Summary
In Land, upon which Defendant Executive Aviation relies entirely in making this argument, the Tennessee Court of Appeals found the plaintiffs knew the truth regarding every alleged misrepresentation before they closed on a real property sale, therefore their claims of misrepresentation failed.
Summary of this case from Swift Freedom Aviation, LLC v. AeroOpinion
No. E2004-03019-COA-R3-CV.
May 12, 2005 Session.
Filed July 12, 2005.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County; No. 04C986; Samuel H. Payne, Judge.
Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed in Part and Vacated in Part; Case Remanded.
James R. McKoon and John R. Hegeman, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the Appellants, Spencer D. Land and Action Building and Development, LLC.
Roger W. Dickson and James T. Williams, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the Appellees, John L. Dixon, Henry Glascock, John L. Dixon Associates, Inc., and The Glascock Company d/b/a The Henry B. Glascock Company.
Sharon G. Lee, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Charles D. Susano, Jr. and D. Michael Swiney, JJ., joined.
OPINION
This action arises from a sale of real estate by auction. Plaintiffs, the high bidders on the property, sued the auctioneer and the real estate broker, alleging professional negligence in conducting the auction, misrepresentation, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court granted the Defendants' motion for dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), and the Plaintiffs appeal. After careful review, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' cause of action based on misrepresentation and alleged violation of the Consumer Protection Act, but vacate the dismissal of the claim for professional negligence, and remand for trial.
The Plaintiffs, Spencer D. Land and Action Building and Development, LLC, filed their complaint in this action on June 15, 2004. The facts as set forth in the Plaintiffs' complaint are as follows.
On or about April 17, 2004, the Defendants, John L. Dixon, Henry Glascock, John L. Dixon Associates, Inc., and The Glascock Company d/b/a The Henry B. Glascock Company, conducted an absolute auction of approximately 448 acres of real property, located near Soddy Daisy, Hamilton County, Tennessee. Mr. Dixon and Mr. Glascock each personally held an ownership interest in the property at the time of the auction; however, neither of them disclosed their ownership interest to Plaintiffs before or during the auction.
Prior to attending the auction and bidding on the property, Mr. Land obtained a brochure advertising the property. The brochure contained an aerial photograph of the property with lines added to indicate its borders. The photograph indicated that the property included approximately two acres in a shape that juts out from the main shape of the property. But this two-acre tract, described in the complaint as "prime property," was not included in the property conveyed at the auction.
The brochure stated in large lettering: "Selling by Order of Trustee Robert L. Brown." But there was no "Order" of the Trustee requiring a sale. The Trustee sold the property at the choice of the beneficial owners, including the Defendants, and then utilized himself as closing attorney, his business as title insurer, and two beneficiaries of the Trust as auctioneer and real estate broker.
Before the April 17, 2004 auction began, the Defendants announced the auction would be conducted according to the "two-minute rule." This rule means that once the auctioneers determine that too much time had passed between bids, that the auctioneer would announce the start of a two minute period. Once the start of this two minute period is called, if no new bid is submitted within the two minute period, then the gavel goes down and the last person submitting a bid prior to the start of the two minute period is the purchaser of the property.
The complaint further alleges as follows:
When the auction reached a bid at or about $1,400,000.00, Mr Land was the high bidder.
Following Mr. Land's $1,400,000.00 bid, Mr. Glascock, who was already in communication with Mr. Louis Card via telephone, attempted to convince Mr. Card to submit a bid higher than the bid of Mr. Land. Earlier in the auction, bids had been submitted on Mr. Card's behalf.
While Mr. Glascock was on the telephone with Mr. Card, Mr. Dixon announced the start of the two minute rule. After this announcement, more than two minutes elapsed. Witnesses to the auction informed the Defendants that more than two minutes had passed. The Defendants announced the end of the two minute period but did not conclude the auction. No bid was submitted from any other party during the two minutes higher than that of Mr. Land.
Despite the passage of time, Defendants continued with the auction, in violation of the announced rules of the auction, and eventually Mr. Card submitted a higher bid. In order to acquire the property, it was necessary for Mr. Land to follow Mr. Card's bid with a still higher bid.
