Landis, Gdns. v. Condon

8 Citing cases

  1. Huston v. Konieczny

    52 Ohio St. 3d 214 (Ohio 1990)   Cited 125 times
    Finding relevant, in claim arising from a drunk driving accident, that β€œ[p]arents may incur liability when they negligently entrust their child with an instrumentality (such as a gun or car) which, because of the child's immaturity or lack of experience, may become a source of danger to others”

    A parent may also be held responsible for failure to exercise reasonable control over the child when the parent knows, or should know, that injury to another is a probable consequence. See, e.g., Cashman v. Reider's Stop-N-Shop Supermarket (1986), 29 Ohio App.3d 142, 29 OBR 158, 504 N.E.2d 487; Landis v. Condon (1952), 95 Ohio App. 28, 52 O.O. 371, 116 N.E.2d 602; Parsons v. Smithey (Ariz. 1973), 504 P.2d 1272; Gissen v. Goodwill (Fla. 1955), 80 So.2d 701; see, also, 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), Section 316. Finally, when parents know of the child's wrongdoing and consent to it, direct it or sanction it, they may be held liable.

  2. Bocock v. Rose

    213 Tenn. 195 (Tenn. 1963)   Cited 8 times
    In Bocock v. Rose, 213 Tenn. 195, 373 S.W.2d 441 (1962), the Trial Court sustained a demurrer to the declaration (dismissed a complaint for failure to state a claim).

    350 S.W.2d 524 The cases of Landis v. Condon, 95 Ohio App. 28, 116 N.E.2d 602 (1952) and Caldwell v. Zaher, 344 Mass. 590, 183 N.E.2d 706 (1962) are recent cases where parents have been held liable for their children's willful assaults, when the parents knew of the children's propensities to assault others, but failed to take any steps to correct or restrain the children. 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child sec. 68 has this to say:

  3. Caldwell v. Zaher

    183 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1962)   Cited 24 times
    In Caldwell, the plaintiff stated a good cause of action by alleging that the defendants knew or should have known of their minor child's propensity to assault other children, but did nothing to restrain such propensity.

    See Sousa v. Irome, 219 Mass. 273, 276; Gudziewski v. Stemplesky, 263 Mass. 103, 105-106; Sojka v. Dlugosz, 293 Mass. 419, 423; Norlin v. Connolly, 336 Mass. 553, 554. We believe that the principle is equally applicable where the parents' negligence is, as here, based on allegations that they knew of their child's propensity toward assaulting other children and "did nothing" (emphasis supplied) to halt it. Bieker v. Owens, 234 Ark. 97. Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So.2d 701, 703-705 (Fla.). Steinberg v. Cauchois, 249 App. Div. (N.Y.) 518, 519. Agnesini v. Olsen, 277 App. Div. (N.Y.) 1006. Zuckerberg v. Munzer, 277 App. Div. (N.Y.) 1061. Landis v. Condon, 95 Ohio App. 28, 29-30. Condel v. Savo, 350 Pa. 350, 352-355.

  4. Ross v. Wendel

    2017 Ohio 7804 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 2 times
    Analyzing negligent supervision claim against child's parents based on child setting fire to plaintiffs' trucks

    {ΒΆ 26} In Ohio, parental knowledge of a child's "vicious propensities" is an essential element in establishing negligent supervision. Landis v. Condon , 95 Ohio App. 28, 29–30, 116 N.E.2d 602 (2d Dist.1952). " β€˜To establish foreseeability of the act or injury [pursuant to negligent supervision], plaintiff must prove that specific instances of prior conduct were sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that the act complained of was likely to occur.

  5. Cogswell v. Clark Retail Enterprises

    2004 Ohio 5640 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004)

    {ΒΆ 20} In order to establish negligent supervision, parental knowledge of a child's "vicious propensities" is an essential element. Shupe, supra, at ΒΆ 16, citing Landis v. Condon (1952), 95 Ohio App. 28, 29-30. "`To establish foreseeability of the act or injury (pursuant to negligent supervision), plaintiff must prove that specific instances of prior conduct were sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that the act complained of was likely to occur.'"

  6. Shupe v. Childers

    2004 Ohio 1767 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004)

    {ΒΆ 16} In Ohio, parental knowledge of a child's "vicious propensities" is an essential element in establishing negligent supervision. Landis v. Condon (1952), 95 Ohio App. 28, 29-30, 116 N.E.2d 602. "`To establish foreseeability of the act or injury [pursuant to negligent supervision], plaintiff must prove that specific instances of prior conduct were sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that the act complained of was likely to occur.'" (Alteration in original.)

  7. HAU v. GILL

    C.A. No. 98CA007061 (Ohio Ct. App. Jul. 14, 1999)   Cited 15 times

    In Ohio, parental knowledge of a child's "vicious propensities" is an essential element in establishing negligent supervision. Landis v. Condon (1952), 95 Ohio App. 28, 29-30. "`To establish foreseeability of the act or injury [pursuant to negligent supervision], plaintiff must prove that specific instances of prior conduct were sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that the act complained of was likely to occur.'"

  8. Snow v. Nelson

    450 So. 2d 269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 5 times

    s); Caldwell v. Zaher, 344 Mass. 590, 183 N.E.2d 706 (1962) (child with habit of assaulting, accosting, tormenting and molesting young children assaulted, accosted, tormented and molested young child); Gudziewski v. Stemplesky, 263 Mass. 103, 160 N.E. 334 (1928) (child who had used an air gun, not a dangerous instrumentality, indiscriminately and mischievously on three occasions by placing children in a line and pointing the air gun at them from a distance of ten or eleven feet, shooting at clothes hanging in the yard to dry and shooting at a shanty and birds, used the air gun to shoot another child in the eye); Lane v. Chatham, 251 N.C. 400, 111 S.E.2d 598 (1959) (child who had three times misused an air rifle, not a dangerous instrumentality, by shooting person in hip, shooting another person with match stems in arms and legs and chasing another person a couple of times while carrying air rifle without firing it, pointed air rifle directly at another person and shot him in the eye); Landis v. Condon, 95 Ohio App. 28, 116 N.E.2d 602 (1952) (child with vicious propensities and disposition jumped upon another child's back and threw the child to the floor); Sawyer v. Kelly, 194 Okla. 516, 153 P.2d 97 (1944) (child who was permitted to ride horse with only a halter to control the animal was riding the horse when it ran into an automobile); Condel v. Savo, 350 Pa. 350, 39 A.2d 51 (1944) (child with habit of mauling, pummelling, assaulting and mistreating smaller children threw another child down a steep and precipitous embankment); Bocock v. Rose, 213 Tenn. 195, 373 S.W.2d 441 (1963) (children who had a propensity to assault others assaulted and battered plaintiff); Eldredge v. Kamp Kachess Youth Servs., Inc., 90 Wn.2d 402, 583 P.2d 626 (1978) (children who had escaped from a group child care facility, whose legal standard of care was that of a parent, had stolen and abandoned an automobile and had committed a burglary, were apprehended and reassigned to the same facility, escaped again, stole an automobile and wrecked the