Opinion
1:01CV260-C
December 12, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS MATTER is before the court upon
(1) defendant Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund's ("Health and Welfare Fund") Motion to Dismiss (#2).
(2) defendant Teamster Local Union No. 61's ("Local 61") and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO's ("Teamsters") Motion to Dismiss or For Summary Judgment (#5); and
(3) defendant Teamster Local Union No. 385's ("Local 385") Motion to Dismiss or For Judgment on the Pleadings (#9).
Plaintiff's responses to such motions were due, seriatim, November 19, 2001, November 23, 2001, and November 26, 2001. No responses have been filed. The court has considered the memoranda of law submitted in support of the motions.
I. Background
In this action, plaintiff alleges in common-law and state-statutory claims that she was the beneficiary of a policy of life insurance and that the various defendants either wrongfully denied coverage under a policy of life insurance or wrongfully failed to pay premiums on behalf of her deceased husband. Defendants timely removed this action from the North Carolina General Court of Justice, contending that plaintiff's state-law claims are preempted under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") and by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. It is undisputed that this court has original jurisdiction over the subject matter of this lawsuit. The moving defendants have moved in the alternative to dismiss, for judgment on the pleadings, and for summary judgment.
II. Standards
A. Standard for Motion for judgment on the Pleadings
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where ultimate facts are not in dispute. A. S. Abell Co. v. Baltimore Typographical Union Co., 338 F.2d 190, 193 (4th Cir. 1964). Under Rule 12(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, judgment on the pleadings should be entered where it is apparent that there are no issues of material fact, only questions of law. Moreno v. University of Maryland, 420 F. Supp. 541 (D. Md. 1970), aff'd, 556 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1977). When there are no factual issues, judgment on the pleadings should be granted where the moving party clearly is entitled to the judgment it seeks as a matter of law.Jadoff v. Gleason, 140 F.R.D. 330, 331 (M.D.N.C. 1991).
B. Standard for Motion for Summary judgment
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden of production to show that there are no genuine issues for trial. Upon the moving party's meeting that burden, the nonmoving party has the burden of persuasion to establish that there is a genuine issue for trial.
When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving [sic] party, there is no "genuine issue for trial."Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (citations omitted; emphasis in the original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56). There must be more than just a factual dispute; the fact in question must be material and readily identifiable by the substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). By reviewing substantive law, the court may determine what matters constitute material facts. Id. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. at 248. A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" only if the evidence is such that "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.
[T]he court is obliged to credit the factual asseverations contained in the material before it which favor the party resisting summary judgment and to draw inferences favorable to that party if the inferences are reasonable (however improbable they may seem).Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1092 (4th Cir. 1980). Affidavits filed in support of a motion for summary judgment are to be used to determine whether issues of fact exist, not to decide the issues themselves. United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 453 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1971). When resolution of issues of fact depends upon a determination of credibility, summary judgment is improper. Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1979).
C. Standard for Motion to Dismiss
Defendants have moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, contending that plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim. Rule 12(b) authorizes dismissal based upon a dispositive issue of law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1832 (1989); Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984);Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). As the Court discussed in Neitzke:
This procedure [for dismissal], operating on the assumption that the factual allegations in the complaint are true, streamlines litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and fact finding. Nothing in Rule 12(b)(6) confines its sweep to claims of law which are obviously insupportable. On the contrary, if as a matter of law "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts . . . a claim must be dismissed, without regard to whether it is based on outlandish legal theory. . . . What Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance are dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations."Id., at 1832 (citation omitted). For the limited purpose of making a recommendation as to disposition of defendants' motions, the undersigned has accepted as true the facts alleged by plaintiff in the complaint and viewed those facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff.
D. Election of Standards
Inasmuch as evidentiary matters outside the pleadings need not be and have not been considered, the motions to dismiss appear to be the most appropriate mechanisms for resolving the pending motions, inasmuch as each moving defendant has cited a provision of law that supports summary dismissal of the action asserted against them.
III. Discussion
As to each motion, the moving party has shown that it is entitled to dismissal as a matter of well-settled and current law.
