Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CV096046
Duffy, J.
Appellant Richard R. Lane appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for writ of mandate. Lane is a retired public school teacher. He taught at various times in a number of different school and community college districts as well as at San Jose State University. At retirement in 2002, he was a concurrent member of the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS), the agency responsible for managing contributions by employees and member school districts to the State Teachers’ Retirement Fund, and the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), having contributed to and becoming a member of both systems over the course of his working life. Through his petition in the trial court, he sought to compel CalSTRS to recalculate his monthly pension from that system based on his highest annual compensation earned over a single year rather than on the average of his three highest-paying years. He further challenged CalSTRS’s calculation of his sick-leave service credit, which also factored into the formula used to calculate his monthly pension benefit. Lane reprises these challenges on appeal and further claims that he was deprived of due process by the manner in which CalSTRS adjudicated his claim. Finding no error, we affirm the order.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Underlying Facts
The underlying facts are not disputed. Lane began teaching in 1964. During his working life, he taught in numerous different school and community college districts. He also taught for a period of time at San Jose State University. In some instances, his employment was covered by CalSTRS while in others by CalPERS and he became a “concurrent” member of both systems. (Ed. Code, § 22115.2.) He retired from both CalSTRS and CalPERS on May 30, 2002. CalSTRS ultimately calculated that he had earned 11.895 years of service credit with CalSTRS while CalPERS ultimately reported that he had earned 14.325 years of service credit with that system.
Further statutory references are to the Education Code unless otherwise specified.
Lane also separately challenged CalPERS’s calculation of his retirement benefit, pursuing the administrative process, followed by a petition for writ of mandate in the trial court and an appeal from the trial court’s denial of that petition. We affirmed the trial court’s denial in Lane v. California Public Employees’ Retirement System (H031345, 6/10/08) [nonpub. opn.].
Upon retirement, Lane was entitled to a monthly pension benefit from CalSTRS, which calculates the benefit based on a formula involving the retiree’s total service credit, his or her final compensation, and a multiplier associated with the retiree’s age at retirement. For purposes of calculating Lane’s monthly pension benefit, CalSTRS ultimately recognized his total service credit of 11.895 years by using his 11.766 years of CalSTRS service plus .129 years of sick-leave service credit as reported by his last CalSTRS employer—Foothill-DeAnza Community College District. For Lane’s final compensation, CalSTRS calculated the average of his three highest paid years as provided at section 22134, which is part of the Teachers’ Retirement Law governing CalSTRS (§ 22000 et seq.) and which is distinguished from the Public Employees’ Retirement Law governing CalPERS (Gov. Code, § 20000 et seq.). Among other things, section 22134 permits CalSTRS retirees with less than 25 years of credited service but who are nevertheless concurrent members of CalSTRS and specified other public retirement systems, including CalPERS (§ 22115.2), to use service in those other systems for purposes of calculating their highest three-year average. (§ 22134, subd. (c).) Accordingly, CalSTRS calculated Lane’s final compensation of $5,025.58 by using his highest salaries earned between 2000 and 2002, during which he taught at San Jose State University and was a contributing member of CalPERS but not CalSTRS. Lane’s age factor at retirement was .024.
The calculation of Lane’s CalSTRS service credits reflects Lane’s complicated history of various full, part-time, and sometimes overlapping employment in different teaching positions, coupled with his having received several “refunds” when he left the system at various times and his having later “re-deposited” those credits, plus the addition of qualifying sick leave service credit. Except as provided herein, it is not necessary for us to detail the specific calculations of his service credit for purposes of this appeal.
Thus, Lane’s basic CalSTRS monthly benefit is $1,434.70 (11.895 x $5,025.58 x .024 = $1,434.70), to which cost of living adjustments are made.
