Opinion
CV-24-08045-PCT-MTL
07-16-2024
Morgan Joseph Langan, Plaintiff, v. County of Yavapai, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
MICHAEL T. LIBURDI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff sues over a tax lien sale of his real property in Yavapai County. Defendants Yavapai County, the Yavapai County Treasurer, and Chip Davis (collectively “Defendants”) move to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. (Doc. 16) The Motion is fully briefed and neither party requested oral argument. The Court will grant the Motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
I.
Plaintiff owned about 15 acres in Cornville, Yavapai County, Arizona. This land was identified as a single parcel in county records. Without notice to Plaintiff, Yavapai County split it into two separate parcels. The County then asserted tax debts on both parcels. It appears from Plaintiff's allegations that the combined tax imposed on both parcels was greater than the amount imposed on the property when it was categorized as a single parcel.
Plaintiff continued to pay the lower, single parcel amount. Over time, Plaintiff accumulated a significant tax debt, the legality of which he disputes. Private parties, not involved in this case, acquired rights in Plaintiff's land by lawfully purchasing the delinquent property tax liens. They then pursued tax foreclosure actions in state court and acquired the properties. Plaintiff has been litigating issues related to the loss of his property ever since.
II.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes a court to dismiss claims over which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). A Rule 12(b)(1) challenge may be facial or factual. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). When a defendant argues that the claims in the complaint, even if true, cannot establish subject matter jurisdiction, the challenge is a facial one. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), courts must accept all material allegations in the complaint as true and construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff. White, 227 F.3d at 1242. “By contrast, in a factual attack [to subject matter jurisdiction], the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. Courts may look beyond the complaint only when a defendant brings a factual attack against jurisdiction. White, 227 F.3d at 1242. In that case, the court “also need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiffs' allegations.” Id. Defendants' challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is a facial one.
Because Plaintiff is pro se, the Court liberally construes the allegations in the Complaint in his favor. Capp v. Cnty. of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2019) (“We have emphasized that pro se pleadings . . . are to be liberally construed on a motion to dismiss.”). Whether or not Plaintiff is self-represented, he bears the burden of proving the requirements of subject matter jurisdiction. See Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that each of the requirements for subject-matter jurisdiction has been met.”). .... ....
III.
A.
Plaintiff lacks standing to assert his claims against the named Defendants. Article III of the United States Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to “Cases” and “Controversies.” Murthy v. Missouri, - U.S. -, 144 S.Ct. 1972, 1985 (2024). “A proper case or controversy exists only when at least one plaintiff establishes that [he] has standing to sue. [He] must show that [he] has suffered, or will suffer, an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.” Id. at 1986 (cleaned up).
Plaintiff's complaint does not allege injury that is traceable to these Defendants. Under Arizona's statutory scheme for property tax liens, A.R.S. § 42-18101, et seq., the taxing authority may sell liens to private purchasers. Id. § 42-18101(A). The purchaser obtains a right to foreclose after three years. Id. § 42-18201(A). This procedure was followed in Plaintiff's case when the tax lien purchasers opted to foreclose on the property. While Plaintiff named various governmental defendants in this case, he did not bring into this case the purchasers of the property tax liens. Moreover, even if Plaintiff obtains a judgment in his favor, the Court could not reverse the conveyance of his property to the new owners because they have not been joined in this action. Plaintiff thus fails to show two of the three requirements for Article III standing.
B.
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. “Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a state-court decision is not reviewable by lower federal courts. This doctrine bars a federal district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction not only over an action explicitly styled as a direct appeal, but also over the de facto equivalent of such an appeal.” Hooper v. Brnovich, 56 F.4th 619, 624 (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). This principle derives from our federalist form of government and the federal courts' respect for state sovereignty.
Plaintiff's requested relief would have this Court nullify decisions issued by Arizona state courts. In his complaint, Plaintiff prays for a declaration that Defendants' actions were unconstitutional and that he is the rightful owner of the property. But this would indirectly require overturning the state court rulings in the tax foreclosure proceedings. And Plaintiff seeks to indirectly invalidate a ruling of the Arizona Superior Court in Yavapai County that his claims against Yavapai County are barred under Arizona's one-year statute of limitations, A.R.S. § 12-821, and the notice of claim statute, id. § 12-821.01. (See D. Ariz. Case No. 3:22-cv-08136-GMS, Doc. 24-1 at 43-47, 62.)
The Motion identifies other state court cases that have been litigated to finality, all of which were decided against Plaintiff. The Court need not examine these cases individually. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine already applies because of the tax court decisions and the final judgment entered by the Superior Court in Yavapai County.
C.
Defendants raise additional jurisdictional arguments under the res judicata doctrine and the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341. They also move to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The County Treasurer moves to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Court finds that it need not examine these potentially meritorious arguments because it has already determined that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking under the Article III standing and Rooker-Feldman doctrines.
IV.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16) is GRANTED. This case is dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk of Court must enter a judgment of dismissal in Defendants' favor and close this case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Clarification (Doc. 21) is DENIED.