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam). In our review, we credit favorable evidence if a reasonable fact finder could do so and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder could not. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding under review, and we indulge every reasonable inference that would support the finding. Id. at 822. The doctrine of adverse possession is based on the statutes of limitation for the recovery of real property. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 16.021-.027 (West 2002 and West Supp. 2020). See also Wells v. Johnson, 443 S.W.3d 479, 488 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2014, pet. denied). Thus, in the context of a dispute concerning possession of real property, the rightful owner of the property must institute suit within a specified period of time (three, five, ten or twenty-five years depending on various statutory factors and conditions) or subsequently be barred from recovery. Not only are suits for the recovery of possession by the rightful owner barred, but adverse possession also operates to vest the adverse claimant with title to the property. See § 16.030 (a) (West 2002). Therefore, "[t]he concept of adverse possession allows a person to claim title to real property presently titled in another." Session v. Woods, 206 S.W.3d 772, 777 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied) (emphasis in original).
All further references to "section" or to "§" are to the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code unless otherwise designated.
Due to the harsh nature of disenfranchising someone of title otherwise rightfully held, establishing title by adverse possession is not well-regarded in the law, and strict compliance of the statutory prerequisites is required. See Thomas v. Southwestern Settlement & Development Co., 131 S.W.2d 31, 34 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1939, writ dism'd judgm't cor.). Wells, 443 S.W.3d at 488. "One seeking to establish title to land by virtue of the statute of limitations has the burden of proving every fact essential to that claim by a preponderance of the evidence." Rhodes v. Cahill, 802 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. 1990); Osborn v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 153 Tex. 281, 286, 267 S.W.2d 781, 787 (1954) (holding that adverse claimant has the burden to prove every fact necessary to that claim by "clear and satisfactory" evidence). Thus, the burden of proving each essential element is on the party claiming title by adverse possession. Fuentes v. Garcia, 696 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1985, no writ) (citing Davis v. Carriker, 536 S.W.2d 246, 251 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). See Moore v. Stone, 255 S.W.3d 284, 288 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. denied). In other words, it was Yokum's burden to prove adverse possession.
Under Texas law, courts have interpreted every claim of adverse possession as encompassing at least six essential elements: (1) visible appropriation and possession of the disputed property, (2) that is open and notorious, (3) that is peaceable, (4) under a claim of right, (5) that is adverse and hostile to the claim of the owner, and (6) consistent and continuous for the duration of the statutory period. Glover v. Union Pac. R.R., 187 S.W.3d 201, 213 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied). See § 16.021(1) (West 2002). It has been said that adverse possession requires "an actual and visible appropriation of real property, commenced and continued under a claim of right that is inconsistent with and is hostile to the claim of another person." BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 342 S.W.3d 59, 69 (Tex. 2011) (quoting § 16.021(1)).
Here, Yokum did not establish any open and notorious possession of Lot 24 until sometime after May 19, 2007, when he began construction on his residence. Prior to that date, his use of the property consisted of occasional mowing of the grass, the posting of some signs, and the placement of a wrought-iron stick man. Nothing was done which permanently altered or interfered with the Langstons' use and enjoyment of the property. Furthermore, nothing was done which would put the Langstons on notice that someone was claiming ownership of their property adverse and hostile to their claim of ownership. To the contrary, Yokum testified that he believed (albeit mistakenly) that he was occupying the lot that he had purchased—Lot 23. As such, his possession was not under a claim of right, nor was it adverse and hostile to the rights of the actual owners, the Langstons. Because the Langstons filed their suit on March 23, 2017, less than ten years after Yokum's earliest commencement of any open and notorious possession (the commencement of permanent construction), Yokum's ten-year adverse possession claim fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, we resolve the Langstons' second issue in their favor and against Yokum.
Issue Three—Whether the Langstons' Claims are Barred by Laches
Yokum contends the Langstons' claims are also barred by the doctrine of laches. In order to establish a claim of laches, it must be shown that there was an unreasonable delay in asserting a legal or equitable right and a good faith change of position by one party, to his detriment, caused by that delay. Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex. 1989); City of Fort Worth v. Johnson, 358 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. 1964); Campbell v. Pirtle, 790 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1990, no writ). Under a claim of laches, if the delay impairs the defendant's ability to defend against the claim or ascertain the facts, then the claim should be barred for laches. De Benavides v. Warren, 674 S.W.3d 353, 362 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Where, however, the claim is based on a legal right, the doctrine of laches is unavailable. Id. In fact, the Texas Supreme Court has held that "laches is not a defense in a trespass to try title suit where the plaintiff's right is based on legal title." Rogers, 772 S.W.2d at 80. Accordingly, we resolve the Langstons' third issue in their favor and against Yokum.