A. Final Compensation Component
Lane by letter disputed CalSTRS’s calculation of his final compensation by the average of his three highest paid years under section 22134. He contended that because his combined credited service in CalSTRS and CalPERS exceeded 25 years, he was entitled to a determination of his final compensation under section 22134.5. This section provides that for retirees with 25 or more years of “credited service,” final compensation may be calculated by using the highest single year’s annual salary (similarly earned while contributing to CalSTRS or specified other retirement systems, including CalPERS) rather than the highest three-year average. (§ 22134.5, subd. (c).) CalSTRS disputed Lane’s contention and informed Lane of his right to seek “Executive Review” of its decision by request.
Lane sought such review, which resulted in CalSTRS’s rejection of his contention. Lane then requested an administrative hearing concerning the matter.
B. Sick-Leave Credit Component
The amount of sick-leave service credit that CalSTRS granted to Lane as a component of his total service credit varied over time, which altered the amount of his monthly pension benefit. For example, in July 2004, CalSTRS granted Lane sick-leave credit in the amount of .129 years based on information provided by Lane’s last CalSTRS employer—Foothill-DeAnza Community College District. Later, in December 2004, CalSTRS also awarded Lane an additional .345 years of service credit based on information later received from the Palo Alto Unified School District, where Lane’s employment had terminated on December 31, 1980 before his last CalSTRS employment with Foothill-DeAnza Community College District. This brought Lane’s total sick-leave service credit to .474 years, which, in turn, increased his monthly benefit. But in November 2005, CalSTRS informed Lane that his sick-leave service credit was reduced to the previously calculated .129 years, which correspondingly reduced his monthly benefit. On December 30, 2005, CalSTRS informed Lane in writing that it had previously granted the additional sick-leave service credit in error (resulting in an overpayment of $1,788.12) as Lane was not entitled to transfer such credit from the Palo Alto School District and was entitled to sick-leave service credit only from his last CalSTRS employer—Foothill-DeAnza Community College District under section 22717, subdivision (a), which generally governs accumulated and unused sick leave credit at retirement under CalSTRS. Lane requested an administrative hearing with respect to this issue as well.
This section provides in pertinent part that a “member shall be granted credit at service retirement for each day of accumulated and unused leave of absence for illness or injury . . . [to] which the member was entitled on the member’s final day of employment with the employer by which the member was last employed to perform creditable service subject to coverage by the Defined Benefit Program.” (§ 22717, subd. (a), italics added.) The “Defined Benefit Program,” as provided at section 22122.5, means the “Defined Benefit Program provided in the State Teachers’ Retirement Plan as set forth in [Part 13 of the Education Code].” (§ 22122.5.)
II. The Administrative Process
The administrative hearing with respect to both contested issues took place on February 9, 2007, before an administrative law judge (ALJ) in the Office of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ issued his proposed decision on March 5, 2007, finding against Lane on both issues. The order specifically stated that “CalSTRS is not required to recalculate [Lane’s] retirement allowance based on one-year final compensation or to again credit him with .345 years of service credit based upon unused sick leave from the Palo Alto Unified School District.” Lane appealed the proposed decision to the Teachers’ Retirement Board Appeals Committee, which issued a final decision denying his appeal that appeared to adopt the ALJ’s decision as its own.
The ALJ’s proposed decision and order was seven pages long. But the record on appeal, which includes an appendix assembled by Lane under rule 8.124 of the California Rules of Court plus a reporter’s transcript, only includes pages one through three and seven of the proposed decision. Thus, we are deprived of the benefit of the decision for purposes of our review.
III. Trial Court Proceedings
Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Lane filed his “PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE; ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE ([Code Civ. Proc., §§] 1085; 1094.5)” in the trial court on October 10, 2007. It set forth two causes of action, the first related to the determination of Lane’s final compensation based on his credited service in both CalSTRS and CalPERS and the second related to the determination of his sick-leave service credit. CalSTRS filed its answer and return and the matter was set for hearing on February 26, 2008. On March 12, 2008, the court denied the petition by written order, concluding that Lane was “not entitled to combine his service credit in CalSTRS with his service credit in CalPERS, nor [was] he entitled to sick leave credit from multiple employers.” Lane timely appealed.
