Opinion
Civ. No. 98-3628, SECTION "J" (2).
March 14, 2000.
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the defendant. Plaintiff opposes the motion. The motion was set for hearing on March 1, 2000, and on March 3, 2000, the Court issued a minute entry granting defendant's motion and stating that its reasons would subsequently be filed in a separate minute entry. Accordingly, for the following reasons, the Court finds that defendant's motion should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Deborah Lane, a black female, has been employed by the Chalmette Medical Center (the "Hospital") since September 1, 1991, as a registered nurse. On March 17, 1997, the Hospital opened a geriatric psychiatric division called the "Behavioral Healthcare Center" ("BHC") and Lane was assigned to the main psych unit. Lane was promoted to charge nurse on the night shift, which runs from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. weekdays. Lane is the only full time black registered nurse employed by the Hospital and all other shift supervisors and directors of nursing are white.
The BHC is staffed according to a "staffing matrix" developed by the program director and the nurse manager which matches the number of admitted patients to the number of staff needed to care for those patients' needs during each shift. Typically, the staffing increases and decreases according to the patient census. Since the BHC division opened, the night shift has been staffed with fewer people than the other two shifts (day and evening) although all shifts care for the same number of patients.Original Complaint, ¶ 7.
Lane asserts that although she repeatedly requested that the staffing disparity between the day and night shifts be corrected, the Hospital refused to do so. Lane argues that the day and evening shifts — where white employees worked — "consistently had more staff to perform substantially the same duties for the same number of patients." See Lane's Opposition, 2. This allegation forms the basis of Lane's claim that she suffered employment discrimination on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq., and Louisiana state law.
DISCUSSION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) entitled "Unlawful employment practices" states in part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer — (1) . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges or employment, because of such individual's race. . . ." In order to make a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must establish: (1) she is a member of a protected class under the statute; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action and (4) others similarly situated were more favorably treated. See Rutherford v. Harris County, Texas 197 F.3d 173, 184 (5th Cir. 1999); Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 2000); LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 1996).
It is generally accepted that "employment actions are not adverse [and thus the third prong required to state a prima facie case is not met] where pay, benefits, and level of responsibility remain the same." See Watts v. The Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 512 (5th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit has noted that "Title VII was designed to address ultimate employment decisions" such as "hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting and compensating.'" Id. at 511 (quoting Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 932, 118 S.Ct. 336 (1997)).
Under this framework, it is obvious that Lane satisfies the first two elements of a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination: (1) she is a black female and (2) she is qualified for the job she performs. However, Lane's pay, benefits and level of responsibility have remained unchanged. Thus, Lane has not suffered from any employment decision that would rise to the level of an "adverse employment action" for the purposes of establishing a discrimination claim under Title VII.
In fact, Lane's base hourly rate is higher than that of any other charge nurses on the other shifts, plus she makes an additional $3/hour for working the night shift. (Defendant's Exhibit 8 at ¶ 4).
Lane's claims of racial discrimination under § 1981 and Louisiana state law are also governed by the same evidentiary framework applicable to claims of employment discrimination brought under Title VII. See LaPierre, 86 F.3d at 448 n. 2.;McKnight v. Automatic Coin Enterprise, 1997 WL 79447 (E.D. La. 1997) (Duval, J.) (quoting Plummer v. Marriott Corp., 654 So.2d 843, 848 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1995)) (holding that Louisiana employment discrimination statute is to be analyzed under federal employment discrimination jurisprudence). Thus, because the Court has concluded that Lane has failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, her § 1981 and state law claims must fail as well. Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 20) should be and is hereby GRANTED.