Issue Four—Whether the Langstons' Claims are Barred by Estoppel
By their fourth and final issue, the Langstons contend there is no evidence to support the trial court's affirmative finding of equitable estoppel because there is no evidence of any of the five essential elements of estoppel. Those essential elements are as follows: (1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact, (2) made with knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the relevant facts, (3) made with the intention that the representation be acted on, (4) to a party without knowledge or the means of obtaining knowledge of those facts, and (5) who relies upon the representation to his detriment. Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991). Here, no evidence or findings support a finding of equitable estoppel. No representations were made by the Langstons; therefore, there could be no false representation or concealment of facts, as a matter of law. The Langstons' fourth issue is resolved in their favor and against Yokum.
Conclusion
Having sustained each issue in favor of the Langstons and against Yokum, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment that Dale and Sue Langston are the owners of the following described property situated in Leon County, Texas:
Lot 24, Block 2, of HILLTOP LAKES, Section 24, a subdivision in Leon County, Texas, according to the map or plat thereof recorded in Volume 2, Page 28 of the Map Records of Leon County, Texas (the map or plat may also be recorded in Envelope No. 56-B of the Map records of Leon County, Texas); more commonly known as 46 Cherokee Lane, Hilltop Lakes, Texas.
Furthermore, we remand this proceeding to the trial court in order that it might consider Yokum's equitable claim for mistaken improvement of the Langstons' property, pursuant to section 22.021 of the Texas Property Code and Rule 788 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, on the theories of unjust enrichment, restitution, and equitable relief. Yokum is granted temporary possession of the premises pending final disposition of his section 22.021 claims. All other relief requested is denied.
DISSENTNG OPINION
BRIAN QUINN, CHIEF JUSTICE
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion's disposition of issue one.
Appellants Dale and Sue Langston appeal the trial court's take-nothing judgment in their trespass to try title action, the effect of which judgment was to vest title to a parcel of land in Gary C. Yokum. On appeal, they challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support several of the trial court's findings of fact on issues relating to title, adverse possession, and the affirmative defenses of laches and estoppel.
Background
In 1978, the Langstons allegedly purchased unimproved Lot 24, Block 2 of Hilltop Lakes Section 24 subdivision in Leon County, Texas. In 2000, Yokum purchased neighboring lots 23 and 34 in the same subdivision. After his purchase of them, he began mowing and caring for Lot 24 while apparently under the mistaken impression it was Lot 23. So too did he clear bushes and weeds on Lot 24 between the years 2000 and 2007 and post signs and permits on the lots throughout the years he improved them.
Eventually, on May 19, 2007, Yokum executed a Builder Contract and built a home on Lot 24. The home was completed in June or July 2008. Nine years later, the Langstons filed a trespass to try title action, claiming that Yokum dispossessed them of their realty. Yokum answered and counterclaimed, asserting the affirmative defenses of adverse possession by ten-year statute of limitations, laches, and estoppel and also asserting his own counterclaim in trespass to try title by adverse possession.
Pursuant to Rule 791 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Yokum demanded that the Langstons file an abstract of title to Lot 24. The Langstons did not do so within the prescribed thirty-day time period but, rather, moved for an extension of time to file it.1The trial court granted the Langstons an extension, giving them until September 15, 2017, to file the abstract. They again allowed the deadline to lapse without compliance. Nevertheless, on May 24, 2018, they filed two documents purporting to satisfy Yokum's demand. Those documents consisted of a "Developer's Dedication" and a "General Warranty Deed."
Trial was held in November 2019. On December 11, 2019, the trial court signed its judgment placing title in Yokum. The Langstons appealed.
When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue that they had to prove at trial, they must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence establishes, "as a matter of law," all vital facts supporting the issue. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam). When a party challenges the factual sufficiency of a finding on an issue that he or she had the burden of proof, that party must demonstrate that the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 242.
The first issue I address is the attack upon the trial court's finding that the Langstons failed to establish their title to Lot 24. Again, they contend that the evidence was insufficient to support it. I disagree.
