Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-1765-BF.
January 10, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 15, 2004. This Court has considered the Motion for Summary Judgment, along with Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Appendix in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support Thereof, both filed October 15, 2004, and the applicable law. Plaintiff Linda Lue Lane ("Plaintiff") has not filed a response. For the reasons below, this Court determines that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. I. Background
The background information comes from Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Appendix in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support Thereof.
Plaintiff, an African American female, filed an employment discrimination action against the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security ("Defendant"). Plaintiff claims that she was not selected in 1995 for an Examination Assistant position with the INS because of her race and gender in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) ("Title VII"). Plaintiff states that she had been treated differently than the other applicants interviewed, because she was interviewed by only one panel member and was given the wrong information regarding the location of her interview.
The Defendant at the time this case was filed was James W. Ziglar, the then Secretary of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"). On August 27, 2003, Tom Ridge was substituted as Defendant. (Def.'s Summ. J. Mot. at 2 n. 1).
Defendant claims that Plaintiff was not selected for the Examination Assistant position because of her unsatisfactory performance at the job interview. The INS formed a three person panel to interview applicants for its Examination Assistant positions. Defendant states that Plaintiff was interviewed by only one of the three panelists because the other two panelists were not yet in the office due to weather conditions. According to Defendant, Plaintiff was told that her interview was to take place in an office on the 5th floor, because when the interviews were being scheduled, the occupant of that office was scheduled to be out. However, Defendant states that it was later learned that the office would no longer be available on the date of Plaintiff's interview, and the interview site had to be changed. According to Defendant, no one was able to contact Plaintiff prior to her interview to inform her that the interview site had changed, because her interview was scheduled early in the morning. However, Defendant states that the interviewing panelist personally escorted Plaintiff to the proper interview site, as he had done with the applicant scheduled to be interviewed before Plaintiff, who also was not contacted prior to the interview regarding the location change.
II. Analysis
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and record evidence show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). The burden is on the movant to prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Latimer v. Smithkline French Labs., 919 F.2d 301, 303 (5th Cir. 1990). If the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the summary judgment movant need not support his motion with evidence negating the non-movant's case. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. Rather, the movant may satisfy his burden by pointing to the absence of evidence to support the non-movant's case. Id. Once the movant meets his burden, the non-movant must show that summary judgement is not appropriate. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). "[A properly supported summary judgment motion] requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56). In determining whether a genuine issue exists for trial, the court must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 302 (5th Cir. 2000).
Since direct evidence of an employer's discriminatory intent is uncommon, a Title VII plaintiff alleging employment discrimination must ordinarily support his claim with circumstantial evidence in order to avoid judgment as a matter of law. Scales v. Slater, 181 F.3d 703, 708-09 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 449 (5th Cir. 1996)). Under the "modified version of the burden-shifting analysis articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas," the Title VII plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1089 (5th Cir. 1995)). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. Scales, 181 F.3d at 709 (citing Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-56 (1981); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). If a defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's stated reason was pretextual. Id. (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804).
A. Prima Facie Case
Summary judgment is appropriate in this case, because there is no direct evidence of discriminatory intent, nor is there a showing of a prima facie case of discrimination. In order to establish a prima facie case, Plaintiff should show that: (1) she was qualified for the position; (2) she was a member of a protected class at the time of the decision; (3) the individual ultimately selected was not within the protected class; and (4) she suffered an adverse employment action. Rios v. Rossotti, 252 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2001). See also Scales, 181 F.3d at 709 (Proving a prima facie case entails showing that "(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she sought and was qualified for an available employment position; (3) she was rejected for that position; and (4) the employer continued to seek applicants with the plaintiff's qualifications.") (citations omitted). It is necessary for Plaintiff to "establish all four elements of the case in order to prove that she was treated differently." Id. (citing Garcia v. Woman's Hosp. of Texas, 143 F.3d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam)).
Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case because she cannot establish two of the four requirements set out above. Plaintiff was not qualified for a position as an INS Examination Assistant because of her unsatisfactory performance at the job interview. Meeting the minimum qualifications for the position which allowed her to procure the interview is not sufficient to show that she was qualified for the postion. See Scales, 181 F.3d at 709. An employer has the discretion to narrow the applicant pool through additional qualifications not included in the job announcement. Id. at 710. Plaintiff also has not shown that Defendant continued to seek individuals with Plaintiff's qualification or that the applicants ultimately selected were not within the protected class. Out of the twenty-six applicants selected for the Examination Assistant positions, eight African Americans and twelve females were selected. (Def.'s Summ. J. Mot. at 3). Five of the twenty-six selected were African American and female. Id. at 3. In addition, Defendant did not continue to seek individuals with Plaintiff's qualifications, namely, individuals who did not demonstrate an ability to communicate effectively, but selected those with satisfactory interview performances. Id. at 4.
B. Evidence of Pretext
Even if Plaintiff had established a prima facie case of discrimination, summary judgment is still appropriate because there is no evidence to show that the Defendant's reason for Plaintiff's non-selection was pretextual. See Scales, 181 F.3d at 712 ("[S]ummary judgment was proper because Scales failed to establish the . . . prima facie case; even assuming that she had proved the case, she failed to demonstrate why the criteria were pretextual."). In order to show pretext, Plaintiff must produce evidence which shows that Defendant's asserted reasons were false and that Defendant was actually motivated by discrimination. Scales, 181 F.3d at 709 (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993)). See also E.E.O.C. v. Louisiana Office of Cmty. Servs., 47 F.3d 1438, 1443 (5th Cir. 1995) ("In determining whether the employer's stated reason is false, the trier of fact may not disregard the defendant's explanation without countervailing evidence that it was not the real reason for the discharge."). Pretext can also be inferred if Plaintiff "was `clearly better qualified' (as opposed to merely better or as qualified) than the employees who are selected." Id. at 1444 (citations omitted).
There is no evidence to show that Plaintiff was "clearly better qualified" than the selected applicants. There is no evidence to refute Defendant's assertion that its reason for not hiring Plaintiff was legitimate and non-discriminatory. Defendant determined that Plaintiff's inability to communicate clearly at the interview deemed her to be a less qualified candidate. (Def's Summ. J. Mot. at 4). Courts should "decline to substitute our judgment for the employer in evaluating what types of experience are most valuable for an employee in the new position in the absence of proof that the standards were not consistently applied or were so irrational or idiosyncratic as to suggest a cover-up." E.E.O.C., 47 F.3d at 1445-46 (citations omitted). There is no evidence here to suggest that Defendant's hiring standards were applied inconsistently or that they were irrational. Thus, Defendant had the right to offer the positions to the interviewees that it opined to be the most qualified. See Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 693 F.2d 589, 590-91 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[P]romotion of a better qualified applicant is a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for preferring the successful applicant over the rejected employee. . . .") (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
Defendant has also provided non-discriminatory explanations as to why Plaintiff was given the wrong information regarding the location of the interview and why she, along with another applicant, was interviewed without the full panel. (Def.'s Summ. J. Mot. at 5-6). No evidence was presented to refute these explanations. Even if Plaintiff was interviewed by less than the full panel because of reasons other than weather conditions, such "evidence of departures from prior procedures does not suffice to defeat summary judgment in a discrimination case unless there is some evidence that the departures were meant to be discriminatory." Scales, 181 F.3d at 711 (citing E.E.O.C. v. Texas Instruments, 100 F.3d 1173, 1182 (1996); Risher v. Aldridge, 889, F.2d 592, 597 (5th Cir. 1989)).
There appears to be no evidence other than Plaintiff's subjective belief to support the assertion that Defendant's reason for not hiring Plaintiff was discriminatory, and this is insufficient to survive Defendant's summary judgment motion. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assoc., 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("It is more than well-settled that an employee's subjective belief that [s]he suffered an adverse employment action as a result of discrimination, without more, is not enough to survive a summary judgment motion. . . .") (citations omitted).
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
SO ORDERED.