Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Michael Stern, Judge., Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC 322214.
Law Offices of Leo James Terrell and Leo James Terrell for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Gibeaut, Mahan & Briscoe, Lauren Bullock and Julie A. Mullane for Defendants and Respondents.
MOSK, J.
Plaintiff and appellant Daun’ne Monique Land (plaintiff) appeals from an adverse judgment on her claim for violation of her civil rights against defendants and respondents Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), Earl Perkins, Deborah Gayle, Sean Gaston, Waymon Hobdy, Mattie Sanders, Ben Fuller, Jocelyn Lofton, Carol Watts and Gladys Storey (collectively, “defendants”). Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that defendants violated her First Amendment and other civil rights by harassing her because of her decision not to participate in a uniform policy instituted at her middle school. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for nonsuit as to plaintiff’s claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (section 1983)—the only claim that plaintiff has appealed—concluding that plaintiff failed to establish that the uniform policy was unconstitutional or that any of the defendants had otherwise violated plaintiff’s rights. We affirm.
Camiella Lover died prior to trial and was dismissed as a defendant by the trial court.
BACKGROUND
Viewed most favorably to plaintiff (see post, Discussion Part A), plaintiff’s evidence establishes the following facts. In 2001, Horace Mann Middle School (HMMS) was identified as one of the lowest performing middle schools in the State of California. To help alleviate these problems, HMMS was made part of the Ten Schools Program in July 2002. The Ten Schools Program was initiated in the mid-1980s, and had been successful in transforming ten of LAUSD’s lowest performing elementary schools into some of the best performing schools in the district. Among the changes made at HMMS to comply with the Ten Schools Program was the institution of a strict dress code for faculty (which, for example, required men to wear a shirt and tie when on campus), and a uniform policy for students.
Plaintiff’s case-in-chief consisted of testimony from plaintiff, plaintiff’s aunt, plaintiff’s grandfather, and eight witnesses (including several of the individual defendants) examined as adverse witnesses pursuant to Evidence Code, section 776: Ben Fuller, Ruben Alvarado, Earl Perkins, Deborah Gayle, Gladys Storey, Sean Gaston, Mattie Sanders, Marguerite LaMotte, and Jocelyn Lofton.
The uniform policy was intended to address several concerns. HMMS had problems with students leaving campus without authorization during school hours, and with non-students coming onto campus and assaulting students. The uniforms would assist HMMS staff to identify non-students on campus. The uniforms would also help prevent students from being confronted by gang members from the surrounding neighborhood, while walking to or from school, because of the students’ attire. The uniforms also were expected to help students concentrate on their school work by removing the distraction of their clothing.
The HMMS uniform consisted of a white collared shirt and navy blue bottoms. Uniforms were supplied for students who could not afford them. HMMS experienced significant improvements in attendance and test scores, and a “big decrease” in behavior problems, after adopting the uniform policy.
The uniform policy was voluntary, although some of the staff at HMMS initially thought the policy was a mandatory component of the Ten Schools Program. A student’s parent or guardian could “opt out” of the policy, so that a student did not have to wear a uniform if the student’s parent or guardian so elected. The school did not provide a specific form to opt out; rather, a parent who wished to opt out would inform the principal or the administrator in charge of discipline. For students whose parent or guardian did not opt out, the uniform was mandatory. Students were not punished for being out of uniform. HMMS teachers and administrators did telephone parents, however, to ensure that parents were aware when their child was not in uniform.
Plaintiff lives with her grandfather, Frank Canada, who is her guardian. Prior to plaintiff entering HMMS as a sixth-grade student in the Fall of 2003, plaintiff and her family received a letter from HMMS acting principal Barbara Rickett that stated that “all students who are returning to school are expected to wear the school’s uniform . . . .” In mid-August, plaintiff attended an orientation session at HMMS with her aunt. At the orientation session, Ms. Rickett described the uniform policy and stated that students who came to school out of uniform would be “placed in detention or placed in one of the dean’s office.” This statement worried plaintiff’s aunt, a teacher employed by LAUSD, who knew that the LAUSD parent-student handbook stated that any uniform policy must be voluntary. Plaintiff’s aunt called Canada, who came to HMMS and arrived prior to the end of the orientation session. Canada became “very vocal” during the orientation session in expressing his dislike of the uniform policy, stating that the uniforms “represented prisons.”