As previously indicated, the Langstons began the party by initiating suit against the possessor of their allegedly realty. Through that action, they pursued a trespass-to-try-title action. Such an action is the exclusive means of determining disputed issues of title on a piece of property. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 22.001 (West 2014); Danbill Partners, LP. v. Sandoval, No. 08-19-00139-CV, 2020 Tex.App. LEXIS 9302, at *12 (Tex. App.—El Paso Nov. 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). To prevail, the claimant must prove either 1) a regular chain of conveyances from the sovereign, 2) a superior title out of a common source, 3) title by limitations, or 4) title by prior possession coupled with proof that possession was not abandoned. Lance v. Robinson, 543 S.W.3d 723, 735 (Tex. 2018); 2027 S. Austin St., LLC v. Latour Condos., Inc., No. 07-19-00395-CV, 2021 Tex.App. LEXIS 2005, at *10-11 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 17, 2021, pet. filed) (mem. op.).2
Next, the pleading and proof requirements in a trespass to try title action are strict and formal; they also require a claimant to prevail on the superiority of his title, as opposed to the weakness of his opponent's title. Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262, 265 (Tex. 2004); see Lance, 543 S.W.3d at 735 (noting that trespass-to-try-title actions "involve detailed pleading and proof requirements"). That is to say, "[a] plaintiff is not entitled to recover unless the plaintiffs own title is effectively disclosed." Ramsey v. Grizzle, 313 S.W.3d 498, 505 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.). Consequently, when a defendant is shown to be in possession of the land in controversy and the plaintiff fails to establish their prima facie right to title, judgment must be entered for the defendant. Kilpatrick v. McKenzie, 230 S.W.3d 207, 214 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). This is true even if the defendant may have pled a title that he failed to establish. Id.
The sole documents tendered by the Langstons and purportedly evincing their title were uncertified copies of a "Developer's Dedication" dated 1967 and a "General Warranty Deed" to the Langstons dated 1978. Neither traced title back to the sovereign, as required by Lance. See Lance, 543 S.W.3d at 735. Thus, the evidence proffered fell short of establishing a continuous chain of title back to the sovereign. This also means they failed to satisfy the burdens imposed on them by the standards of review explained earlier. They did not illustrate their entitlement to recovery as a matter of law. Nor did they establish that the trial court's decision was contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
To the extent the Langstons also suggest that § 22.002 of the Texas Property Code created alternative means to establish title, they are mistaken. The statute provides that "[a] headright certificate, land scrip, bounty warrant, or other evidence of legal right to located and surveyed land is sufficient title to maintain a trespass to try title action." See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 22.002 (West 2014). That those items mentioned in the statute evince "sufficient title" to "maintain a trespass to try title action" means just that; they evince an interest in the realty sufficient to authorize the individual to pursue such an action. See Ramsey v. Jones Enters., 810 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1991, writ denied) (stating that "[s]ection 22.002 of chapter 22 sets out what we perceive to be the minimum requirement to maintain a trespass to try title action"). I do not read the statute as modifying Lance or otherwise relieving one from establishing a chain of conveyances from a sovereign when the first of the four modes of proving a trespass-to-try-title claim mentioned in Lance is pursued. A headright certificate, land scrip, bounty warrant, or other evidence of legal right may be a link in the chain but they are not the chain required by Lance 3
I disagree with the majority in three respects. All implicate the strict trespass to try title rules.
