[Cit.]" Lance v. Safwat, 170 Ga. App. 694-695 (1) ( 318 SE2d 86) (1984). See also OCGA § 21-2-217 (a) (7). Likewise, a genuine issue of material fact is not created by evidence that Commissioner Baker spends a majority of time at the DeKalb County house in order to facilitate the performance of his official duties, to which he is required by OCGA § 46-2-1 (a) to devote his entire time.
Denson will not be eligible for parole until August 2013. Subsequent to his imprisonment, Denson sold his mobile home in Evans County and his wife moved to another county. See Lance v. Safwat, 170 Ga. App. 694 (1) ( 318 S.E.2d 86) (1984) (neither domicile nor residence of one spouse is presumed to be that of the other.) Relying on his stated intent to return to Evans County in 2013 after he is paroled, and on his avowed denial that he is a resident of South Carolina or domiciled there, Denson contends that venue was only proper in Evans County.
Even if Paulk traveled to and from Atlanta, spent several nights a week there, and conducted a business there, that does not mandate that his residence was in Atlanta. Lance v. Safwat, 170 Ga. App. 694, 695 (1984). "Where a party maintains a residence with a member of his family, but travels about or lives at various other places, the permanent residence may, on the facts, be his usual place of abode."