After the orientation session, plaintiff and her grandfather spoke to Marguerite LaMotte, a member of the LAUSD school board and a former principal of HMMS. Plaintiff told Ms. LaMotte she did not want to wear a uniform. Ms. LaMotte explained to plaintiff that it was important to wear a uniform for safety reasons, and encouraged plaintiff to go see the uniforms to see if she liked them before making a decision. Plaintiff did so, and decided that she did not want to wear one. Plaintiff did not want to look like everyone else, thought the uniforms were ugly, and thought (as Canada had said) that “wearing a uniform meant they were getting you ready for prison.” Plaintiff testified that she believed that the uniform policy was voluntary. Plaintiff was the only student at HMMS in 2003 to opt out of the uniform policy.
One day during the first week of school, plaintiff wore light blue pants and a light blue jacket to school. Defendant Deborah Gayle, an assistant principal at HMMS, called plaintiff out of line during lunch and asked plaintiff her name and why she was out of uniform. Gayle did not know who plaintiff was at the time; during the first few days of school, Gayle questioned any student who was out of uniform. On September 4, Gayle spoke with Canada by telephone to explain the benefits of the uniforms, just as she did with any parent who objected to the uniform policy. Canada made it “very clear” that he did not want plaintiff to wear a uniform; Gayle never again asked plaintiff about being out of uniform.
As plaintiff was leaving school the same day that she was questioned by Gayle, defendant Gladys Storey, a Dean of Students, yelled out to plaintiff in a loud voice, “We [wear] navy blue pants in this school, young lady.” Storey did not know who plaintiff was, and never again spoke to plaintiff about being out of uniform.
The evening of September 4, Canada and plaintiff’s aunt made a card for plaintiff to carry at school that stated, in part, that plaintiff “does not and will not be wearing a uniform, so stop discriminating against her and harassing her about this.” On September 5, plaintiff and her friend were not wearing uniforms at school and were detained by defendant Sean Gaston, then an instructional specialist at HMMS. Plaintiff showed Gaston the card; Gaston balled it up, threw it on the ground and laughed. He took plaintiff and her friend to defendant Waymon Hobdy’s office. Plaintiff missed her second period class while Hobdy called Canada about plaintiff being out of uniform. After speaking to Canada, Hobdy sent plaintiff back to class.
Hobdy did not testify; the record does not indicate his position at HMMS.
In the second week of school, plaintiff was detained by a security guard as she entered school in the morning and told to get against the wall. Several other students, all of whom were out of uniform, were also detained. Canada, who had dropped plaintiff off at school, saw what happened and came inside to speak to the security guard. After speaking with Canada, the security guard permitted plaintiff to go to class. Plaintiff was again detained entering school a few days later; again, she was permitted to go class.
Plaintiff testified that, on another day during lunch, Gaston stopped plaintiff and her friend and asked whether they had “hopped the gate.” They denied doing so. Gaston asked plaintiff why she was not in uniform; she responded that she did not want to wear one. Gaston said, “Then you can go to these schools,” and listed a number of schools that did not have a uniform policy. On September 15, Canada authorized his attorney to send a letter to defendant Earl Perkins, the new acting principal at HMMS, stating that plaintiff would not be wearing a uniform.
On September 24, plaintiff was stopped by a school administrator because plaintiff was out of uniform. The administrator took plaintiff to Camiella Lover’s office. Plaintiff missed her fifth and sixth period classes. Lover called Canada; after speaking with him, Lover let plaintiff go.
As noted above, Ms. Lover died before trial. The record does not indicate her position at HMMS.
On school picture day, plaintiff waited in line and paid the photographer for her photograph. The photographer told plaintiff that, because she was not in uniform, she could not have her picture taken. The photographer said “it was the principal’s orders.” Plaintiff testified that Perkins announced that all students must be in uniform to have their pictures taken. Because plaintiff did not have her picture taken, she was excluded from the school yearbook and did not get a school identification card. The following week, plaintiff was on her way to a school assembly when defendant Carol Watts pulled plaintiff out of line and asked plaintiff her name and why she was not in uniform.