Despite having already won the auction when the two minutes passed, Mr. Land was declared the winner of the auction by the Defendants when Mr. Land submitted a bid of $1,590,000.00. At this time, Mr. Land was required to sign Defendants' form contract for the purchase of the property.
Defendants charged a buyer's premium of ten percent (10%) of the auction price.
Plaintiffs reasonably relied upon the Defendants' knowledge, expertise and professional skill as licensed auctioneers and real estate brokers to properly and forthrightly conduct the auction and the sale of the real estate in a professional, competent and lawful manner.
On the same day of the auction, April 17, 2004, the parties executed a real estate sales contract which listed the purchase price as $1,749,000 ($1,590,000 plus buyer's premium of $159,000). The contract recites that "Purchaser [Plaintiff] has paid to Auctioneer the sum of $349,800 as earnest money . . ." It is signed by Mr. Land, Robert L. Brown, President of Legal Title and Escrow, Inc. (holder of legal title to the property and the seller), and Mr. Dixon as auctioneer.
After the auction, the property was surveyed and the sales price was adjusted downward based on the actual acreage. As a result, the sales price was reduced to $1,501,327.29, and the buyer's premium was reduced to $150,132.73, for a total sales price of $1,651,460.02.
The Plaintiffs allege that as a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' actions and violations of applicable standards of care, Plaintiffs "paid $286,627.29 too much for the property" and "$26,862.73 too much as the buyer's premium for the property."
The Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit at 3:18 PM on June 15, 2004. It is undisputed that very shortly (within an hour) after the complaint was filed, the parties closed on the contract of sale of the real estate and thereby completed the sale.
On August 10, 2004, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendants argued that the Plaintiffs voluntarily closed on the contract with full knowledge of all the alleged misrepresentations made by Defendants, and having done so, should be precluded from recovery. Defendants also asserted that Plaintiffs' cause of action sounds in contract, and that "any cause of action to hold Defendants to the earlier $1.4 million bid is barred by the doctrine of merger and the express terms of the Real Estate Contract."
The trial court granted the motion and dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint, stating and reasoning as follows in relevant part:
This appears to the Court to have been a contract action, however, plaintiffs allege negligence and misrepresentations. To support their claims, plaintiffs allege that defendants: (1) failed to disclose their personal ownership interest in the property in a timely manner; (2) misleadingly described the property being sold; (3) misrepresented the circumstances under which the property was being placed for auction by stating the auction was by "Order of Trustee Robert L. Brown"; (4) failed to make a complete [audio] recording of the auction; (5) failed to conduct the auction in accordance with the express terms of the auction, specifically violating the two-minute rule for submission of bids; and (6) failed to deal with plaintiffs forthrightly and honestly as to the issue of the portion of the property which is affected by the proposed hiking trail.
To support their claim of misrepresentation, plaintiffs allege that defendants: (1) failed to disclose their personal ownership interest in the property prior to the auction; (2) misrepresented the ownership of the property; (3) misleadingly described the property being auctioned; (4) misleadingly described the circumstances giving rise to the auction; (5) made numerous contradictory statements concerning the existence and/or completeness of the audio recording of the auction; and (6) made contradictory statements concerning the status of the donation/sale/transfer of the portion of the property for which a hiking trail was proposed . . .
From the pleadings it is evident that the plaintiffs were fully aware of all the above alleged facts prior to their closing on the property. This is obvious because the complaint was filed on June 15, 2004, within minutes of the time that plaintiffs closed on this transaction.
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Plaintiffs voluntarily entered into a written contract for purchase of real estate after being the successful bidder at auction and voluntarily closed on this contract with full knowledge of the facts that plaintiff now allege constitutes misrepresentation and negligent conduct.
Plaintiffs are not without remedies in the fact that they could have sought recision based on the alleged information known to them at the time of the closing. Plaintiffs' pleadings do not entitle them to any relief under Tennessee law.
Plaintiffs appeal, raising the issue of whether the trial court erred in granting Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
It is apparent that the trial court considered at least one fact not contained in the pleadings; the Plaintiffs closed on the real estate contract shortly after filing the lawsuit. This fact is not in dispute. However, because it is a matter outside the pleadings and was considered by the trial court, we must treat the motion to dismiss as one filed pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56, i.e., as a motion for summary judgment. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 ("If, . . ., matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56."); Hart v. Joseph Decosimo and Co., LLP, 145 S.W.3d 67, 71 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2004).
