Summary
noting the plaintiff's failure "to point to evidence demonstrating any significant impact her learning disability had on her ability to learn and perform her job during her employment at Wal-Mart"
Summary of this case from Mulholland v. Pharmacia Upjohn, Inc.Opinion
CIVIL NO. CCB-99-763
August 28, 2000
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Renee Lane has sued defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., ("Wal-Mart"), alleging discrimination based on an actual disability, discrimination based on a perceived disability, and failure to provide training in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, Wal-Mart has filed a motion for summary judgment. No hearing is deemed necessary. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons stated below, Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
BACKGROUND
The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are as follows. Throughout her life, Renee Lane has suffered from specific learning disabilities. At age three, she was placed in an Early Childhood Education Program for the development of her cognitive abilities. (Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. 1) Thereafter, educators placed Ms. Lane in special education classes and developed an Individualized Educational Program to accommodate her learning disability of "Seriously Emotionally Disturbed." (Id. Ex. C) Ms. Lane subsequently enrolled in home schooling (id. Ex. B; Ex. E), and eventually dropped out of high school (id. Ex. F).
In September 1995 Ms. Lane was hired as a sales associate at a Wal-Mart store located in Glen Burnie, Maryland. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Ex. D) During her interview, Ms. Lane advised Craig Lowry, Wal-Mart's personnel manager, that she had a learning disability which affected her ability to comprehend things as quickly as an average person. Ms. Lane informed Mr. Lowry that she might need instructions repeated to her and might need to be shown how to do certain tasks. (Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. D at 38) Ms. Lane was assigned to the seasonal department; Heather Kail was her supervisor. (Id. Ex. D at 51) Upon assignment to the seasonal department, Mr. Lowry advised Ms. Kail to put Ms. Lane on a fixed schedule, rather than the rotating one assigned to other Wal-Mart associates. (Id. Ex. H at 127-28) When questioned about this, Mr. Lowry responded that Ms. Lane was "special" and needed to work with supervision. (Id. Ex. H at 128)
Before being placed on the sales floor, Ms. Lane received two hours of video training on Wal-Mart Culture and Customer Service. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A at 48-49) Additionally, she received on-the-job training and direction from her department manager, Ms. Kail. (Id. Ex. A at 65-66, 110, 161) She was not afforded an opportunity to complete the CBL's, which were a training device utilized by all Wal-Mart employees, unless specially exempted. (Id. Ex. A. at 66; Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. H at 139; Ex. J at 16-18) Ms. Lane was evaluated on December 22, 1995, at which time she received a standard rating and a $0.30 per hour raise. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ J. Ex. G)
In early January 1996, Ms. Lane voluntarily resigned her position at Wal-Mart in order to go to Las Vegas for personal reasons. (Id. Ex. A at 82-83, 88) Though Mr. Lowry told her he would took "take care of everything," Ms. Lane understood that she was ineligible for a formal leave of absence. (Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. D at 80) When Ms. Lane returned in April 1996, she reapplied at Wal-Mart and was hired by Lynn Earnest, the store manager. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Ex. A at 88-89) She was reassigned to work under the supervision and direction of Ms. Kail. (Id.) Again, Ms. Lane was denied the opportunity to take CBL's. (Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. D at 50-51, 67-69) When asked about Ms. Lane's CBL's, Mr. Lowry informed Ms. Lane and Ms. Kail that he had entered CBL scores into the computer on Ms. Lane's behalf, and she would not have to take the training. (Id. Ex. D at 68-69; Ex. H at 138-39) Ms. Lane was again evaluated on July 15, 1996 by Jeffrey Moulden, an assistant store manager; she received a standard rating and a $0.25 per hour raise. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Ex. H)
In January 1997, Ms. Earnest determined that a workforce reduction was necessary. She identified the following criteria to be used in selecting employees for termination: 1) length of employment with Wal-Mart; 2) whether the employee had any "coachings" in their file; and 3) whether the employee was available and willing to work nights. (Id. Ex. J at 39; Ex. K at 56) To be eligible, an employee had to meet two of the criteria. (Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. M at 72-73) Mr. Moulden was told to select two employees in the seasonal area; he therefore reviewed personnel files and recommended Ms. Lane and another employee for termination. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Ex. J at 45-46, 49-51) After considering this recommendation, Ms. Earnest decided to terminate Ms. Lane, along with twenty other Wal-Mart employees. (Id. Ex. K at 57) Mr. Moulden informed Ms. Lane of Wal-Mart's decision to terminate her. (Id. Ex. A at 105)