Perkins, testifying as an adverse witness in plaintiff’s case, denied issuing any such policy. In deposition testimony read to the jury at the close of plaintiff’s case, Perkins stated that students who were not in uniform when getting pictures taken were given white shirts to wear for purposes of the photograph. After the trial court granted defendant’s motion for nonsuit, plaintiff was permitted to reopen her case to call her friend, Marie Penn. Penn testified that the photographer offered plaintiff a white shirt to wear for the picture, but plaintiff refused it.
Watts did not testify; the record does not indicate her position at HMMS.
One day in October 2003, plaintiff was wearing a pink skirt and a pink sweater. While she was on her way to lunch, defendant Ben Fuller, a Dean of Students, grabbed plaintiff by the arm and said, “I’m taking you to the office because you are out of uniform.” Plaintiff testified that Fuller hurt her when he grabbed her. Fuller led plaintiff by the arm for approximately sixty feet, and told plaintiff to wait in the office until he finished supervising the beginning of lunch. Plaintiff left the office before Fuller returned; he never got her name and did not know who she was. Canada reported the incident to the police. Fuller never detained plaintiff for being out of uniform after he learned that Canada did not want her to wear one.
In February 2004, HMMS had a Valentine’s Day dance after school. Plaintiff bought a ticket and went to the dance with her friend. Defendant Mattie Sanders, an assistant principal at HMMS, told plaintiff and her friend that they could not go into the dance because they were not in uniform. Sanders denied entry to all students not in uniform. Plaintiff called her grandfather, who came to the school to discuss the issue with Gaston and Hobdy. Plaintiff was never admitted to the dance. Plaintiff’s friend, however, changed into a uniform and went to the dance.
Plaintiff continued to wear her own clothes to school. At the time of trial, she was a 13-year old eighth grader in her final year at HMMS. She had never worn a uniform while at HMMS, had never been sent home to put on a uniform, and had never been suspended or expelled for not wearing a uniform. After the incident at the Valentine’s Day dance, plaintiff was never again detained for being out of uniform, and questioning about her uniform by administrators stopped as soon as plaintiff identified herself.
Plaintiff sued LAUSD and ten staff members from HMMS. Her Second Amended Complaint alleged four causes of action: (1) declaratory relief, (2) violation of civil rights, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (4) against defendant Ben Fuller, battery. At the close of plaintiff’s case, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for nonsuit on plaintiff’s causes of action for declaratory relief and violation of civil rights (section 1983). A jury rendered special verdicts against plaintiff on her emotional distress and battery claims. The trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants on December 19, 2005. Plaintiff timely appealed. Plaintiff appeals only the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for nonsuit on her second cause of action for violation of civil rights.
Plaintiff does not appeal the nonsuit on her claim for declaratory relief, or the jury verdicts against her on her claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and battery.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“A motion for nonsuit allows a defendant to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence before presenting his or her case. Because a successful nonsuit motion precludes submission of plaintiff’s case to the jury, courts grant motions for nonsuit only under very limited circumstances.” (Carson v. Facilities Development Co. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 830, 838.) “A defendant is entitled to a nonsuit if the trial court determines that, as a matter of law, the evidence presented by plaintiff is insufficient to permit a jury to find in his favor. [Citation.] ‘In determining whether plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient, the court may not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses. Instead, the evidence most favorable to plaintiff must be accepted as true and conflicting evidence must be disregarded. The court must give “to the plaintiff[’s] evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled, . . . indulging every legitimate inference which may be drawn from the evidence in plaintiff[’s] favor.” [Citation.] A mere ‘scintilla of evidence’ does not create a conflict for the jury’s resolution; ‘there must be substantial evidence to create the necessary conflict.’ [Citation.]” (Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 291.)
In reviewing a grant of nonsuit, we evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. (Stonegate Homeowners Assn. v. Staben (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 740, 745.) “We will not sustain the judgment ‘“unless interpreting the evidence most favorably to plaintiff’s case and most strongly against the defendant and resolving all presumptions, inferences and doubts in favor of the plaintiff a judgment for the defendant is required as a matter of law.”’ [Citations.]” (Nally v. Grace Community Church, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 291.) Reversal is warranted only “if there is ‘some substance to plaintiff’s evidence upon which reasonable minds could differ . . . .’” (Carson v. Facilities Development Co., supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 839.)
