Opinion
05-22-00127-CR
06-23-2023
RAYGENE DEMOND LANE, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(B).
On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-2170105-Q
Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Smith, and Breedlove
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS JUSTICE
Appellant Raygene Demond Lane challenges his conviction for aggravated assault. In two issues, Lane asserts the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and the judgment should be modified. We affirm as modified.
BACKGROUND
Lane was indicted for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for causing bodily injury to Michael Henry. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(1). Lane waived a jury and proceeded with a bench trial. Henry testified for the State. He explained that on the day of the assault, he and his ex-girlfriend, Jasmine Williams, got into an argument at her parents' home. Henry believed Williams was seeing Lane "on the side" when he saw messages on her phone. After their argument, Henry left but returned later to ask Williams to return the phone back. When Williams returned to her parents' home, she was with Lane. Henry stated he approached Williams outside of the apartment to talk to her, but she turned and began talking to Lane. Henry approached Lane's vehicle on the driver's side, opened the driver's side door, and began punching Lane. Henry admitted he did not give Lane an opportunity to get out of the vehicle and they both just started punching each other. As they fought, Lane turned the vehicle on, put the vehicle in reverse, and hit Henry with the open driver's door. Henry said he fell down and saw Lane turning the steering wheel, which caused the tires to roll over Henry's body. Henry believed Lane was trying to kill him, and when he saw Lane put the car in drive, he moved to the top of the curb. Henry testified Lane ran over his shoulder, arm, and leg with the front wheel. He also sustained a cut to his head from the fender. Once Henry was on the curb, Lane reversed and left the parking lot. Henry called 911 and had them meet him at his apartment. At the hospital, staff determined Henry had sustained a broken arm, leg, and hand, and had cuts inside his mouth.
Henry explained that he paid for Williams' phone so he wanted it returned after their argument.
Lane testified in his defense. He explained he was friends with Williams but never dated her. According to Lane, Williams told him that Henry had been harassing her all day, so he took Williams to her parents' house to gather some belongings late in the evening hoping to avoid Henry. The parking lot of the apartment complex was dark when Lane pulled in and Lane did not see anyone there. As Williams was walking towards her parents' home, Lane stated he heard her say "watch out" and Lane saw a man running towards the vehicle attempting to punch him through his open window. At the time, Lane did not know the man was Henry, and later he could not pick Henry out of a photo lineup. Lane testified that Henry opened the driver's side door and began punching him. Lane was still wearing his seat belt at the time, and Henry would not let him get out of the car. Lane believed he was punched about nine times in the head. During this time, Williams returned to the car and tried to stop Henry by hitting him. Lane was able to put his car in reverse and drive over the curb behind him. Lane stated he was not trying to hit Henry. He later discovered that Williams was also hit by the door when he reversed his car. Once he was able to leave, Lane drove up the hill and stopped to report the incident to police officers. Lane told the court that the officers saw injuries to his head. He also testified that at no point did he run over Henry with his car. He believed Henry's injuries were due to being hit with the car door.
The trial court found Lane guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. See id. Following a pre-sentence investigation, Lane was sentenced to three years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first issue, Lane states the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's rejection of his self-defense claim.
We review a sufficiency challenge by considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine, whether, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational jury could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We defer to the fact finder's credibility and weight determinations because the fact finder is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. See Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 922. The fact finder can choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties. Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). "Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Evidence is sufficient if "the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most favorable to the verdict." Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
When an appellant asserts that the evidence is legally insufficient to support an adverse finding on an affirmative defense, we construe the issue as an assertion that the contrary was established as a matter of a law. Velasquez v. State, No. 05-17-01214-CR, 2018 WL 6065257, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 20, 2018, no pet.); see Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 667 &n.14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We first search the record for evidence favorable to the finding, disregarding all contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder could not. Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 669. If we find no evidence supporting the finding, we then determine whether the contrary was established as a matter of law. Id. Only if the appealing party establishes that the evidence conclusively proves his affirmative defense and "that no reasonable jury was free to think otherwise" may the reviewing court conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury's rejection of the defendant's affirmative defense. Id. at 670.
Section 9.31 of the penal code provides that, subject to certain exceptions, a person is justified in using force against another "when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force." TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.31(a). The use of force is not justified in response to verbal provocation alone, or if the actor provoked the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force. Id. § 9.31(b). A "reasonable belief" is defined as "one that would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor." Id. § 1.07(a)(42). In a claim of selfdefense that would justify a defendant's use of force against another, the defendant bears the burden to produce evidence supporting the defense, while the State bears the burden of persuasion to disprove the raised issues. Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
The evidence at trial showed there was an altercation between Lane and Henry. It appears Henry was the initial aggressor, when he attacked Lane in his vehicle and repeatedly punched him in the face. However, Lane escalated the force used when he reversed the car, hit Henry with the car door, and then ran over Henry with his vehicle. The trial court could have reasonably found Lane's self-defense theory was not justified. He reversed away from Henry, knocking him and Williams down. However, according to Henry, Lane moved his wheel in order to run over Henry, which caused the injuries he sustained. The trial court's rejection of Lane's self-defense argument was reasonable. Lane's first issue is overruled.
B. Modification of the Judgment
In his second issue, Lane asks us to modify the judgment to properly reflect what occurred in the trial court. He asks us to correct the name of the attorney for the State, that he pleaded "not guilty" to the offense, and that it was an "open plea."
We have the power to modify a judgment to speak the truth when we have the necessary information to do so. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(B); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd) (en banc). When there is a conflict between the oral pronouncement of a sentence and the written judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. Shuler v. State, 650 S.W.3d 683, 686 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2022, no pet.) (citing Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). When the oral pronouncement and the written judgment conflict, the remedy is to reform the judgment. See Thompson v. State, 108 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Lane asks us to correct the judgment to properly reflect that he pleaded not guilty without a plea bargain. The State agrees and joins Lane's request to modify the judgment to delete the finding of "guilty" under the section titled "Plea to Offense" and replace it was "not guilty." Lane also requests we delete the finding of a plea bargain under "Terms of Plea Bargain." There was no plea bargain in this case, and we agree that finding should be deleted. Lane also asks us to correct the name of the "Attorney for State" from "Amber Moore" to "Trenton Dressen." We agree Trenton Dressen, not Amber Moore, was the lead prosecutor below. We sustain Lane's issue and modify the judgment accordingly.
CONCLUSION
Under this record, we overrule Lane's first issue regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the rejection of the self-defense claim. We sustain Lane's second issue and conclude the judgment should be modified by deleting the finding of "guilty" under the section titled "Plea to Offense" and showing a plea of "not guilty," deleting the finding under "Terms of Plea Bargain", and modifying the name of the "Attorney for State" from "Amber Moore" to "Trenton Dressen." We affirm the judgment as modified.
JUDGMENT
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows: by deleting the finding of "guilty" under the section titled "Plea to Offense" and showing a plea of "not guilty," deleting the finding under "Terms of Plea Bargain," and modifying the name of the "Attorney for State" from "Amber Moore" to "Trenton Dress" As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.