A motion for summary judgment should be granted when the movant demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993).
We first address Plaintiffs' claims of misrepresentation, as heretofore outlined by the recitation of facts and the trial court's memorandum opinion. As the trial court correctly noted, it is clear that Plaintiffs were aware of every alleged misrepresentation prior to closing on the real estate contract. By that time, Plaintiffs knew of the Defendants' ownership interest in the property; that the two acres depicted in the advertising brochure were not included in the sale; that the property had been voluntarily placed for sale by auction, and not as a result of financial distress on the sellers' part as conceivably suggested by the brochure; and that the assertion, earlier made, that a portion of the property along a boundary line had been sold to the State of Tennessee for the purpose of constructing a hiking trail was untrue.
Armed with this knowledge, Plaintiffs chose to close on the contract anyway, almost immediately after filing the complaint in this case. In Winstead v. First Tennessee Bank N.A., Memphis, 709 S.W.2d 627 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986), this court stated as follows:
If one who is in possession of all material facts, either actually or constructively, proceeds with a purchase of realty, notwithstanding such knowledge, such a person cannot thereafter recover on the basis of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment of the information to which all parties had equal access.
Winstead, 709 S.W.2d at 633. We are of the opinion that this principle applies to preclude Plaintiffs from seeking recovery based on the misrepresentations alleged in the complaint, and we affirm the trial court's ruling in this regard. The fact that Plaintiffs filed suit shortly before closing on the contract does not preclude the application of this rule; Plaintiffs were still aware of the truth regarding the property prior to closing on the real estate contract.
Further, we find that Plaintiffs' cause of action under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-101 et seq., must similarly fail, because, among other reasons, it rests on the same allegations of misrepresentation. The Act provides that "[a]ny person who suffers an ascertainable loss . . . as a result of the use or employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive act or practice declared to be unlawful by this part, may bring an action individually to recover damages." Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-109(a)(1) [emphasis added]. The phrase "as a result of" requires a showing by a plaintiff that the alleged violations caused his or her injury. Under the circumstances of this case, where Plaintiffs voluntarily elected to close on the contract for sale of the property with full knowledge of the alleged misrepresentations and of the truth regarding the property, Plaintiffs cannot show the required causative link between the misrepresentations and their alleged injury. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's cause of action alleging violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.
Regarding Plaintiffs' claims of professional negligence against the Defendants in their capacity as auctioneer and real estate broker, the Defendants argue that this action sounds in contract and is barred by the doctrine of merger and by the Plaintiffs' voluntary decision to execute the real estate contract for the higher price. Defendants assert that Plaintiffs "are actually seeking specific performance of a contract based upon a bid of $1,400,000."
Plaintiffs counter this argument by pointing out that they have not attacked the validity of the contract they signed, and have not sued the seller. Plaintiffs argue that the essence of their complaint is that the Defendants, by announcing the two-minute rule and not following it in an attempt to solicit a higher bid by another bidder, violated the applicable standard of care for auctioneers and real estate brokers. Plaintiffs assert that they are not attempting to enforce a contract at the lower bid level of $1.4 million, but instead alleging that but for the tortious misconduct of Defendants, a contract for that amount would have been created, and they would have been able to purchase the property for a lesser amount.
The complaint alleges that Mr. Dixon is licensed by the State of Tennessee as a real estate broker and an auctioneer, and that Mr. Glascock is licensed as a real estate broker and "as an auctioneering firm in the name of the Henry B. Glascock Company." Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-13-403 states as follows in pertinent part regarding the duties of a licensed real estate broker:
A licensee who provides real estate services in a real estate transaction shall owe all parties to such transaction the following duties, except as provided otherwise by § 62-13-405, in addition to other duties specifically set forth in this chapter or the rules of the commission:
(1) Diligently exercise reasonable skill and care in providing services to all parties to the transaction;
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(4) Provide services to each party to the transaction with honesty and good faith[.]