B. The Trial Court Properly Granted Defendants’ Motion for Nonsuit on Plaintiff’s Claim for Violation of Civil Rights
1. The First Amendment Claim
Although plaintiff did not plead a violation of the First Amendment (U.S. Const., Amend. 1), her primary argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in concluding that she failed to present a prima facie case that defendants violated her right to freedom of expression under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist. (1969) 393 U.S. 503 (Tinker). Plaintiff contends that the HMMS uniform policy, “by requiring mandatory participation and harassment, punishment and ostracism for those students who don’t participate[,] is inherently unconstitutional and violates the [plaintiff’s] constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech and expression.” We conclude that plaintiff failed to establish that she was engaged in expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint does not specifically allege a violation of the First Amendment, nor did plaintiff assert a violation of the First Amendment in her Proposed Statement of the Case or her Brief on Trial Issues. The parties, however, argued the First Amendment issue to the trial court on defendants’ motion for nonsuit; the trial court expressly decided the issue; and defendants do not contend on appeal that plaintiff has forfeited the issue or raised it improperly. We therefore construe plaintiff’s claim under section 1983 to allege a claim for damages for a violation of plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.
The trial court did not address defendants’ claim of immunity from suit, and defendants have not raised that issue in their brief. Further, defendants have not raised the issue whether LAUSD can be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. (See Howlett v. Rose (1990) 496 U.S. 356, 365; Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 691; Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 348-350.) Accordingly, those issues are not before us on this appeal.
In Tinker’s oft-repeated phrase, public school students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” (Tinker, 393 U.S. at p. 506.) Students “cannot be punished merely for expressing their personal views on the school premises . . . unless school authorities have reason to believe that such expression will ‘substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students.’ [Citation.]” (Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier (1988) 484 U.S. 260, 266.) The First Amendment protects not only a student’s verbal expression, but also her expressive conduct. (Tinker, supra, 393 U.S. at pp. 507-508 [armbands worn in protest of Vietnam war]; see Spence v. Washington (1974) 418 U.S. 405, 415 [display of flag upside-down with peace sign].)
Conduct, however, is protected by the First Amendment only if it “is inherently expressive.” (Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (2006) 547 U.S. 47, __ [126 S.Ct. 1297, 1310].) That is, conduct is constitutionally protected as speech only if it is “‘sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.’ [Citation.]” (Texas v. Johnson (1989) 491 U.S. 397, 404 (Johnson); accord, In re Joshua H. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1734, 1747.) Determining whether conduct is sufficiently communicative requires a two-pronged inquiry: “[1] whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [2] [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.’ [Citation.]” (Johnson, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 404; Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence (1984) 468 U.S. 288, 294 (Clark); Nordyke v. King (9th Cir. 2003) 319 F.3d 1185, 1189; Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, New York (2d Cir. 2003) 316 F.3d 314, 319 (Zalewska).) “[I]t is the obligation of the person desiring to engage in assertedly expressive conduct to demonstrate that the First Amendment even applies.” (Clark, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 293, fn. 5.)
