Opinion
12448-20 13268-20
10-23-2023
LAMSTALL HOLDINGS, LLC, JOHN W. GEARY, III, TAX MATTERS PARTNER, ET AL., Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
ORDER
Alina I. Marshall Judge
These cases concern whether Lamstall Holdings, LLC (Lamstall), docket No. 12448-20, and Plum 129 Investments, LLC (Plum), docket No. 13268-20, (together, the LLCs), are entitled to section 170(a) charitable contribution deductions in partnership tax years ending December 31, 2016, for section 170(h) qualified conservation contributions. If not, we must decide whether the LLCs are liable for accuracy-related penalties.
Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code), Title 26 U.S.C., in effect at all relevant times, all regulation references are to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
This Order:
• Grants respondent's Rule 121 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed February 17, 2023 and supplemented April 17, 2023, holding that respondent obtained section 6751(b) supervisory approval of the proposed penalties;
• Denies petitioner's Motion for Protective Order filed June 2, 2023;
• Denies in part and grants in part third-party Kristina Sorenson's Motion to Quash or Modify Subpoena filed July 27, 2023;
• Denies without prejudice respondent's Motion for In Camera Review filed September 8, 2023; • Denies petitioner's Motion to Compel Responses to Interrogatories filed
September 14, 2023;
• Denies petitioner's Motion to Review the Sufficiency of Answers or Objection to Request for Admissions filed September 14, 2023; and
• Denies respondent's Motion to Quash or Modify Subpoena, filed September 19, 2023, without prejudice to objections that may be raised during the trial if particular witnesses are called and documents are identified.
Background
Neither party disputes the following facts, which the Court derives from the First Stipulation of Facts filed May 26, 2023, the Second Stipulation of Facts filed September 28, 2023, the Third Stipulation of Facts filed September 29, 2023, the Petitions, and the Motion papers. The LLCs are Georgia limited liability companies that were treated at all relevant times as TEFRA partnerships for federal income tax purposes. This Order assumes, as petitioner claims, that the LLCs' principal places of business were in Georgia when the Petitions were filed. See infra Discussion Part I.A (explaining that we draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party in resolving a motion for partial summary judgment).
For partnership tax years beginning before January 1, 2018, see Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, § 1101(a), 129 Stat. 584, 625, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-428, §§ 401-407, 96 Stat. 324, 648-71, governs the tax treatment and audit procedures for certain partnerships, including the LLCs. References to any of sections 6221- 6234 pertain to the Code as it existed before the repeal of TEFRA.
John W. Geary, III is the petitioner in both docket No. 12448-20 and docket No. 13268-20.
I. Lamstall's Conservation Easement Claim
Lamstall was formed September 28, 2015 and received approximately 236.29 acres of real property in Jones County, Georgia from Ms. Linda M. Fincher on December 16, 2015. On October 7, 2016, Lamstall Investors, LLC (Lamstall Investors) was formed as a Georgia limited liability company and raised cash from the sale of membership interests, which it used to purchase a 95% interest in Lamstall on December 20, 2016. A week later, on December 27, 2016, Lamstall conveyed a conservation easement to Southeastern Trust for Parks and Land, Inc. (Southeastern) over approximately 224.29 of its acres. In 2016, Southeastern was a publicly supported section 501(c)(3) charitable organization as described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi).
On Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income, for its partnership tax year ended December 31, 2016, Lamstall claimed a $22,586,000 section 170(a) charitable contribution deduction for the easement it granted, purportedly based on an appraisal prepared by Claud Clark III, and listed John W. Geary, III as its tax matters partner (TMP).
Lamstall also deducted a $10,000 cash contribution to Southeastern.
II. Plum's Conservation Easement Claim
Plum was formed December 10, 2014 and received approximately 285 acres of real property in Jones County, Georgia from Plum Creek Timberlands, L.P. on December 22, 2014. On May 18, 2016, Plum 129 Fund, LLC (Plum Fund) was formed as a Georgia limited liability company and raised cash from the sale of membership interests, which it used to purchase a 98% interest in Plum on October 19, 2016. A few weeks later, on November 3, 2016, Plum conveyed a conservation easement to Oconee River Land Trust, Inc. (Oconee) over approximately 285 acres. In 2016, Oconee was a publicly supported section 501(c)(3) charitable organization as described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi).
On Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income, for its partnership tax year ended December 31, 2016, Plum claimed a $22,875,000 section 170(a) charitable contribution deduction for the easement it granted, purportedly based on an appraisal prepared by Claud Clark III, and listed John W. Geary, III as its tax matters partner (TMP).
Plum also deducted a $15,000 cash contribution to Oconee.
III. Examination of the Returns
Respondent issued Notices of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAAs) for the tax year ended December 31, 2016 to Lamstall's TMP on July 20, 2020 and to Plum's TMP on August 26, 2020. Each FPAA reduced the LLC's claimed charitable contribution deduction by the amount of the deduction claimed for the conservation easement on the grounds that the LLC did not establish that (1) it "made a noncash charitable contribution during the tax year ended December 31, 2016," (2) it satisfied the requirements of section 170 and the corresponding regulations for deducting a noncash charitable contribution, and (3) the value of the noncash charitable contribution was correct.