After Ms. Kail learned of Ms. Lane's termination, she asked Mr. Moulden why the decision had been made. He stated he had "no part of it." (Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. H at 262-63) Ms. Kail made the same inquiry of Ms. Earnest and Mr. Lowry. Mr. Lowry responded that Wal-Mart did not need "someone like that out there" and then referred to two Worker's Compensation incidents involving Ms. Lane. (Id. Ex. H at 123-24) When further pressed by Ms. Kail, Mr. Lowry referenced two other Wal-Mart employees by first name, both of whom were "special needs" individuals. (Id. Ex. H at 125-26) Ms. Earnest, however, did not participate in these comments or express any opinions similar to those of Mr. Lowry.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
[Summary judgment] shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). In making this determination, the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment is to be believed and all justifiable inferences drawn in her favor. Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 196 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). The non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in her pleading, however, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Allstate Fin. Corp. v. Financorp, Inc., 934 F.2d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1991). The "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position" is not enough to defeat a defendant's summary judgment motion.Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
ANALYSIS
Title I of the ADA mandates that employers shall not discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability in regard to, inter alia, discharge or job training. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Ms. Lane alleges that both her lack of CBL training and her termination in January 1997 were motivated by Wal-Mart's animus towards her because of her disability or her perceived disability, specifically her learning disability which, she contends, "substantially limits her major life activity of learning." (Pl.'s Opp'n at 12)
A plaintiff may prove a claim of intentional discrimination by either direct or indirect evidence. Since Ms. Lane does not present direct evidence of discrimination, her claim is subject to the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973), and its progeny. See, e.g., Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 1998).
Ms. Lane's allegation that her claim is supported by direct evidence of Wal-Mart's intentional discrimination is rendered moot by the court's finding that she is not disabled and by her own admission that the decision-making employees did not act in a discriminatory manner towards her. Any remarks made by Mr. Lowry, an employee who had no influence over Ms. Earnest's decision to terminate Ms. Lane, do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination. Cf. Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598, 608 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that stray or isolated remarks do not count as direct evidence unless the remarks were related to the employment decision).
The Supreme Court has recently clarified the McDonnell Douglas proof structure. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000). First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See id. at 2106. To establish her prima facie case, Ms. Lane must present evidence sufficient to prove : (1) that she is disabled under the ADA; (2) that she was otherwise qualified for her position; and (3) that her disability was a motivating factor in her dismissal. See id.; see also Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 467, 470 (4th Cir. 1999) (setting out prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA and establishing the "motivating factor" standard for causation under ADA claims).
Under the McDonnell Douglas indirect proof scheme, circumstantial evidence ordinarily may be offered to prove the third prong. See, e.g., Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 802 (4th Cir. 1998) ("Because [plaintiff] was terminated as part of a reduction in force, he could potentially satisfy the fourth element of a prima facie case by introducing other probative evidence that indicates the employer did not treat age and race neutrally when making its decision."); Blistein v. St. John's College, 74 F.3d 1459, 1470 (4th Cir. 1996) (age discrimination).
In Baird, the Fourth Circuit explained that a plaintiff proceeding under the ADA need not prove that her disability was the sole motivating factor for the discriminatory action. The court also explained that "[d]amages may not be awarded for such a violation, however, if the defendant `would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.' . . . In such circumstances, relief is limited to declaratory and injunctive relief, costs, and attorney's fees." Baird, 192 F.3d at 470.
If she can establish her prima facie case, the burden shifts to Wal-Mart to "produc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason."Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2106 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)). The defendant's burden is one of production, not persuasion, and the court should not evaluate the credibility of the defendant's explanation. See id. Once the defendant satisfies its burden, "the McDonnell Douglas framework — with its presumptions and burdens — [disappears] and the sole remaining issue [is] discrimination vel non." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Although discrimination vel non remains the ultimate issue, the plaintiff "must be afforded the `opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.'" Id. at 2106 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). "[T]he plaintiff may attempt to establish that he was the victim of intentional discrimination `by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.'" Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). The plaintiff can use evidence establishing her prima facie case, and inferences properly drawn therefrom, to support a showing that the defendant's proffered reason is not believable. See id.