This is not a case in which plaintiff wore or was forbidden to wear clothing imprinted with speech or political symbols, or clothing that, in context, had a specific symbolic significance. (E.g., Cohen v. California (1971) 403 U.S. 15, 22-26 [jacket with printed anti-draft message]; Schacht v. United States (1970) 398 U.S. 58, 62-63 [wearing army uniform to protest Army’s role in Vietnam]; Tinker, supra, 393 U.S. at pp. 507-508 [black armbands]; Zalewska, supra, 316 F.3d at p. 320 [citing example of male high school student wearing female clothing to express gender identity]; Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified School Dist. (C.D. Cal. 1993) 827 F.Supp. 1459, 1461 [clothing imprinted with team names to show support for sports teams at elementary and middle schools].) Rather, plaintiff wore her regular street clothes. Although “clothes are certainly a way in which people express themselves, clothing as such is not—not normally at any rate—constitutionally protected expression.” (Brandt v. Board of Education of City of Chicago (7th Cir. 2007) 480 F.3d 460, 465 (Brandt).) Indeed, the court in Tinker expressly distinguished between a school’s regulation of a student’s right to wear a symbolic black armband, which was an impermissible restriction on conduct “akin to ‘pure speech,’” and a school’s “regulation of the length of skirts or the type of clothing, . . . hair style, or deportment.” (Tinker, supra, 393 U.S. at pp. 507-508; Blau v. Fort Thomas Public School Dist. (6th Cir. 2005) 401 F.3d 381, 389 (Blau) [same]; In re Alcala (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 345, 362-363 (Alcala) [same]; Montalvo v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Education (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 323, 333-334 (Montalvo) [same].) “Self-expression is not to be equated to the expression of ideas or opinions and thus to participation in the intellectual marketplace. Nor is the kind of ‘message’ that clothing normally sends—‘I am rich,’ ‘I am sexy,’ ‘I have good taste,’ and so forth—intended to contribute to competition in that marketplace.” (Brandt, supra, 480 F.3d at p. 465.)
Both federal and California state cases have concluded that personal expression in clothing or hair style, without more, is not protected speech. In Brandt, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a T-shirt designed by a member of a class of gifted eighth graders did not constitute protected speech because the design was “no more expressive of an idea or opinion that the First Amendment might be thought to protect than a young child’s talentless infantile drawing which [the] design successfully mimics.” (Brandt, supra, 480 F.3d at pp. 465-466.) To afford the mere wearing of the T-shirt First Amendment protection would mean that “every T-shirt that was not all white with no design or words, with not even the manufacturer’s logo or the owner’s name tag, would be protected by the First Amendment, and schools could not impose dress codes or require uniforms without violating the free speech of the students . . . .” (Id. at p. 466.)
In Blau, a student challenged a school dress code because she “want[ed] to be able to wear clothes that ‘look[ed] nice on [her],” that she ‘fe[lt] good in’ and that express[ed] her individuality.” (Blau, supra, 401 F.3d at p. 386.) The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff had “not met [her] burden of showing that the First Amendment protects [her] conduct—which in this instance amounts to nothing more than a generalized and vague desire to express her middle-school individuality.” (Id. at p. 389.) “[T]he First Amendment does not protect such vague and attenuated notions of expression—namely, self-expression through any and all clothing that a 12-year old may wish to wear on a given day. . . . To rule otherwise not only would erase the requirement that expressive conduct have an identifiable message but also would risk depreciating the First Amendment in cases in which a ‘particularized message’ does exist.” (Id. at p. 390.)
In Zalewska, the plaintiff was a van driver employed by a county agency. The county mandated that van drivers wear pants. The plaintiff, however, “‘as a matter of familial and cultural custom . . . [had] never worn pants in her entire life.’” (Zalewska, supra, 316 F.3d at p. 317.) The Second Circuit held that the regulation did not violate plaintiff’s First Amendment rights because the act of wearing a skirt did not convey a particularized message, nor would plaintiff’s message be readily understood by observers. (Id. at pp. 319-320.) “We realize,” the court stated, “that for [plaintiff]—as for most people—clothing and personal appearance are important forms of self-expression.” (Id. at p. 319.) Nevertheless, “the fact that something is in some way communicative does not automatically afford it constitutional protection.” (Ibid.) “Although [plaintiff’s] activity is expressive, it does not constitute the type of expressive conduct which would allow her to invoke the First Amendment in challenging the county’s regulation because the ordinary viewer would glean no particularized message from [plaintiff’s] wearing of a skirt rather than pants as part of her uniform.” (Id. at p. 320.)
In Alcala, a prisoner challenged a warden’s prohibition against prisoners wearing certain items of personal, civilian clothing, such as colored T-shirts, baseball caps and sweaters. (Alcala, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 352.) The court held that “[t]he right to wear clothing of one’s choice is not explicitly granted by either the United States Constitution or the California Constitution” (id. at p. 361) and that “no authority supports a general right of freedom of choice in clothing . . . .” (Id. at p. 362). The plaintiff offered no evidence that “the prisoners are attempting symbolic speech, [or] what message they seek to convey, [or which] identifies the audience they may be trying to reach.” (Id. at p. 363.) Accordingly, the plaintiff’s “vague, unfocused message of personal expression does not merit the protection of the First Amendment.” (Ibid.)