Underpayments resulting from this adjustment, the FPAAs continued, "are attributable to a gross valuation misstatement" and subject to section 6662(h) 40% accuracy-related penalties. Alternatively, each FPAA asserted section 6662A penalties of 20% of the understatements arising from the adjustment, which it said were attributable to a transaction described in Notice 2017-10, 2017-4 I.R.B. 544, 545 (§ 2), a section 6707A(c) listed transaction. As a further alternative, each FPAA asserted a section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty of 20% of the underpayments arising from the adjustment, which it said were attributable to section 6662(c) negligence or disregard of rules or regulations, section 6662(d) substantial understatements of income tax, and section 6662(e) substantial valuation misstatements. To the extent the section 6664(c) reasonable cause defense or any other defense to the penalties could apply, each FPAA concluded, neither the LLC nor its partners have established that any such defense precludes the asserted penalties.
Margaret M. McCarter (Ms. McCarter) asserts in her Declaration in support of respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that she was Revenue Agent Anthony E. Bryant's (RA Bryant) immediate supervisor during the examinations and that RA Bryant made the initial determinations of the penalties asserted in the FPAAs. She adds that on April 6 and April 27, 2020, she personally approved such initial determinations by signing Civil Penalty Approval Forms as to Lamstall and Plum, respectively. The Stipulation includes copies of both forms, which bear her dated electronic signatures.
RA Bryant asserts in his Declaration, attached to respondent's First Supplement to Motion Partial Summary Judgment filed April 17, 2023, that he made the initial determinations of the penalties asserted in the FPAAs and that his supervisor Ms. McCarter approved the initial determinations by signing Civil Penalty Approval Forms on April 6 and April 27, 2020, with respect to Lamstall and Plum, respectively. He further asserts that his May 20 and June 1, 2020 letters to John W. Geary, III were the first times civil penalties asserted against Lamstall and Plum, respectively, were communicated to petitioner.
Theresa Guida's Declaration was also attached to respondent's First Supplement to Motion Partial Summary Judgment filed April 17, 2023. Ms. Guida states therein that Ms. McCarter was RA Bryant's direct supervisor from July 2018 through March 2021. Her Declaration attaches an email congratulating Ms. McCarter and RA Bryant on being selected for a newly formed syndicated conservation easement group. It also attaches three Forms 6850-BU, Bargaining Unit Performance Appraisal and Recognition Election, for RA Bryant identifying Ms. McCarter as the "Rater" and Ms. Guida as the "Reviewing Official."
IV. Tax Court Proceedings
Petitioner timely sought readjustment of the claimed deductions in this Court. See § 6226(a)(1).
Discussion
I. Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
A. Summary Judgment Standard
The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite litigation and avoid costly and unnecessary trials. FPL Grp., Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 73, 74 (2001). We shall grant a motion for partial summary judgment regarding an issue when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(a)(2); Elec. Arts, Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 226, 238 (2002). We construe the facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to decide whether partial summary judgment is appropriate. Sundstrand Corp. & Consol. Subs. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), aff'd, 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). The nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in his pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute for trial. Rule 121(d); Sundstrand, 98 T.C. at 520.
B. Supervisory Approval of Penalties
Section 6751(b) prohibits the assessment of any penalty under the Code "unless the initial determination of such assessment is personally approved (in writing) by the immediate supervisor of the individual making such determination." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that section 6751(b) generally does not require supervisory approval at any particular time before assessment. Kroner v. Commissioner, 48 F.4th 1272, 1276-78 (11th Cir. 2022), rev'g in part T.C. Memo. 2020-73. The court interpreted the phrase "initial determination of [the] assessment" to refer to the "ministerial" process by which the IRS formally records the tax debt. See id. at 1278. Absent stipulation to the contrary, this case is appealable to the Eleventh Circuit, and we thus follow its precedent that is squarely in point. See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 756-57 (1970), aff'd 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971).
Although the Commissioner does not bear a burden of production with respect to penalties in a partnership-level proceeding, a partnership may raise section 6751(b) as an affirmative defense. See Dynamo Holdings Ltd. P'ship v. Commissioner, 150 T.C. 224, 236-37 (2018).
Under a literal application of the standard enunciated in Kroner, supervisory approval could seemingly be secured at any moment before actual assessment of the tax. But the Eleventh Circuit left open the possibility that supervisory approval in some cases might need to be secured sooner, i.e., before the supervisor "has lost the discretion to disapprove" the penalty determination. See Kroner v. Commissioner, 48 F.4th at 1279 n.1.
Ms. McCarter asserts in her Declaration in support of respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that she was RA Bryant's immediate supervisor during the examinations and that RA Bryant made the initial determinations of the penalties asserted in the FPAAs. All of the penalties at issue were approved by Ms. McCarter on April 6 and April 27, 2020. Respondent supplied a copy of the signed Civil Penalty Approval Forms bearing her dated electronic signatures as to both Lamstall and Plum.