A real estate broker who breaches the duty to act honestly and in good faith, and with reasonable skill and care, is potentially liable to a party injured by such a breach. Id.; Gage v. Seaman, C/A No. 03A01-9711-CH-00503, 1999 WL 95185 at *4, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 114 at *11-12 (Tenn.Ct.App. E.S., filed Feb. 23, 1999). Similarly, an auctioneer whose conduct falls below the applicable standard of care for his or her profession is liable to a party injured by the breach of duty. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-19-101 et seq.; Green v. Crye, 11 S.W.2d 869 (Tenn. 1928); Keebler v. Wilson, C/A No. 03A01-9310-CH-00375, 1994 WL 116074, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 193 (Tenn.Ct.App. E.S., filed Apr. 7, 1994).
We are of the opinion that it was error for the trial court to dismiss the Plaintiffs' cause of action for professional negligence. As Defendants state in their brief,
Plaintiffs make only one negligence allegation that bears any logical relation to the damages which Plaintiffs seek — i.e., the differential between the two bids and corresponding buyer's premiums. This is the allegation that Defendants violated the applicable standard of care by failing "to conduct the auction in accordance with the express terms of the auction, specifically violating the two-minute rule for the submission of bids." If Defendants violated the two-minute rule in the manner described by Plaintiffs, an assertion which Defendants vigorously deny, Plaintiffs conceivably could assert this violation resulted in denying them the benefit of the bargain based on their lower bid of $1.4 million.
Defendants argue that "this is a contract allegation, and nothing more." We disagree. Plaintiffs should be allowed the opportunity to prove that Defendants' conduct fell below the applicable standard of care, and that they were damaged by Defendants' negligence or intentional tortious conduct.
Defendants further argue that the following language contained in the contract signed on April 17, 2004 precludes Plaintiffs from bringing the instant action:
If any dispute arises between Purchaser and Seller as to the final disposition of all or part of the earnest money, Auctioneer may, at its option, notify Purchaser and Seller in writing that Auctioneer is unable to resolve such dispute and may interplead all or any disputed part of the earnest money into court, whereupon Auctioneer shall be entitled to be compensated by the party who does not prevail in the interpleader action for its costs and expenses . . . or, upon fifteen (15) days written notice to the parties, Auctioneer may make a disbursal of the earnest money upon a reasonable interpretation of this contract. In either event, the parties hereto shall thereafter make no claim against Auctioneer for said disputed earnest money and shall not seek damages from Auctioneer by reason thereof or by reason of any other matter arising out of this contract or the transaction contemplated hereunder.
[Emphasis added]. We again disagree. As is seen from the italicized portion of the contract, this paragraph can be readily construed as becoming applicable only in the event of a "dispute . . . between Purchaser and Seller as to the final disposition of all or part of the earnest money." No such dispute occurred in this case. An ambiguous or vague provision in a contract will generally be construed against the party drafting it, Vargo v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc., 115 S.W.3d 487 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2003), in this case John L. Dixon Associates, Inc.
Additionally, on June 4, 2004, the parties executed an extension of the contract, which states in relevant part as follows:
The undersigned ("Buyer") requests an extension for closing on the referenced property until on or before June 14, 2004, time being of the essence. In consideration of this extension, Buyer agrees that the earnest money of $349,800 shall be non-refundable for any reason except the failure or refusal of Seller to convey marketable title or a default by or claim against Seller or its agents, which shall survive the closing. Other closing conditions are waived.
[Emphasis added]. This extension was signed by Mr. Land, Mr. Brown, and Mr. Glascock on behalf of John Dixon Associates, Inc. We hold that the contract signed by Plaintiffs on April 17, 2004, as extended by the June 4, 2004 extension, does not preclude Plaintiffs from bringing a cause of action for professional negligence in conducting the real estate auction.
For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the trial court dismissing the Plaintiffs' cause of action based on misrepresentation, and on alleged violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, is affirmed. The judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint for professional negligence is vacated, and the cause remanded for trial on the issues associated with this cause of action. Costs on appeal are assessed one-half to the Appellants, Spencer D. Land and Action Building and Development, LLC, and one-half to the Appellees, John L. Dixon, Henry Glascock, John L. Dixon Associates, Inc., and The Glascock Company d/b/a The Henry B. Glascock Company.