We do not address whether plaintiff’s conduct was protected by the California Constitution. Although plaintiff generally asserts the California Constitution in her brief, section 1983 only permits actions for damages based on federal rights. (Parratt v. Taylor (1981) 451 U.S. 527, 535, overruled on another ground by Daniels v. Williams (1986) 474 U.S. 327.) As explained below, plaintiff has forfeited her state law claims on appeal.
Finally, in Montalvo, a junior high school student attacked the validity of a school regulation requiring that male students’ hair be cut above the eyes, ears and collars. (Montalvo, supra, 21 Cal.App.3d at pp. 326-329.) The court held that “hair style, without more, is not per se an expression of speech, symbolic or pure, within the protection of the First Amendment.” (Id. at p. 334.) “At most, hair style is an indefinite and vague expression of personality, individuality or of an idiosyncrasy much like the color or style of clothes or deportment. Such activity is not intended to be nor is it interpreted by the viewer to be an expression of any definitive philosophical, social or political point of view.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff testified that she did not wear the HMMS uniform because she did not want to look like everyone else, thought the uniforms were ugly, and thought (as Canada had said) that “wearing a uniform meant they were getting you ready for prison.” Plaintiff did not testify that she wore her street clothes as a form of protest, or that she intended to communicate a particular message to observers. Further, plaintiff wore normal, non-symbolic clothing; insofar as the record reveals, she wore light blue pants and a light blue jacket on one day, and a pink skirt with a pink sweater on another day. Plaintiff did not wear any buttons, armbands or signs to protest the uniform policy, nor did she wear clothing that an observer would understand to communicate an anti-uniform message or any other particularized message. In sum, plaintiff failed to carry her burden of establishing both her “‘intent to convey a particularized message,’” and that “‘the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.’” (Johnson, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 404.) The trial court therefore properly granted defendants’ motion for nonsuit on plaintiff’s First Amendment claim.
2. Plaintiff’s Other Claims
As noted above, plaintiff did not plead a violation of her First Amendment rights, although we have viewed that as an issue. Instead, plaintiff’s second cause of action alleged violations of her civil rights premised on defendants’ alleged violations of Education Code sections 200, 201, 35291 and 48907; Civil Code sections 51, subdivision (b), and 52.1, subdivisions (a) and (b); and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Plaintiff also alleged a “violation” of section 1983. Section 1983, however, does not convey any substantive rights; it merely provides a remedial cause of action for violations of substantive federal rights. (Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org. (1979) 441 U.S. 600, 617; Pitts v. County of Kern, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 348-350; Irwin v. City of Hemet (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 507, 515.)
The trial court disposed of plaintiff’s claims based on the state Education Code on the ground that the sections relied upon by plaintiff do not create a private cause of action for damages. Although plaintiff continues to assert that the HMMS uniform policy violated those provisions, she makes no specific argument on appeal and cites no authority that any of the four Education Code sections she relies upon are enforceable by a private plaintiff in an action for damages against a school district or its employees, or that those sections entail any constitutional rights. Plaintiff has therefore forfeited the issue. (People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 441 fn. 8 [“‘“[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration”’”].)
With respect to plaintiff’s claims based on the Civil Code, the trial court relied on Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts (1998) 17 Cal.4th 670 to conclude that Civil Code sections 51 (the Unruh Civil Rights Act) and 52.1 (the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act) do not apply to public schools. (See generally, Stamps v. Superior Court (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1449-1454 [distinguishing between Unruh and Bane Acts].) Plaintiff does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion on appeal, and thus forfeits any error. We therefore do not consider whether the trial court’s ruling was correct on this issue.
With respect to plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, the trial court concluded that plaintiff failed to prove that she was treated any differently than other similarly situated students, or that defendants instituted or engaged in any discriminatory policy. Again, plaintiff alludes generally to the Fourteenth Amendment in her brief, but makes no specific argument and cites no authorities relating to her equal protection claim. She therefore forfeits any error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: ARMSTRONG, Acting P. J., KRIEGLER, J.