Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-354
March 22, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Gwendolyn Lane is a former employee of defendant Packaging Coordinators, Inc. At all relevant times, Packaging Coordinators and Lane's union, the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International Union, Philadelphia Local No. 2-286, were parties to a collective bargaining agreement. In September of 2002, Packaging Coordinators terminated Lane, and on January 27, 2003, she filed apro se complaint against her former employer seeking restoration of her job and $150,000 in damages.
Lane apparently seeks to proceed against Packaging Coordinators on the theory that her termination breached the collective bargaining agreement in violation of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 301, describing her claim as follows:
I am filing a discrimination claim against P.C.I. Services for firing me without a fair hearing. I was also in the Union, and the Union failed to stand up and protect my rights. I was employed at P.C.I, for (4) four years. I should not have been fired for missing a days [sic] work.
Compl. at 4.
The complaint also alleges that Lane paid her union dues faithfully each month and that her union representative "did not set up a hearing concerning this matter." Id. at 3.
After Lane requested the assistance of a lawyer, we directed the Clerk of Court to seek counsel from the employment Court's law panel. The Clerk was unsuccessful, and on October 3, 2003, Lane notified us that she wished to pursue this action pro se.
Packaging Coordinators answered the complaint and attempted to engage in discovery. However, it ultimately abandoned that effort and filed the Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion now before us, which argues that the complaint must be dismissed because Lane failed to exhaust the grievance procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement.
In resolving a motion to dismiss brought under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), we look only to the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien Frankel, 20 F.3d 1251, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). We accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-movant. General Motors Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 263 F.3d 296, 325 (3d Cir. 2001). Although we need not accept as true "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences," we must deem the complaint to have alleged sufficient facts if it adequately provides the defendants with notice of the essential elements of the plaintiff's claims. Langford v. City of Atlantic City, 235 F.3d 845, 847 (3d Cir. 2000); Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 417 (3d Cir. 1997). We may dismiss a complaint "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).
Our Court of Appeals has repeatedly confirmed that union members must exhaust the grievance and arbitration procedures contained in a collective bargaining agreement before filing suit under the LMRA.Anielino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 99 (3d Cir. 1999); Angst v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 969 F.2d 1530, 1538 (3d Cir. 1992). Here, the collective bargaining agreement provided that
[a]ny employee must discuss a grievance with a supervisor prior to filing a formal grievance. A Shop Steward may be present during these discussions. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a formal grievance must be filed within five (5) working days of the alleged occurrence of a grievance or when the employee has knowledge of said grievance.
PCI Services-P.A.C.E. CBA art. VIII sect. 1 (Def.'s Ex. 1). By her own admission, Lane never filed a grievance, and we must therefore dismiss this action.
We agree with Packaging Coordinators that the collective bargaining agreement is integral to Lane's complaint and that we may rely on it without converting this motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.
In her response to Packaging Coordinators' motion, Lane acknowledges that she never filed a grievance but blames the union for failing to take this step. See Pl's Resp. at 2. While this allegation conceivably could have supported a claim against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation, Lane did not name the union as a defendant in this action.
In an abundance of caution prompted by Lane's use of the word "discrimination" in the complaint, Packaging Coordinators also seeks dismissal of any civil rights claim Lane may be attempting to assert for failure to comply with the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). A complaint need only include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," but it must nevertheless "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). While the complaint characterizes this action as a "discrimination claim . . . for firing me without a fair hearing," it never so much as hints that Packaging Coordinators's conduct was motivated by her race or gender. We must therefore conclude that if Lane is indeed seeking to state a claim for race or gender discrimination, she has failed to satisfy even Rule 8's lenient pleading standard.
In response to the motion to dismiss, Lane asserts that "PCI took advantage of plaintiff because she was a woman and a minority." Pl.'s Resp. at 2. However, even at this late date Lane has not filed an amended complaint or even attempted to explain whether she is indeed asserting a discrimination claim, and Packaging Coordinators is under no obligation to articulate — and then defend itself against — any claim that Lane's termination could possibly support. In any event, as Packaging Cordinators notes, we would be bound to dismiss any Title VII claim that Lane attempted to assert in this action even if she had complied with Rule 8. Lane did not satisfy Title VII's jurisdictional prerequisite by filing a charge of discrimination with the Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the time for doing so has long passed.
Finally, Packaging Coordinators seeks sanctions against Lane for pursuing this litigation. While sanctions are available against a plaintiff under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 for filing a frivolous complaint, Packaging Coordinators has not complied with Rule 11's "safe harbor" provisions. In any event, we find that sanctions would not be warranted against Lane. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(1)(A). Even though we dismiss her complaint, there is no reason to believe that she filed this action in bad faith or out of a desire to harass her former employer.
It is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's motion is GRANTED;
2. This action is DISMISSED; and
3. The Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this action statistically.