Lane did not appear at the hearing, at which the court orally denied his petition from the bench and requested respondent’s counsel to prepare an order to that effect. On March 7, 2008, Lane filed an ex parte request for reconsideration of his petition, asserting that he had missed the hearing due to no fault of his own. On the same day, the court granted that request by written order in the interests of justice and based on Lane’s “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and/or excusable neglect” under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). Five days later, the court signed its written order denying the petition. The order references the February 26, 2008 hearing date and does not reference the grant of reconsideration. But since the court actually signed and entered the order days after having granted reconsideration of the petition on March 7, 2008, we consider the written order denying it to have taken into account the court’s post-hearing reconsideration of the matter. In any event, Lane raises no claim with respect to this issue.
Lane had requested a statement of decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 but the court denied that request, concluding that Lane had no statutory right to a statement of decision. Lane raises no issue on appeal with respect to this denial.
The notice of appeal states that it is from the “[j]udgment denying writ of mandamus . . ., which was entered on March 12, 2008.” But there is no judgment in the record, only the court’s March 12, 2008 order denying Lane’s petition. Nevertheless, because a petition to the superior court for a writ of mandamus initiates a special proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure section 1067, where no related issues remain pending in the superior court, either a judgment or order denying the petition is generally appealable. (Bloom v. Municipal Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 71, 74-75; Public Defenders’ Organization v. County of Riverside (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1409 [order appealable despite lack of formal judgment]; Breslin v. City & County of San Francisco (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1064, 1073-1074 [order denying writ petition appealable because it effectively disposed of all causes of action notwithstanding lack of formal judgment so stating].) Accordingly, as no issues remain in the trial court with respect to Lane’s petition, we will construe his notice of appeal to be from the order denying his petition for writ.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
“ ‘Judicial review of most public agency decisions is obtained by a proceeding for a writ of ordinary or administrative mandamus. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1085, 1094.5.) The applicable type of mandate is determined by the nature of the administrative action or decision. [Citation.] Usually, quasi-legislative acts are reviewed by ordinary mandate and quasi-judicial acts are reviewed by administrative mandate.’ [Citation.] There are subtle differences between the scope of judicial review applied to ordinary mandamus and that used for administrative mandamus. [Citation.] Regardless of the writ involved, however, where the facts are undisputed, the reviewing court faces a question of law. ‘On questions of law arising in mandate proceedings, we exercise independent judgment.’ [Citation.]” Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority v. Rea (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1313.) In those circumstances, the trial and appellate courts perform the same function. (Ibid.)
As both sides agree, we are presented here with questions involving the construction and application of statutes that are part of the Teachers’ Retirement Law to certain undisputed facts. Accordingly, to resolve these questions, we apply our independent review without reference to the trial court’s actions. (McGill v. Regents of University of California (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1776, 1786.)
In exercising our independent judgment, we rely on settled rules of statutory construction. First, in ascertaining statutory intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law, a court should examine the actual language of the statute for it is this that “has successfully braved the legislative gauntlet.” (Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1238 (Halbert’s Lumber).) In examining the language, courts should give to the statute’s words their ordinary, everyday meaning, construing them in context, unless, of course, the statute itself specifically defines those words to give them a special meaning. (Ibid.; Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal.4th 657, 663.) And every statute “ ‘should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part, so that all may be harmonized and have effect.’ ” (Mejia, supra, at p. 663.) “If the meaning [of the statutory language] is without ambiguity, doubt, or uncertainty, then the language controls. [Citations.] There is nothing to ‘interpret’ or ‘construe.’ [Citations.]” (Halbert’s Lumber, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1239.) It is only if the words are not clear that a court proceeds to the second and third steps of the statutory construction process that involve reference to legislative history and application of reason, practicality, and common sense to the language at hand, respectively. (Ibid.)
