Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-CV-3164.
October 25, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Lynn Landes ("Plaintiff") brings this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants Margaret Tartaglione, in her official capacity as Chair of the City Commissioners of Philadelphia, Pedro A. Cortes, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and John Ashcroft, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States (collectively "Defendants"). Now before the Court are Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for lack of standing or in the alternative for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant these Motions.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a registered voter in the City and County of Philadelphia, filed this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging the use of absentee voting in elections for public office as a violation of "the Constitutional right to vote, to have votes counted properly, to observe the voting process effectively, and to have those rights fully enforced." Compl. ¶ 3. Plaintiff brings her claims under Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1971, 1973a, 1973i, and 1973j. Plaintiff claims that the use of absentee voting offers substantial opportunity for voter fraud and coercion, and prevents election officials, the press, and the public from effectively observing the voting process. Id. Thus, Plaintiff contends that the use of absentee voting calls into question the results of past, present, and future elections.Id.
Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the local, state, and federal laws permitting absentee voting are unconstitutional, and seeks injunctions prohibiting Defendant Tartaglione from administering absentee voting, prohibiting Defendant Cortes from approving absentee voting, and compelling Defendant Ashcroft to enforce voting rights in Philadelphia. Id. ¶¶ 30-32. Defendants Cortes and Ashcroft individually filed motions to dismiss for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted; Defendant Tartaglione also filed a motion to dismiss.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court may look only to the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). For the purpose of ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the Court "must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). However, pleadings "must be something more than an ingenious exercise into the conceivable." Id. At 509. Further, it is "the responsibility of the complainant clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute and the exercise of the court's remedial powers." Id. at 518.
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants Cortes and Ashcroft move to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the absentee voting system. In essence, the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute. Warth, 402 U.S. at 498. A litigant must meet both the constitutional and prudential requirements for standing.
Even when Article III "case or controversy" requirements are met, "a plaintiff may still lack standing under the prudential principles by which the judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no individual right would be vindicated and to limit access to federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim."Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979).
To establish constitutional standing, Plaintiff must: (1) suffer an injury in fact, meaning an actual or imminent, not hypothetical or conjectural, invasion of a particularized legally protected interest; (2) demonstrate a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, meaning the injury must be traceable to the challenged action of Defendant and not the result of independent action by a third party; and, (3) show it likely that the injury will be remedied by a favorable decision.See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); Storino v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 296 (3d Cir. 2003). Indirect harm to Plaintiff may confer standing to sue, but it is substantially more difficult to meet the minimum requirements of Article III when only indirect harm is alleged. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 504-05.
To meet the prudential component of standing: (1) Plaintiff must assert her own rights and not the interests of third parties; (2) the claims asserted must not be "abstract questions of wide public significance which amount to generalized grievances shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches"; and, (3) the complaint must fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute or constitutional provision in question. Valley Forge Christian College v. American United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 474-75 (1982);Miller v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., 362 F.3d 209, 221 (3d Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court has consistently held that a Plaintiff "raising only a generalized grievance about government — claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest of proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large — does not state an Article III case or controversy." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74; see also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171 (1974) (dismissing for lack of standing a taxpayer suit challenging the Government's failures to disclose CIA expenditures as the impact on the plaintiff was "plainly undifferentiated and common to all members of the public").
In the present case, Plaintiff fails to satisfy both constitutional and prudential standing requirements. The injuries Plaintiff asserts are not particularized, concrete, or imminent, but are abstract and hypothetical. Plaintiff's claim that she is injured by the use of absentee voting is a generalized grievance that may be shared by a large number of citizens, and is thus insufficient to confer standing. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 148, 160 (1990) (stating the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance is an inadequate basis on which to grant standing and that an asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with law is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a federal court); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974).
While Plaintiff attacks Pennsylvania law permitting the use of absentee ballots in elections, she does not allege that her right to vote has been adversely affected by absentee voting. Plaintiff asserts only a generalized, theoretical concern that absentee ballots may result in fraud and other problems. See Compl. ¶ 18. This is the sort of hypothetical harm that federal courts consistently refuse to address. See Storino, 322 F.3d at 296-97 (stating allegations of contingent future injuries are not sufficient to establish standing).
Plaintiff's Complaint makes broad assertions that absentee voting is not transparent and thus invites voter fraud and coercion. Such concerns involve questions of wide public significance that are most appropriately addressed by the legislative branch. If this Court ignored the concrete injury requirement for standing, we would be "discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional role of [the judicial] branch — one of the essential elements that identifies those `cases' and `controversies' that are the business of the courts rather than of the political branches."Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576. "Vindicating the public interest (including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576.
Because Plaintiff lacks standing, this action must be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grants Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. An appropriate Order follows.