1969). In Langdon v. State, 235 So.2d 321 (Fla.App. 1970), it was held that a defendant who admitted living in a bus of which he was not the owner, could not be guilty of possession where he was one of eight occupants of the bus in which a small quantity of marijuana was found. [7,8] Applying these principles to the present case, we find that the possession convictions of James, Sheryl and Mike Kennedy, Milton Petry, and the two Houstons cannot be sustained on the evidence.

There is no evidence whatsoever that the defendant's presence in the truck or lobby was as a lookout. We have no difficulty with the answer to this remaining question. It is apodictic that to prove that the defendant possessed the cocaine the State must show, and it clearly did not, that he actually possessed it, or must show that he, with knowledge of its presence on the truck, had the ability to maintain control over the cocaine, that is, constructively possessed it. Griffin v. State, 276 So.2d 191 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); Langdon v. State, 235 So.2d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); Markman v. State, 210 So.2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). Because it has been held that the dominion and control necessary to establish constructive possession is not shown, for example, (1) where the defendant, whose companion was in the process of selling quaaludes to a police officer, stated to the undercover buyer, "is that all you're going to buy, 300 ludes? Why don't you buy them all?", Kickasola v. State, 405 So.2d 200 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); (2) where the defendant was present at the sale of valium, participated in counting the money, and was present at discussions concerning additional sales, Di Sangro v. State, 422 So.2d 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev. denied, 434 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1983); (3) where, after the police officer and confidential informant negotiated the purchase of cocaine with persons other than the defendant, the transaction was completed in a bedroom where the cocaine was lying on a table ten feet from where the defendant stood, Green v. State, 460 So.2d 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 1

See also Townsend v. State, 330 So.2d 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Moore v. State, 325 So.2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). In finding insufficient evidence to convict a defendant, who was one of eight occupants, and was a resident, of a bus in which marijuana was located, of possession of marijuana, the Third District in Langdon v. State, 235 So.2d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970), noted that the evidence was subject not only to the hypothesis of defendant's guilt but was also subject to the equally reasonable hypothesis of his innocence. In D.J. v. State, 330 So.2d 35 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), another case finding insufficient evidence of possession of marijuana, the defendant was a joint occupant of a car in which small amounts of marijuana were found, in contrast to the facts of the case at hand, in plain view, some of which was in close proximity to defendant.

Defendant rented motel facilities which he shared with a female. Many persons were seen going in and out on the day in question; Langdon v. State, 235 So.2d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). Marijuana found in bus which defendant and others lived.

That is simply reaffirming the state's burden of proving circumstances that are consistent with no other reasonable hypothesis than the guilt of the accused. Between them, Spataro and Frank produced numerous offspring of constructive possession cases where the state was relying on proof of occupancy of a vehicle, room or other place as its proof of the defendant's constructive possession, including knowledge by the accused of the drugs found there. See, e.g., Britton v. State, 336 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Hively v. State, 336 So.2d 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Nast v. State, 333 So.2d 103 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Tanksley v. State, 332 So.2d 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Moore v. State, 325 So.2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Willis v. State, 320 So.2d 823 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Taylor v. State, 319 So.2d 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Medlin v. State, 279 So.2d 41 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); Griffin v. State, 276 So.2d 191 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); Torres v. State, 253 So.2d 450 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); Langdon v. State, 235 So.2d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); and Markham v. State, 210 So.2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). These cases, like their progenitors Spataro and Frank themselves, recite the dicta that constructive possession is provable by evidence of occupancy while reversing a conviction based on occupancy alone.

In order to establish constructive possession of contraband when the accused does not have exclusive possession of the premises where the contraband is found, actual knowledge of its presence and the ability to control it may not be inferred but must be proven. Frank v. State, supra; Langdon v. State, Fla.App.3d 1970, 235 So.2d 321. The instant record discloses no evidence on which the arresting officer at the time of the arrest could reasonably conclude that the appellant knew of the presence of the marijuana or had the ability to reduce it to his possession and control.

Neither the fact that Appellants were driving at night nor that they failed to stop at the inspection station were such inferences from which alone the jury might lawfully infer knowledge by the Appellants of the contents. Mere presence of the Appellants where the drugs were found was not sufficient to sustain a conviction of possession. Harris v. State, 307 So.2d 218 (Fla.App. 3rd 1975); Arant v. State, 256 So.2d 515 (Fla.App. 1st 1972); Langdon v. State, 235 So.2d 321 (Fla.App. 3rd 1970). The State argues that the circumstances involved in the Appellants' rental of the truck in Miami, their small compensation for driving it out of the state, and their failure to inquire into the contents from a stranger, were unreasonable and unbelievable, and that similar arrangements could permit the transportation of contraband without criminal liability.

Harris, supra. The evidence in this case is not only subject to the hypothesis of Taylor's guilt but is also subject to the equally reasonable hypothesis of her innocence in that the marijuana was in the possession of the owner of the apartment or one of the other occupants. Langdon v. State, Fla.App.3d 1970, 235 So.2d 321. Taylor did not have control or joint control of the premises, but was a mere visitor with no apparent authority to treat the drugs as her own. Arant v. State, Fla. App.1st 1972, 256 So.2d 515; D.M.M. v. State, Fla.App.2d 1973, 275 So.2d 308.

Frank v. State, Fla.App. 1967, 199 So.2d 117, 120; Markman v. State, Fla.App. 1968, 210 So.2d 486, 487. Accord, Langdon v. State, Fla.App. 1970, 235 So.2d 321; Thomas v. State, Fla.App. 1974, 297 So.2d 850. The only evidence in this case with which the state could prove knowledge of the presence of the heroin packet would be the testimony of one of the officers that the packet was located approximately eight inches closer to the defendant than to the passenger, Smith. This is clearly circumstantial evidence, and in order for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for conviction, it must be ". . . consistent with the accused's guilt, inconsistent with innocence and must exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt."

Here is what happened: Whitehead v. State, Fla.App.2d 1973, 273 So.2d 146; Herring v. State, Fla.App.3d 1960, 121 So.2d 807; Pacetti v. State, Fla. App.2d 1963, 157 So.2d 445; Langdon v. State, Fla.App.3d 1970, 235 So.2d 321; Markman v. State, Fla.App.3d 1968, 210 So.2d 486; Kirtley v. State, Fla.App.3d 1971, 245 So.2d 282; Smith v. State, Fla. 1973, 279 So.2d 27; Mosley v. State, Fla.App. 4th 1973, 281 So.2d 590; and Griffin v. State, Fla.App.4th 1973, 276 So.2d 191. Riutta dropped a small pistol on the floor of a tavern.