Although our review in these circumstances is independent, we do not necessarily disregard CalSTRS’s interpretation of the law, as Lane urges us to do. “An agency interpretation of the meaning and legal effect of a statute is entitled to consideration and respect by the courts; however, . . . the binding power of an agency’s interpretation of a statute or regulation is contextual; Its power to persuade is both circumstantial and dependent on the presence or absence of factors that support the merit of the interpretation.” (Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 7.) The rationale for this rule is simple and logical: When interpreting a statute that falls within the administrative jurisdiction of an agency, there is a presumption that the agency possesses a more in-depth familiarity with certain legal and regulatory issues associated with that statute. (Id. at p. 11.) But because a “statute’s legal meaning and effect [are] questions lying within the constitutional domain of the courts,” it is those judicial bodies that are the ultimate arbiters of the question whether the agency’s interpretation is correct. (Ibid.) Accordingly, if application of the settled rules of statutory construction here does not clearly reveal the legislative intent behind the relevant statutes, then CalSTRS’s interpretation of the statutes may be helpful but it is not dispositive.
II. CalSTRS Properly Applied Section 22134 to Calculate Lane’s Final Compensation
As we have observed, upon retirement, a CalSTRS member is entitled to a monthly pension benefit. As noted, the amount of the benefit is calculated by a formula that factors into account the retiree’s service credit (“credited service” under § 22121, i.e., the number of contributing years worked in CalSTRS-covered employment) plus credit for unused sick leave from the member’s last CalSTRS-covered employment (§ 22717), his or her “final compensation” as provided at section 22134 if the member has less than 25 years of credited service or 22134.5 if the member has “25 or more years of credited service” (§ 22134.5, subd. (f) [formerly subd. (g)), and a multiplier associated with the retiree’s age at retirement.
In 2002, “credited service” was defined only as “service for which the required contributions have been paid.” (§ 22121.) “Service” is further defined in relevant part as “work performed for compensation in a position subject to coverage under the Defined Benefit Program.” (§ 22170.)
See Statutes 2003, chapter 313, section 3.
Here, CalSTRS used section 22134 to calculate the final compensation component of Lane’s monthly pension benefit based on his 11.895 total years of CalSTRS credited service, i.e., less than 25 years. Lane contends that his final compensation should have been calculated instead under section 22134.5 as his 11.895 years of credited service under CalSTRS added to his 14.325 years of CalPERS credited service exceeded 25 years of total credited service, entitling him to the longevity service benefit provided at section 22134.5.
Section 22134 generally governs the calculation of the final compensation component for CalSTRS retirees. Under this section (as it existed when Lane retired in 2002), “ ‘[f]inal compensation’ means the highest average annual compensation earnable by a member during any period of three consecutive school years while an active member of the Defined Benefit Program.” (§ 22134, subd. (a).) Subdivision (c) further provided that the “determination of final compensation of a member who has concurrent membership in another retirement system pursuant to Section 22115.2 [defining concurrent membership and including CalPERS] shall take into consideration the compensation earnable while a member of the other system” providing certain conditions are met, which were here. Accordingly, CalSTRS properly gave Lane the benefit of his highest three-year average salary in the calculation of his “final compensation” for purposes of his monthly pension benefit by using his salary earned while employed at San Jose State University—a CalPERS but not CalSTRS employer—during 2000-2002.
Section 22134.5 operates as an exception to section 22134 and applies in the determination of a CalSTRS member’s “final compensation” for purposes of calculating his or her monthly pension benefit but only if the member “has 25 or more years of credited service,” excluding certain types of defined service not pertinent here. (§ 22134.5, subd. (f).) Section 22134.5, subdivision (a) provides that “[n]otwithstanding Section 22134, ‘final compensation’ means the highest average annual compensation earnable by a member during any period of 12 consecutive months while an active member of the Defined Benefit Program or time during which he or she was not a member but for which the member has received credit under the Defined Benefit Program, . . .” Like section 22134, section 22134.5 also allows, under certain conditions, concurrent members of CalSTRS and specified other retirement systems including CalPERS to take into consideration their highest compensation earned while a member of the other system for the limited purpose of the “determination of final compensation.” (§ 22134.5, subd. (c).)
