Opinion
96 Civ. 4009 (WK)
October 15, 2001
Richard H. Apat Pearlman, Apat Futterman, LLP, Kew Gardens, NY, For Plaintiff.
Lawrence R. Sandak, Proskauer Rose LLP, Newark, N.J., For Defendant.
ORDER
On March 29, 2000, we denied Defendant Arthur Anderson LLP's ("Anderson") motion for summary judgment. Anderson now requests leave to file a second motion for summary judgment. Anderson asserts that its request is based on new evidence derived from an amplified record, on a clarification of the law by cases decided after this Court denied summary judgment, and on the fact that its first motion for summary judgment did not address whether Plaintiff had failed to avail himself of corrective measures.
Generally, under the law of the case doctrine, "if a court decides a rule of law, that decision should govern subsequent stages of the same case." DiFiore v. DiLorenzo, 91 civ. 4209, (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1997) 1997 WL 722697, *3. In essence, the law of the case doctrine discourages "the reconsideration of matters which were previously decided `absent `cogent' or `compelling' reasons.'" Bonnie Company Fashions, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 955 F. Supp. 203, 209. However, the law of the case doctrine does not "limit a court's ability to reconsider an issue if the court deems such reconsideration appropriate." Id. Accordingly, "an initial denial of summary judgment does not foreclose, as law of the case, a subsequent grant of summary judgment on an amplified record." Id. at 210. See also Hydraulics, Inc. v. Eaton Corp. (N.D.Ill. 1976) 415 F. Supp. 283, 284 (granting second motion for summary judgment on the same or similar grounds as those on which the first motion for summary judgment was denied where there had been a subsequent clarification of the law). Moreover, "`questions that have not been decided do not become law of the case merely because they could have been decided.'" Bonnie Company Fashions, Inc., 955 F. Supp. at 209.
We preliminarily grant Anderson's request to file papers in support of a second motion for summary judgment in order to allow Anderson a chance to clarify the issues on which it now seeks summary judgment and the evidence on which it bases this second motion. However, we reserve our decision as to whether summary judgment on all or part of the issues raised by Anderson is barred by the law of the case doctrine until we have had a chance to review Anderson's papers, Plaintiff Peter Lanci's opposition to Anderson's motion, and Anderson's reply to Plaintiff's response.
SO ORDERED.