Opinion
C.A. No. 06C-01-012 WLW.
Submitted: September 15, 2006.
Decided: September 20, 2006.
Upon Plaintiffs' Motion for Reargument. Denied.
Maggie Clausell, Esquire of Law Office of Maggie Clausell, LLC, Dover, Delaware; attorneys for the Plaintiffs.
Philip T. Edwards, Esquire of Murphy Spadaro Landon, Wilmington, Delaware; attorneys for the Defendant.
ORDER
Plaintiffs, Debra and Charles Langshaw ("the Langshaws"), filed a Motion for Reargument concerning the Court's August 11, 2006 Order denying the Defendant's, Appleby Systems, Inc. ("Appleby"), Motion to Dismiss Counts I-VI of the complaint. The Court decided that the non-statutory claims would be decided by an arbitrator, and that the Court would retain jurisdiction over the Consumer Fraud Act claim, which would be stayed pending resolution of the claims before the arbitrator. The Langshaws argue that the arbitration provision in the contract should be struck down due to its ambiguity, and all of the Plaintiffs' claims should be heard in the Superior Court. Appleby argues that Langshaws' motion should be denied, because the motion is time barred pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e). Secondly, while Appleby failed to appear at the scheduled hearing, Defendant, in its papers, argues that the motion is improperly noticed for a hearing date without a Court Order in further violation of Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e). Finally, Appleby argues that the Plaintiffs' motion fails substantively, because the Langshaws are merely rehashing the arguments the Plaintiffs made in their original motion. Also, the Langshaws have failed to point to any new precedent or legal principle that the Court has overlooked and failed to point to any misapprehended facts or law.
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' Motion for Reargument is denied.
Standard of Review
The standard for a Rule 59(e) motion for reargument is well defined under Delaware law. A motion for reargument "will be denied unless the Court has overlooked a controlling precedent or legal principles, or the Court has misapprehended the law or facts such as would have changed the outcome of the underlying decision." A motion for reargument is not intended to rehash arguments already decided by the court.Discussion
The Langshaws' Motion for Reargument is time barred pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e). Rule 59(e) states that a "motion for reargument shall be served and filed within 5 days after the filing of the Court's opinion or decision." "The Rule is crystal clear." "Under Superior Court Civil Rule 6(b), the Superior Court has divested itself of the power to enlarge the time for a motion for reargument." The computation of the 5-day time limit for filing a Motion for Reargument, under Rule 59(e), excludes the computation of Saturdays, Sundays, and Court holidays. The Court order that is subject to the Plaintiffs' instant Motion for Reargument was decided on Friday, August 11, 2006. On Monday, August 14, 2006, the time began to run on the 5-day time limit. The 5-day time limit for filing a Motion for Reargument concerning the August 11, 2006 Order expired on Friday, August 18, 2006. The Langshaws' Motion for Reargument was not signed until Monday, August 21, 2006 and not filed until Wednesday, August 23, 2006. The Court lacks discretion, pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule (6)(b), to enlarge the time requirement for filing a Motion for Reargument. Therefore, Plaintiffs' untimely Motion for Reargument is time barred pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e).Plaintiffs' Motion for Reargument also fails substantively. The Langshaws have failed to establish that the Court overlooked a precedent or legal principle that would have controlling effect, or that it has misapprehended the law or the facts such as would effect the outcome of the decision. The Langshaws have essentially rehashed the arguments already decided by Court Order. Plaintiffs contend that due to the ambiguity in the contractual arbitration clause, the Superior Court should hear all of the Plaintiffs' claims. The Court previously recognized ambiguity in the provision due to the fact that the contract was silent concerning whether cases that include both statutory and non-statutory claims are subject to arbitration. The Court resolved the ambiguity by determining that non-statutory claims would be decided by an arbitrator, and the Court would retain jurisdiction over the Consumers Fraud Act claim, which would be stayed pending resolution of the claims before the arbitrator.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs Motion for Reargument is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.