The Connecticut Appellate Court has addressed the question of whether a custodial parent assigns his/her rights to past, current, and future support payments in exchange for receiving public assistance. Langan v. Weeks, 37 Conn. App. 105, 655 A.2d 771 (1995). In Langan, the appellate court held that the mother assigned all her rights to support obligations, including past due arrearages, when she applied for the state aid. 37 Conn. App. 105, 655 A.2d at 782.
See State v. Crafts, 226 Conn. 237, 243 n. 3, 627 A.2d 877 (1993). Moreover, the state and federal due process provisions are coextensive and afford equivalent levels of protection. Langan v. Weeks, 37 Conn. App. 105, 118 n. 14, 655 A.2d 771 (1995). We, therefore, decline to analyze the claim separately.
v. Dept. of Liquor Control, [ 213 Conn. 184, 205, 567 A.2d 1156 (1989)]." Langan v. Weeks, 37 Conn. App. 105, 118, 655 A.2d 771 (1995). In the absence of a claim of deprivation of a fundamental right, we have scrutinized such questions under a rational basis test.
He also argues that the legislature's use of the word shall in § 46b-56c (d) creates a mandatory duty. See Langan v. Weeks , 37 Conn. App. 105, 121, 655 A.2d 771 (1995) (general rule is that word shall is mandatory, not directory). Although we agree generally with the plaintiff's statement of legal principles, we disagree with his claim that the court misapplied the statute when it issued the support order.
We afford plenary review to the court's legal conclusions. See Verna v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 261 Conn. 102, 107, 801 A.2d 769 (2002); Langan v. Weeks, 37 Conn. App. 105, 112, 655 A.2d 771 (1995). "[T]he defect in a late judgment is that it implicates the trial court's power to continue to exercise jurisdiction over the parties before it. . . . A delay in decision beyond that authorized by the statute makes the decision voidable and, absent waiver, requires a new trial."
Moreover, "[t]he guarantee of procedural due process requires that persons whose rights are to be affected have a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Langan v. Weeks, 37 Conn. App. 105, 118, 655 A.2d 771 (1995). Although Russell addresses only General Statutes § 52-593, the purpose and language of General Statutes §§ 52-592 and 52-593 are closely analogous.
Moreover, "[t]he guarantee of procedural due process requires that persons whose rights are to be affected have a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Langan v. Weeks, 37 Conn. App. 105, 118, 655 A.2d 771 (1995). We have adhered to these due process principles in cases where parties who did not receive timely notice have sought to open judgments that were more than four months old.
In general, the word "shall" is mandatory, not directory. Langan v. Weeks, 37 Conn. App. 105, 121, 655 A.2d 771 (1995). Use of the word "shall," however, does not always indicate that a clause is mandatory.
Because the issues of whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the plaintiff's motion five months after the final judgment was rendered, and whether a party may waive fees under § 4-184a by not expressly requesting them in the petition to the Superior Court raise questions of law rather than fact, those issues are subject to our plenary review. Gateway Co. v. DiNoia, 232 Conn. 233, 229, 654 A.2d 342 (1995); Langan v. Weeks, 37 Conn. App. 105, 112, 655 A.2d 771 (1995). With regard to the commission's claim that the amount the trial court awarded the plaintiff was unreasonable, this court has in other contexts held that the assessment of attorney's fees is a matter within the trial court's discretion.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Langan v. Weeks, 37 Conn.App. 105, 124, 655 A.2d 771 (1995). The defendant is ordered to install the toe drain as it designed and proposed in the December 1997, revised August 7, 1998, plans and the July 28, 1998 specifications.