Opinion
A-13875 0352
11-01-2023
MARK ANTHONY LANDWEHR, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Katrina Larsen, Attorney at Law, Ketchikan, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Timothy J. Davenport, Assistant District Attorney, Kenai, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Homer, Bride Seifert, Judge. Trial Court No. 3HO-20-00142 CR
Katrina Larsen, Attorney at Law, Ketchikan, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Timothy J. Davenport, Assistant District Attorney, Kenai, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Wollenberg, Harbison, and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Mark Anthony Landwehr was convicted, following a jury trial, of driving while under the influence of alcohol and refusal to submit to a chemical test. On appeal, Landwehr argues that there was insufficient evidence that he was under the influence of alcohol - i.e., that his physical or mental abilities were so impaired that he lacked "the ability to operate a vehicle with the caution characteristic of a person of ordinary prudence who is not under the influence."
AS 28.35.030(a)(1) and AS 28.35.032(a), respectively.
Molina v. State, 186 P.3d 28, 29 (Alaska App. 2008) (quoting Gundersen v. Anchorage, 762 P.2d 104, 114-15 n.7 (Alaska App. 1988)).
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences arising from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the verdict. We then ask whether a reasonable juror could find that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Johnson v. State, 188 P.3d 700, 702 (Alaska App. 2008).
Id.
As we noted, Landwehr did not submit to a chemical test of his breath, so there is no breath test result to assess his blood alcohol level. He also declined to perform field sobriety tests. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, however, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support Landwehr's conviction.
In the early morning hours of March 11, 2020, the police responded to a report of a vehicle in a ditch. When the police arrived on the scene, they found a car abandoned on the side of a road after having been driven off the road and onto a stump. The front wheels of the car were off the ground and spinning, the engine was still running, and the reverse lights were on. One officer ran the license plate number and determined that the registered owner of the vehicle was Mark Landwehr.
The officers made contact with Landwehr, first by phone and then about a half block away from where his car was located. Landwehr told the officers that he had been driving home from a friend's party when he got his car stuck on a stump, and he admitted that he had been drinking beer that night.
According to the officers, Landwehr smelled of alcohol, appeared "very animated and very agitated," and exhibited behaviors that were "not normal." In audio recordings admitted at trial, Landwehr could be heard yelling, talking over the officers, and responding with non sequiturs as the officers tried to ask him questions. Landwehr refused to comply with the officers' investigation and, ultimately, physically resisted the officers' efforts to place him under arrest.
The State initially charged Landwehr with resisting arrest, under AS 11.56.700(a)(1), but the State dismissed that charge mid-trial.
Given the totality of this evidence, and the deferential standard with which we view it, we conclude that a reasonable juror could find that Landwehr was under the influence of alcohol.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.