Thus, to determine whether it is section 22134 or 22134.5 that applies to the calculation of Lane’s final compensation, we must ascertain if he has “25 or more years of credited service” as provided at section 22134.5, subdivision (f)(1). We conclude that he does not.
As we have noted, “credited service” as used in the Teachers Retirement Law is defined as “service for which the required contributions have been paid” (§ 22121) and “service” is further defined as “work performed for compensation in a position subject to coverage under the Defined Benefit Program, except as otherwise specifically provided in [the Teachers’ Retirement Law].” (§ 22170.) The “Defined Benefit Program” means the “Defined Benefit Program provided in the State Teachers’ Retirement Plan as set forth in [Part 13 of the Education Code].” (§ 22122.5) Further, section 22705, which is among the sections governing computation of service to be credited, provides that “[n]o service shall be included under [Part 13 of the Education Code governing CalSTRS] for which a member of the Defined Benefit Program is entitled to receive a retirement benefit in a lump sum or installment payments.” Thus, by the very terms of the Teachers’ Retirement Law, which is the statutory universe within which we are operating, “credited service” as used in section 22134.5 means service under CalSTRS only and not service credited under the terms of another retirement plan outside of the State Teachers’ Retirement Plan, including CalPERS.
To so understand the term “credited service” as used in section 22134.5, it is not necessary to insert the words “in CalSTRS” following the term as Lane contends. This is because the multiple definitions of relevant terms in the Teachers’ Retirement Law already impart this very meaning and would make such express insertion mere surplusage. That both sections 22134 and 22134.5 allow the consideration of a member’s highest compensation in specified other retirement systems for the limited purpose of determining final compensation does not change this result. Contrary to what Lane contends, so providing does not mean that the member can also combine credited service in CalSTRS and other systems in order to become entitled to the longevity benefit exclusively provided to CalSTRS members with over 25 years of credited service in CalSTRS under section 22134.5. And section 22705, which excludes service for which a CalSTRS member is entitled to receive a different retirement benefit, does more than prevent “double dip[ping]” in both systems—the limited prohibition of this section that Lane acknowledges. The language of section 22705 also limits the computation of service and here reinforces that Lane is not entitled to add his service outside of CalSTRS to his CalSTRS credited service in order to increase his total period of credited service so as to fall under section 22134.5 and thus enhance his retirement benefit.
This reading of section 22134.5’s plain and unambiguous language compels us to reject Lane’s contention regarding this section’s application to the calculation of his final compensation. Section 22134.5 does not apply to Lane and his final compensation is instead governed by section 22134 as he has less than 25 years of CalSTRS credited service. Because we reach this conclusion based on the statutory language itself, we need not venture further on the path of statutory construction to examine legislative history or apply reason, practicality, and common sense in order to divine legislative purpose and intent. We accordingly reject Lane’s other arguments regarding the proper construction of section 22134.5 as they delve beyond, and even disregard, the statute’s plain meaning. Moreover, Lane’s policy or fairness-based arguments that focus on expansive statutory interpretation in favor of CalSTRS members fail to take into account the dual purposes of the Teachers’ Retirement Law. These purposes include providing a “financially sound plan for the retirement, with adequate retirement allowances, of teachers in the public schools of this state, teachers in schools supported by this state, and other persons employed in connection with the schools.” (§ 22001.) In other words, maintaining a fiscally sound plan by avoiding pay outs in excess of statutory allowances is a purpose that goes hand in hand with maintaining the ability to pay adequate, but not expansive, retirement allowances.
III. CalSTRS Properly Determined Lane’s Sick-Leave Service Credit
Section 22717 governs CalSTRS accumulated and unused sick leave at retirement. It provides at subdivision (a) that a “member shall be granted credit at service retirement for each day of accumulated and unused leave of absence for illness or injury for which full salary is allowed to which the member was entitled on the member’s final day of employment with the employer by which the member was last employed to perform creditable service subject to coverage by the Defined Benefit Program.” (§ 22717, subd. (a), italics added.)
