Lange v. Cigna Individual Financial Servs.

22 Citing cases

  1. Oneal v. Shalala

    Civ. No. 97-261 JP/DJS (D.N.M. Dec. 21, 2000)   Cited 7 times

    See Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1100 (2d Cir. 1986). Courts applying the single-filing rule have noted that it is consistent with the Title VII policies of notice to the employer and encouragement of conciliation. See Lange v. Cigna Individual Financial Svcs. Co., 759 F. Supp. 764, 767 (D.Kan. 1991). The Tenth Circuit has applied the single-filing rule, albeit not by name, in Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir. 1980).

  2. Rubidoux v. Johnston

    954 F. Supp. 1477 (D. Colo. 1997)   Cited 7 times
    Dismissing a party not named in an EEOC matter as a respondent for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

    There is an exception to this requirement known as the "single-filing rule." Lange v. Cigna Individual Fin. Serv., 759 F. Supp. 764, 767-68 (D.Kan. 1991). An untimely plaintiff may join a suit initiated by a plaintiff who has timely filed, if their claims "`[a]rise out of similar discriminatory treatment in the same time frame.'"

  3. Lange v. Cigna Individual Fin. Serv.

    766 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Kan. 1991)   Cited 10 times

    On March 20, 1991, the court issued a memorandum and order granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs' motion to strike the affirmative defenses. Lange v. Cigna Individual Fin. Serv. Co., 759 F. Supp. 764 (D.Kan. 1991). In the order, the court adopted the "single-filing rule" which allows a plaintiff who has not complied with the Title VII procedural requirements ("non-complying plaintiff") to join with a plaintiff who has satisfied the procedural requirements ("complying plaintiff") if the non-complying plaintiff's claims arise out of similar discriminatory treatment in the same time frame as the complying plaintiffs.

  4. Leo v. Garmin Int'l

    CIVIL ACTION, No. 09-cv-2139-KHV (D. Kan. Sep. 24, 2009)   Cited 5 times

    " Absent flagrant abuse, bad faith, futility of amendment, or truly inordinate and unexplained delay, prejudice to the opposing party is the key factor in deciding a motion to amend. See Lange v. Cigna Individual Fin. Servs. Co., 759 F.Supp. 764, 769 (D. Kan. 1991). A proposed amendment is futile if the amended complaint would be subject to dismissal.

  5. Rural Water Dist. No. 4 v. City of Eudora

    Civil Action No. 07-2463-JAR-DJW (D. Kan. Apr. 24, 2008)   Cited 20 times
    Relying on SIL-FLO, Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 1518-19 (10th Cir. 1990)

    The party opposing the amendment has the burden of showing prejudice.Rubio v. Turner Unified School Dist. No. 202, 453 F.Supp.2d 1295, 1307 (D. Kan. 2006) (citing Lange v. Cigna Individual Fin. Servs. Co., 759 F.Supp. 764, 769 (D. Kan. 1991)).Jones v. Wildgen, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1361 (D. Kan. 2004); Acker v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R. Co., 215 F.R.D. 645, 654 (D. Kan. 2003); Heslop v. UCB, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1313 (D. Kan. 2001).

  6. Rubio v. Turner Unified School Dist. No. 202

    453 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D. Kan. 2006)   Cited 47 times
    Determining whether school employees had final policymaking authority on motion to dismiss

    Absent flagrant abuse, bad faith, futility of amendment, or truly inordinate and unexplained delay, prejudice to the opposing party is the key factor in deciding a motion to amend. See Lange v. Cigna Individual Fin. Servs. Co., 759 F. Supp. 764, 769 (D. Kan. 1991). A proposed amendment is futile if the amended complaint would be subject to dismissal. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Investor's Servs., 175 F.3d 848, 859 (10th Cir. 1999).

  7. Ellibee v. Fox

    Case No. 03-3463-JAR (D. Kan. Mar. 10, 2006)

    " However, this is not sufficient for a showing of prejudice required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 15.Lange v. Cigna Individual Fin. Servs. Co., 759 F. Supp. 764, 770 (D.Kan. 1991). Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion and Brief Seeking Leave to Amend (Doc. 69), at ΒΆ 3.

  8. Jones v. Wildgen

    349 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (D. Kan. 2004)   Cited 34 times
    Explaining that a motion to reconsider "is not a second opportunity for the losing party to make its strongest case, to rehash arguments, or to dress up arguments that previously failed"

    Absent flagrant abuse, bad faith, futility of amendment, or truly inordinate and unexplained delay, prejudice to the opposing party is the key factor in deciding a motion to amend. See Lange v. Cigna Individual Fin. Servs. Co., 759 F. Supp. 764, 769 (D. Kan. 1991). Prejudice under Rule 15 means undue difficulty in defending a lawsuit because of a change of tactics or theories on the part of the other party.

  9. Waddell Reed Financial, Inc. v. Torchmark Corporation

    Civil Action No. 01-2372-KHV (D. Kan. Aug. 20, 2004)

    Absent flagrant abuse, bad faith, futility of amendment, or truly inordinate and unexplained delay, prejudice to the opposing party is the key factor in deciding a motion to amend. See Lange v. Cigna Individual Fin. Servs. Co., 759 F. Supp. 764, 769 (D. Kan. 1991). Prejudice under Rule 15 means undue difficulty in defending a lawsuit because of a change of tactics or theories on the part of the other party.

  10. Arena v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

    221 F.R.D. 569 (D. Kan. 2004)   Cited 9 times
    Permitting amendment where the plaintiffs sought to "make more particular the allegations of fraud ... [not] change their theories of the case"

    Absent flagrant abuse, bad faith, futility of amendment, or truly inordinate and unexplained delay, prejudice to the opposing party is the key factor in deciding a motion to amend. SeeLange v. Cigna Individual Fin. Servs. Co., 759 F.Supp. 764, 769 (D.Kan.1991). Prejudice under Rule 15 means undue difficulty in defending a lawsuit because of a change of tactics or theories on the part of the other party.