We agree. So-Lo Oil Company, Inc. v. Total Petroleum, Inc., Okla., 832 P.2d 14, 18 (1992); Humphrey v. Denney, Okla., 757 P.2d 833, 835 (1988); Matter of Phillips Petroleum Co., Okla., 652 P.2d 283, 285 (1982); Lancaster v. State, Okla., 426 P.2d 714, 716 (1967); State v. Dinwiddie, 186 Okla. 63, 95 P.2d 867, 869 (1939). Section 152(5)'s language creates a dichotomous division of physicians into two distinct categories: (a) teachers or students and (b) practitioners of medicine.
Lancaster v. State, 1967 OK 84, ¶ 6, 426 P.2d 714, 716 (citations omitted). Where a statute's meaning is uncertain, we will give it a reasonable construction which will avoid absurd consequences if this can be done without violating legislative intent.
Without clear legislative direction, these two capacities cannot be intermixed. Nelson v. Pollay, 1996 OK 142, ¶ 6, 916 P.2d 1369, 1373 (citing Anderson v. Eichner, 1994 OK 136, ¶ 11, 890 P.2d 1329, 1336 n. 15); So-Lo Oil Company, Inc. v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 1992 OK 71, ¶ 8, 832 P.2d 14, 18; Humphrey v. Denney, 1988 OK 69, ¶ 8, 757 P.2d 833, 835; Matter of Phillips Petroleum Co., 1982 OK 112, ¶ 5, 652 P.2d 283, 285; Lancaster v. State, 1967 OK 84, ¶ 6, 426 P.2d 714, 716; State v. Dinwiddie, 1939 OK 406, ¶ 10, 95 P.2d 867, 869 (1939). The terms of 12 O.S. 2001 § 2[ 12-2] state:
¶ 26 Consideration must be given to the statute as a whole without isolating words, phrases, or other parts. McNeill v. City of Tulsa, 1998 OK 2, ¶ 11, 953 P.2d 329, 332. Statutes are given a construction which is reasonable and which does not led to internal inconsistencies. Lancaster v. State ex rel. Harrod, 1967 OK 84, ¶ 6, 426 P.2d 714, 716. In this instance, it is possible that subsection 5 and subsection 13 each might come into play where a child has been adjudicated as a deprived child.
We agree. Anderson, supra note 11 at 1337; So-Lo Oil Company, Inc. v. Total Petroleum, Inc., Okla., 832 P.2d 14, 18 (1992); Humphrey v. Denney, Okla., 757 P.2d 833, 835 (1988); Matter of Phillips Petroleum Co., Okla., 652 P.2d 283, 28; (1982); Lancaster v. State, Okla., 426 P.2d 714, 716 (1967); State v. Dinwiddie, 186 Okla. 63, 95 P.2d 867, 869 (1939). State employees acting within the scope of their employment are relieved by § 152.1(A) of private liability for tortious conduct.
Matter of Death of Knight, Okla., 877 P.2d 602, 604 (1994); Public Service Co. of Okla. v. State ex rel. Corp. Comm'n, Okla., 842 P.2d 750, 752 (1992); Ledbetter v. Okla. Alcoholic Bev. Laws Enforcement Comm'n, Okla., 764 P.2d 172, 179 (1988).Eason Oil Company v. Corporation Commission, Okla., 535 P.2d 283, 286 (1975); Lancaster v. State, Okla., 426 P.2d 714, 716 (1967).State v. Tapp, Okla., 380 P.2d 260, 264 (1963).
An act should be construed reasonably and sensibly. Lancaster v. State, Okla., 426 P.2d 714, 716 (1967); Christian v. Shideler, Okla. 382 P.2d 129 (1963). When a statute is susceptible to more than one construction, it must be given that interpretation which frees it from constitutional doubt rather than one that would make it fraught with fundamental-law infirmities.
When the wording of a statement is plain and unambiguous there is no need for judicial interpretation. Lancaster v. State, 426 P.2d 714 (Okla. 1967). Once the language of Houghton v. Payne is determined not to have established a rule of law by which all arguments on "periodicals" must be settled, we are back to the ordinary meaning of the word.
We can find absolutely no rational basis for dispensing a far more severe sanction to licensees with excessive points than to those who refused to take a sobriety test or those who failed to meet the requirements for financial responsibility. Magnolia Pipe Line Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 196 Okla. 633, 167 P.2d 884, 889 [1946]; County Board of Equalization, Pittsburg County v. Muskogee Industrial Finance Corp., Okla., 357 P.2d 224, 228 [1960]; Lancaster v. State, ex rel. Harrod, Okla., 426 P.2d 714, 716-717 [1967]. Art. 2 §§ 6 and 7, Art. 5 §§ 46 and 59, Okla. Const.; Wilson v. Foster, Okla., 595 P.2d 1329, 1332 [1979]; Moses v. Hoebel, Okla., 646 P.2d 601, 605 [1982].
The statute was amended in 1967 to vest exclusive power of appointment in the Attorney General. The appellant also argues that § 215.9 precludes participation by outside counsel. Lancaster v. State, 426 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla. 1967) and Benson v. State, 375 P.2d 958 (Okla. 1962) are cited to support appellant's position that paternity proceedings are controlled by statute and nothing can be done in these proceedings which is not ordained or sanctioned by statute. Driskell v. Goerke, 562 P.2d 157 (Okla. Cr. 1977) is also cited for the principle that the district court may not appoint a special prosecutor to assist the district attorney in the prosecution of a case.