The section goes on to provide the manner in which the amount of the member’s service credit for unused sick-leave is to be determined and to direct that upon the member’s application for retirement, the employer is to certify to CalSTRS within 30 days the number of days of accumulated and unused sick leave that the member was entitled to on the final day of employment. (§ 22717, subds. (b) & (c).) CalSTRS is thus dependent upon employers to timely and accurately report a member’s unused sick leave and it may assess a penalty on an employer’s delinquent reports. (§ 22717, subd. (c).)
As is apparent from the statute’s plain and clear language, a member is only entitled to sick-leave service credit at retirement from his or her “last” CalSTRS employer. Yet Lane contends that the statute “does not forbid CalSTRS from accepting unused sick leave from other employers” and it “does not make the report of the last employer the only sick leave a member can have in his or her account.” This contention lacks merit and ignores the statute’s plain language and meaning to the point of straining credulity.
While Lane argues that our reading of the statute is not fair and penalizes teachers who teach part time or who change jobs leaving accumulated sick leave on the table, it is beyond our purview to second guess legislative policy choices. And, whatever unfairness Lane perceives about the effect of section 22717, this effect is minimized by sections 44931 and 87731, which allow for, under certain conditions, CalSTRS members to transfer unused sick leave (and other rights, benefits, and burdens of permanent employment) from one CalSTRS employer to the next as long as the period between the CalSTRS covered employment does not exceed 39 months. Unfortunately for Lane, he was not able to transfer benefits from preceding employers to his last CalSTRS job. But this does not change the effect of section 22717.
In sum, based on the language of section 22717, we reject Lane’s contention that he was entitled to include sick-leave service credit from his last two CalSTRS employers in the calculation of his total service credit. He was instead only entitled to the .129 years of sick-leave service credit that CalSTRS awarded him as reported by his last CalSTRS employer—Foothill-DeAnza Community College District.
IV. CalSTRS Did Not Violate Government Code Section 11517
As we read his final contention, Lane asserts for the first time that CalSTRS violated Government Code section 11517 when it effectively chose to adopt the ALJ’s decision against him as its own without access to or production of the complete hearing transcript. This section governs the formal hearing process of administrative adjudication in the context of state departments and agencies. It provides that an agency may either itself hear a contested case in the first instance or the case may first be heard, as it was here, by an ALJ. (Gov. Code, § 11517, subd. (a).) If an ALJ hears the case first, the ALJ shall render a proposed decision in a form that may be adopted by the agency within 30 days of submission of the matter. (Gov. Code, § 11517, subd. (c)(1).) Once the agency receives the ALJ’s proposed decision, it may exercise one of several options, which are: (1) adopting the proposed decision in its entirety; (2) reducing or otherwise mitigating the proposed penalty and adopting the balance of the proposed decision; (3) making technical or other minor changes to the proposed decision and adopting it as its own; (4) rejecting the proposed decision and referring the case to the ALJ to take additional evidence; and (5) rejecting the proposed decision and deciding the case upon the record, including the hearing transcript, with or without taking additional evidence. (Gov. Code, § 11517, subd. (c)(2)(A)-(E).) Exercise of this last option requires the agency to prepare the record, including the complete hearing transcript, among other things. (Gov. Code, § 11517, subd. (c)(2)(E)(i)-(iv).) The first four options do not.
Here, CalSTRS appears to have adopted the ALJ’s decision as its own as permitted by Government Code section 11517, subdivision (c)(2)(A). By exercising this option instead of the alternative option of rejecting the ALJ’s proposed decision and deciding the case on the record on its own under Government Code section 11517, subdivision (c)(2)(E), there was no need or requirement for CalSTRS to prepare and review or even have access to the complete hearing transcript. We accordingly reject Lane’s contention that CalSTRS procedurally erred and deprived him of due process by violating Government Code section 11517.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Lane’s petition for writ of mandate is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J., Mihara, J.