First, the Langstons initiated suit. They having sued first, the party was theirs when Yokum pled "not guilty" in answer to the trespass to try title allegation. They had the onus to prove their claim and superior title. See Brumley v. McDuff, 616 S.W.3d 826, 829 n.4 (Tex. 2021) (observing that a defendant in trespass to try title who pleads "not guilty" admits possession of the subject property and claims superior title and "[t]he burden of proof is then on the plaintiff to establish that the plaintiff has a title superior to the defendant's title"); Doria v. Suchowolski, 531 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1975, writ refd n.r.e.) ("A plea of not guilty by the defendants is a denial of plaintiffs allegations and puts plaintiff on proof of all of the elements necessary to the maintenance of the suit and of his right to recover."). Yokum, as the defendant who possessed the land, was under no obligation to prove his title; again, "the plaintiff must recover upon the strength of his own title." Rogers v. Ricane Enters., 884 S.W.2d 763, 768 (Tex. 1994); Hejl v. Wirth, 343 S.W.2d 226, 226 (Tex. 1961); Ramsey, 313 S.W.3d at 505 . Had Langstons' effort fallen short then title effectively would vest in Yokum per Supreme Court's directive. See Hejl, 343 S.W.2d at 226 (stating that "[i]f the plaintiff under the circumstances fails to establish his title, the effect of a judgment of take nothing against him is to vest title in the defendant"). With Yokum being in possession, it mattered not whether he could establish title by adverse possession or other means; judgment would have had to be entered in favor of him upon Langstons' default. See Kilpatrick v. McKenzie, 230 S.W.3d 207, 214 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Indeed, his own failure to establish title "would be harmless unless the Plaintiffs [i.e., the Langstons] show[ed] that they conclusively proved they hold title to the [p]roperty under one of the four methods" expressed earlier. Brooks v. Binger, No. 14-17-00562-CV, 2019 Tex.App. LEXIS 5882 at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 11, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); accord Wells v. Kansas Univ. Endowment Ass'n, 825 S.W.2d 483, 487-88 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (stating that "in a trespass to try title action, the plaintiff is not prejudiced by an adjudication that title rest in a defendant, when the plaintiff fails to establish his own title"). Because the Langstons failed to prove their title through any of the four methods, judgment vesting title had to be entered in favor of Yokum irrespective of whether he satisfied all the elements of adverse possession.
Second, the general warranty deed and developer's dedication were not the type of evidence required to successfully pursue their trespass to try title suit. This was not a general boundary dispute where the rules underlying such suits are relaxed somewhat. See Martin, 133 S.W.3d at 265-66 (noting that the Supreme Court had relaxed the trespass to try title action's formal proof requirements when the sole dispute involved a boundary location). When the complaint implicates mere boundary as opposed to title issues, a recorded deed showing a plaintiff's interest in the property may be sufficient to establish a present legal right to possess the land in question. Id. at 265; Brownlee v. Sexton, 703 S.W.2d 797, 799-800 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref'd). In those situations, the plaintiff need not prove a formal chain of superior title. Martin, 133 S.W.3d at 265. That is not true when title is in issue, like here. The pleading and proof requirements are strict, and a claimant must prove his title via one or more of the four ways mentioned above. Brooks, 2019 Tex.App. LEXIS 5882, at *9. Merely tendering a deed or developer's dedication without further evidence linking them to a chain of title to the sovereign was not one of them and did not satisfy the strict proof requirements applicable in a trespass to try title action. See Ellis v. Buentello, No. 01-12-00098-CV, 2012 Tex.App. LEXIS 6803, at *11-14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 16, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing the well-established means of establishing sufficient title in trespass to try title suit and concluding that correction deed from tax foreclosure sale is merely a conveyance of the previous interest in property and, as such, is insufficient to "establish title emanating directly from the sovereign"); Mosby v. Post Oak Bank, 401 S.W.3d 183, 189 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011), pet. denied) (concluding similarly that an execution deed was insufficient to establish a regular and continuous chain of conveyances emanating from sovereign).
Third, I also disagree with the conclusion that the Langstons proved superior title through a common source. Satisfying that means of proving one's claims entails the claimant "connecting its title and [that of its opponent] . . . through complete chains of title to the common source and then by showing that its [the claimant's] . . . title is superior." Rogers, 884 S.W.2d at 768; accord Adamson v. Doornbos, 587 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1979, no writ) (stating that "[t]o prove a prima facie case of common source, plaintiff must connect her title by a complete chain of title with the title of the common source, connect defendants' title by complete chain of title to the same source, [a]nd prove that plaintiff's title is superior to the one defendants derived from the common source"). Because Yokum's purported source of title to Lot 24 was through adverse possession (as opposed to some conveyance) while the Langstons' source was through conveyance from a prior owner, the competing claims of title do not have a common source. This may well be why they did not attempt to prove below a common source.
No doubt the outcome I would select is harsh. Other jurists have so noted. Yet, those are the rules utilized in suits like that at bar. One could argue that it may be time to reconsider them, such like what occurred when it came to boundary disputes. But, as of now, those rules have their source in higher authority, and I leave it to that authority to undertake the process. Until that that process is effectuated and completed, I would overrule the Langstons' first issue and affirm the trial court's judgment.