A. Health and Welfare Fund's Motion to Dismiss
The Health and Welfare Fund has shown the following:
(1) it is a nonprofit "Taft-Hartley Trust";
(2) the plan document under which plaintiff seeks benefits provides for a three-step review of claims;
(3) the plan requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before seeking judicial review; and
(4) plaintiff has failed to allege that she exhausted such remedies by filing an appeal to the plan trustees for payment of life insurance.
As a matter of law, failure to exhaust administrative remedies under ERISA is fatal to a claim in this court. Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1087 (1986). It appearing that subject-matter jurisdiction does not vest in this court until plaintiff exhausts her administrative remedies, plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The undersigned will recommend that the Health and Welfare Fund's Motion to Dismiss be granted and the claims against this defendant be dismissed without prejudice.
While the complaint has not been amended, the undersigned has construed the state-law claims to be claims under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA. Hoeflicker v. Central States, Southeast Southwest Areas Health Welfare Fund, 644 F. Supp. 195, 200 (W.D. Mo. 1986).
B. Local 61's and Teamsters' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff contends that these defendants, acting as agents of her deceased husband's union, his employer, and his plan provider, breached a fiduciary duty under state law. Such state-law claims, however, are preempted by Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29, United States Code, Section 185, because they are substantially dependent upon the analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399 (1988). As such, plaintiff's state-law claims are recast and litigated as claims for violation of the duty of fair representation, Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372-73 (1990); but must be dismissed as barred by the applicable statute of limitations because more than six months elapsed between when plaintiff knew of the alleged breach of duty and the filing of this suit, DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 155 (1983); 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). In this case, defendants have shown that plaintiff waited 33 months to file this action, which is clearly outside the six-month limitations period mandated by DelCostello. In addition, plaintiff lacks standing to sue Local 61 or the Teamsters as a matter of law. Walker v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 930 F.2d 376, 382 (4th Cir. 1991). The undersigned, therefore, will recommend that plaintiff's claims against these defendants be dismissed with prejudice.
C. Local 385's Motion to Dismiss
Local 385 has moved for dismissal upon the same grounds asserted by Local 61 and the Teamsters. The undersigned incorporates the above discussion and makes its applicable to Local 385's motion. In addition, Local 385 has argued that to the extent plaintiff claimed that Local 385 falsely represented to her husband the status of his benefits in order to keep him as a dues-paying member of the local, such claim is barred in this forum by Section 8 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29, United States Code, Section 158, because the alleged misconduct would constitute an unfair labor practice, which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. A claim of unfair labor practice is also now timebarred by Section 10(b). The undersigned will recommend that plaintiff's fairrepresentation claims be dismissed with prejudice and that any claim of unfair labor practice be dismissed without prejudice, inasmuch as this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over such claim.
Despite such claim being patently barred by the statute of limitations, the undersigned respectfully submits that dismissal without prejudice is appropriate, inasmuch as it is not within this court's jurisdiction to render a final disposition of such claim, even though it is obvious that it would be summarily declined by the National Labor Relations Board.
RECOMMENDATION
IT IS, THEREFORE, RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED that
(1) defendant Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund's Motion to Dismiss (#2) be ALLOWED, and that all claims asserted against such defendant be DISMISSED without prejudice.
(2) defendant Teamster Local Union No. 61's and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO's Motion to Dismiss or For Summary Judgment (#5) be allowed, and that all claims asserted against such defendants be DISMISSED with prejudice; and
(3) defendant Teamster Local Union No. 385's Motion to Dismiss or For Judgment on the Pleadings (#9) be ALLOWED, plaintiff's fairrepresentation claims be DISMISSED with prejudice, and any claim of unfair labor practice be DISMISSED without prejudice, inasmuch as this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over such claim.
The parties are hereby advised that, pursuant to 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(C), written objections to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation contained herein must be filed within ten (10) days of service of same. Failure to file objections to this Memorandum and Recommendation with the district court will preclude the parties from raising such objections on appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), reh'g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984).