Lance v. Safwat

3 Citing cases

  1. Dozier v. Baker

    283 Ga. 543 (Ga. 2008)   Cited 9 times
    Analyzing residency in the context of election laws and recognizing that "[n]o definite amount of time spent in a place is essential to make that place a home" (citation and punctuation omitted)

    [Cit.]" Lance v. Safwat, 170 Ga. App. 694-695 (1) ( 318 SE2d 86) (1984). See also OCGA § 21-2-217 (a) (7). Likewise, a genuine issue of material fact is not created by evidence that Commissioner Baker spends a majority of time at the DeKalb County house in order to facilitate the performance of his official duties, to which he is required by OCGA § 46-2-1 (a) to devote his entire time.

  2. Cooper v. Edwards

    508 S.E.2d 708 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that "[o]ne claiming lack of venue has the burden of proving it."

    Denson will not be eligible for parole until August 2013. Subsequent to his imprisonment, Denson sold his mobile home in Evans County and his wife moved to another county. See Lance v. Safwat, 170 Ga. App. 694 (1) ( 318 S.E.2d 86) (1984) (neither domicile nor residence of one spouse is presumed to be that of the other.) Relying on his stated intent to return to Evans County in 2013 after he is paroled, and on his avowed denial that he is a resident of South Carolina or domiciled there, Denson contends that venue was only proper in Evans County.

  3. McDaniel v. Smith

    CIVIL ACTION NO. CV507-79 (S.D. Ga. Sep. 30, 2008)   Cited 2 times

    Even if Paulk traveled to and from Atlanta, spent several nights a week there, and conducted a business there, that does not mandate that his residence was in Atlanta. Lance v. Safwat, 170 Ga. App. 694, 695 (1984). "Where a party maintains a residence with a member of his family, but travels about or lives at various other places, the permanent residence may, on the facts, be his usual place of abode."