There may be circumstances where the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, and yet no rational juror could conclude that the defendant's action was discriminatory. See id. at 2109. But, "[i]n appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose." Id. at 2108. "[O]nce the employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision." Id. Therefore, by establishing a prima facie case and putting forth sufficient evidence to refute the employer's explanation for its decision, the plaintiff may be able to sustain her burden of proving intentional discrimination. See id.
Under the proof scheme discussed above, Ms. Lane must proffer sufficient evidence of a prima facie case of discrimination. Wal-Mart argues, correctly, that she has failed to meet the first prong of her prima facie case; she is not disabled under the ADA. The ADA defines "disability" as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). Major life activities include "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). As the statute indicates, an impairment rises to the level of a disability for purposes of the ADA if it "substantially limits" one or more of these activities. Thus, not every impairment that affects a major life activity will be considered disabling; only if the resulting limitation is significant will it meet the ADA's test.
According to the regulations, substantially limits means:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).
The court will assume, based on the significant evidence proffered by Ms. Lane, that she suffers from a mental impairment which affects her ability to learn, that is, a specific learning disability: "seriously emotionally disturbed." She has failed, however, to present evidence that this impairment substantially limited her ability to learn during the time period in question, i.e., her employment at Wal-Mart.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (noting that "physical or mental impairment" includes "any mental or psychological disorder, such as . . . specific learning disabilities").
According to her own testimony, her learning disability did not significantly limit her ability to perform her job at Wal-Mart. Rather, she testified that with instruction and demonstration, there was no part of the job she was unable to perform. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A at 39, 52, 56, 65-66, 95-96, 103, 107-08) This hardly qualifies as an inability or significant restriction on her ability to learn. Ms. Lane's supervisor, Heather Kail, also testified that Ms. Lane's learning disability was so "slight" that she did not think it affected her. (Id. Ex. B at 110-11) Most significant, however, is the testimony of Ms. Lane's own expert, Dr. Schwartzberg, who stated in his report that Ms. Lane's learning disability "has not limited her ability to learn which she has demonstrated during her stay at Wal-Mart." (Id. Ex. C at 3) Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, Dr. Schwartzberg's deposition testimony is not inconsistent with his report. (Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. N at 124-26)
As Ms. Lane points out, her learning disabilities significantly hindered her ability to learn throughout her education. (Id. Ex. B; Ex. C) Plaintiff fails, however, to point to evidence demonstrating any significant impact her learning disability had on her ability to learn and perform her job during her employment at Wal-Mart. In Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499 (7th Cir. 1998), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against a plaintiff who failed to proffer sufficient evidence that her attention deficit disorder, while well documented in the past, presently limited her ability to learn. Id. at 508. See also Kohn v. ATT Corp., 58 F. Supp.2d 393, 416 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding that proof of a learning disability in itself did not create a genuine issue of material fact; rather, a plaintiff must present evidence of the effect the condition has on his ability to work); DeMar v. Car-Freshner Corp., 49 F. Supp.2d 84, 91-92 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that plaintiff failed to proffer sufficient evidence of the present effect of his attention deficit disorder on his ability to learn, despite allegations of prior limitations); cf. Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that to qualify under the ADA, a plaintiff must be "significantly restricted" as compared to the average person in the general population). As a result of Ms. Lane's failure to proffer evidence that her learning disability significantly impaired her ability to learn while she was employed at Wal-Mart, no genuine issue of material fact exists; she is not disabled under the statute.
The Seventh Circuit did reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment on the question of whether a plaintiff's prior history of disability can constitute a disability under § 12102(2)(B). See Davidson, 133 F.3d at 510. Ms. Lane has explicitly denied seeking redress under that definition, which requires a showing that the employer was aware of the record. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 11 n. 2)
Wal-Mart's failure to have her participate in CBL's did not adversely affect Ms. Lane in any manner apparent from the evidence. She received alternative training and was able to perform her job.
Even if, however, the court were to assume that Ms. Lane met the first prong of the prima facie case, her claim still fails, as she can not offer sufficient evidence that her disability was a motivating factor in her dismissal. See Baird, 192 F.3d at 470.
The evidence shows that Ms. Earnest was the individual responsible for the decision to terminate Ms. Lane; Mr. Lowry played no role in the decision. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Ex. J at 38-39; Def.'s Reply Ex. 3 at 67; Ex. 5 at 88-89) Even Ms. Kail admits that to be true. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Ex. B at 190) Accordingly, Ms. Lane's testimony that neither Ms. Earnest, who made the final selection regarding termination, nor Mr. Moulden, who forwarded her name to Ms. Earnest, ever said anything derogatory about her or gave her any reason to infer that her termination was prompted by animus negates any inference that her termination was motivated by discrimination. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Ex. A at 104, 118, 167) Nor does Ms. Lane proffer other evidence demonstrating discriminatory intent on the part of Ms. Earnest or Mr. Moulden. This lack of evidence supports the Defendant's argument for summary judgment. In an age discrimination case, the Fourth Circuit held that plaintiffs' case was "undermined" by the parties' inability to "point to any statement or piece of physical evidence indicative of . . . discrimination." EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 941 (4th Cir. 1992) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant when neither plaintiffs' testimony nor the statistical evidence showed any evidence of discriminatory conduct). See also Skagen v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 910 F.2d 1498, 1501 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming summary judgment in age discrimination case in which plaintiff admitted age was not a deciding factor in the employer's reorganization plans).
Ms. Lane apparently based her belief that Mr. Lowry was responsible for her termination on a hearsay statement by Ms. Kail. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Ex. A at 162)
Additionally, this lack of evidence can not withstand the "powerful inference" that Ms. Lane's alleged disability played no role in her termination decision, an inference created by the fact that Ms. Earnest, the store manager and employee responsible for hirings and firings, authorized Ms. Lane's rehire only eight months before the layoff decision. Mr. Moulden, the person who recommended Ms. Lane for termination, administered her performance evaluation on July 15, 1996, giving her a favorable review and a $0.25 raise. (Id. Ex. H) See Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991) ("[I]n cases where the hirer and the firer are the same individual and the termination of employment occurs within a relatively short time span following the hiring, a strong inference exists that discrimination was not a determining factor for the adverse action taken by the employer."); see also Evans v. Technologies Applications Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959 (4th Cir. 1996). Because Ms. Lane can not proffer sufficient evidence that her disability was a motivating factor in Wal-Mart's decision to terminate her, she can not support a prima facie case of discrimination.
Even if the court were to assume, however, that Ms. Lane were able to establish a prima facie case, Wal-Mart has proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision to terminate her. See Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2106. In January 1997, Ms. Earnest selected the following criteria to be used in a workforce reduction: 1) length of employment with Wal-Mart; 2) whether the employee had any "coachings" in their file; and 3) whether the employee was available and willing to work nights. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Ex. J at 39; Ex. K at 56) To be eligible for a layoff, an employee had to meet two of the criteria. (Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. M at 72-73) In response to Ms. Earnest's directive to cut two employees from the seasonal department, Mr. Moulden reviewed the personnel information of the associates under his areas of responsibility and forwarded two names to Ms. Earnest; one of those was Ms. Lane. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Ex. J at 45-46, 50-51) The two employees were chosen by Mr. Moulden because of their recent dates of hire. (Id. p. 51) Additionally, Ms. Lane did not work any evenings nor did her schedule reflect that she was available to work evenings. (Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. I; Def.'s Rely Ex. 6 at 245) Based on the information provided to her, Ms. Earnest decided to terminate Ms. Lane, along with twenty other Wal-Mart employees who fit the criteria. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Ex. I) Accordingly, Wal-Mart has met its burden of production; the court need not pass on the credibility of the evidence. See Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2106.
Ms. Lane's testimony makes clear that her voluntary departure in January 1996 constituted a resignation. She understood that she was not eligible for a leave of absence because she had not been employed the minimum requisite period of one year with a minimum of one thousand hours worked. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Ex. A at 80-81)
Ms. Lane's contention that she worked "two nights per week for at least one month prior to her termination" is refuted by her time sheets which show she did not work any evening shifts during the six months preceding her termination. (Def.'s Reply Ex. 8)
Additionally, even if Ms. Lane would have been willing to change her availability to include nights, Ms. Kail admitted that at the time she made the decision, Ms. Earnest most likely honestly believed that Ms. Lane did not have a flexible schedule. (Def.'s Reply Ex. 4 at 251) See Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 829 (4th Cir. 1989) ("'A reason honestly described but poorly founded is not a pretext, as that term is used in the law of discrimination.' Bad or mistaken reasons for a decision may yet be non-discriminatory." (quoting Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1987))).
As Wal-Mart had proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Ms. Lane's termination, the burden shifts back to Ms. Lane to prove that "`the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.'" Id. at 2106 (quotingBurdine, 450 U.S. at 253). This can be done "`by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.'" Id. (quotingBurdine, 450 U.S. at 256). The plaintiff can use evidence establishing her prima facie case, and inferences properly drawn therefrom, to support a showing that the defendant's proffered reason is not believable. See id.
This Ms. Lane fails to do. Ms. Earnest, the person who made the decision to terminate Ms. Lane, denies any knowledge of Ms. Lane's disability. (Def.'s Reply Ex. 3 at 27) This negates the possibility that her termination was based on discriminatory intent. See Morisky v. Broward County, 80 F.3d 445, 448-49 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that employer cannot be liable under ADA for firing employee when it had no knowledge of the disability). Ms. Lane's sole rebuttal of Wal-Mart's explanation is Mr. Lowry's alleged response to Ms. Kail's inquiry regarding Ms. Lane's termination that Wal-Mart did not want "someone like that out there," after which he referred to Ms. Lane's involvement in two Worker's Compensation incidents and to two other disabled Wal-Mart employees. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 6) Mr. Lowry, however, played no substantive role in Ms. Earnest's decision to terminate Ms. Lane. (Def.'s Reply Ex. 3 p. 67; Ex. 4 p. 190; Ex. 5 p. 88-89) Because he was not a decision maker, his remark, even if it occurred, does not impute animus to Wal-Mart. See Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598, 608 (4th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, Ms. Lane can not demonstrate animus on the part of Wal-Mart; the request for summary judgment with regard to termination based on actual discrimination will be granted.
In light of Ms. Earnest's testimony that she had no idea Ms. Lane was disabled (Def.'s Reply Ex. 3 p. 27), as well as Ms. Lane's failure to proffer any evidence that the termination was based on a perception that she was disabled, Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment will also be granted as to Ms. Lane's claim that her termination was motivated by the perception that she had a disability.
Ms. Lane also has brought a claim alleging that Wal-Mart failed to train her because of the company's perception that she was disabled. She claims that Mr. Lowry's decision not to allow her to participate in the CBL training program was motivated by his desire to discriminate against her based on his perception of her disability. Ms. Lane's claim fails, however, because she received alternate training. Wal-Mart company policy allows employees who are "physically/mentally challenged" to be exempted from the CBL requirement. (Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. K) Instead, an employee is to learn the information "in another format"; this can include training guides and one-on-one training. (Id.) While Ms. Lane did not participate in a formal one-on-one training program, she viewed a training video and her manager, Heather Kail, provided on-the-job training as necessary. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Ex. B p. 156) Ms. Lane testified that she was able to perform "every one of [her] duties." (Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. 6 p. 235) Therefore, though her training was less formal than it would have been had she taken the CBL's, it was nonetheless adequate to prepare her for her job duties. Accordingly, Ms. Lowry's decision not to allow her to take the CBLs did not constitute discrimination based on his perception of her disability.
As the court has found Ms. Lane not to be disabled under the ADA, her claim for failure to train based on her actual disability must fail.
Wal-Mart's argument that the failure to train does not constitute an adverse employment action is inapplicable to this case (De.'s Reply at 15-17), as the cases cited pertain to Title VII claims. The ADA specifically prohibits discrimination in the area of job training. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment will be granted. A separate Order follows.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Wal-Mart's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED;
2. This case is CLOSED: and
3. Copies of this Order and the accompanying Memorandum shall be mailed to counsel of record.