RA Bryant asserts in his Declaration that he made the initial determinations of the penalties asserted in the FPAAs and that his supervisor Ms. McCarter approved the initial determinations by signing Civil Penalty Approval Forms on April 6 and April 27, 2020, with respect to Lamstall and Plum, respectively. He further asserts that his May 20 and June 1, 2020 letters to John W. Geary, III were the first times civil penalties asserted against Lamstall and Plum, respectively, were communicated to petitioner.
Finally, Ms. Guida states in her Declaration that Ms. McCarter was RA Bryant's direct supervisor from July 2018 through March 2021. Her Declaration attaches an email congratulating Ms. McCarter and RA Bryant on being selected for a newly formed syndicated conservation easement group. It also attaches three Forms 6850-BU, Bargaining Unit Performance Appraisal and Recognition Election, for RA Bryant identifying Ms. McCarter as the "Rater" and Ms. Guida as the "Reviewing Official." We conclude that Ms. McCarter was RA Bryant's immediate supervisor within the meaning of section 6751(b)(1). See Sand Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 157 T.C. 136, 142 (2021) (holding that the "immediate supervisor" is the person who supervises the agent's substantive work on an examination).
Petitioner does not dispute that RA Bryant recommended the assertion of all penalties at issue, nor that Ms. McCarter, his immediate supervisor, signed the forms in April 2020. Instead, petitioner states that he received administrative records that were incomplete as to supervisory approval of penalties and therefore he cannot "present facts essential to justify Petitioner's opposition to Respondent's Motion without further discovery." Petitioner further argues that the Declarations "do not merely seek to authenticate or explain the documents attached, but instead ask the Court and Petitioner to accept certain statements as true without cross examination, satisfaction of the rules of evidence, or any other corroborating evidence." Petitioner therefore asks the Court to deny the motion or wait.
We are mindful that "summary judgment should not be granted until the party opposing the motion has had an adequate opportunity for discovery." Snook v. Tr. Co. of Ga. Bank of Savannah, N.A., 859 F.2d 865, 870 (11th Cir. 1988); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). But discovery must be relevant to "the subject matter involved in the pending case." Rule 70(b)(1); Caney v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-90, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1366, 1368; accord Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507-08 (1947).
The record includes documents demonstrating the required written supervisory approval. Petitioner seeks case activity records and email communications among the IRS exam team, essentially seeking to look behind the signature appearing on the face of the form. See Sparta Pink Prop., LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2022-88; Patel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-133. We have repeatedly held that a manager's signature on a civil penalty approval form, without more, is sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements. See Sparta Pink Prop., T.C. Memo. 2022-88, at *8 (citing Belair Woods, LLC v. Commissioner, 154 T.C. 1, 17 (2020)). Furthermore, we have regularly decided section 6751(b)(1) questions on summary judgment on the basis of IRS forms and records. See, e.g., Sand Inv., 157 T.C. at 140-44; Long Branch Land, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2022-2; Excelsior Aggregates, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2021-125.
Petitioner does not assert that the Civil Penalty Approval Forms were signed after the first times civil penalties asserted against Lamstall and Plum were communicated to petitioner. Petitioner does not address the Eleventh Circuit precedent in Kroner. And, now that the deadline for formal discovery has passed and the parties have filed three stipulations of facts, petitioner has not sought to amend or supplement his response. Petitioner has not set forth any facts "show[ing] that there is a genuine dispute of fact for trial" on this point. Rule 121(d). Accordingly, we will grant respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
II. Petitioner's Motions
A. Motion for Protective Order
Rule 103(a) provides that upon motion "by a party or any other affected person, or on the Court's own, and for good cause, the Court may make any order that justice requires to protect a party or other person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." Petitioner asks the Court to issue a Rule 103(a) protective order to prohibit or limit respondent from contacting, seeking discovery from, and interviewing non-participating partners of Lamstall and Plum. Petitioner further asks the Court to require respondent to provide petitioner with any and all information and documents obtained from non-participating partner interviews and document requests. Respondent filed a Response to Motion for Protective Order Pursuant to Rule 103 on July 13, 2023. We agree with respondent and will deny petitioner's motion.
Generally speaking, informal requests for information or interviews "are not subject to restriction under Rule 103" because they "do not fall within our discovery procedures." Fu Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 408, 410 (1995). For this case in particular, we note that petitioner's counsel does not claim to represent the investors (who can seek their own protective orders as affected persons) or that the investors supervise, direct, or regularly consult with petitioner's counsel regarding these cases. See Rule 103(a); Model Rules of Pro. Conduct R. 4.2; see also, e.g., Grandbouche v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 604, 610-14 (1992) (granting a nonparty's Rule 103(a) motion for protective order). We further note petitioner's statement that the investors are "non-managing members" who have "no authority to bind the partnership."
B. Motion to Compel Responses to Interrogatories
Rule 71(b) provides that answers to interrogatories "shall be made in good faith and as completely as the answering party's information shall permit" subject to the requirement that the answering party "make reasonable inquiry and ascertain readily obtainable information." Fourteen interrogatories are in dispute.
With respect to interrogatories 2, 3 and 4, petitioner inquires about the subject matter on which experts are expected to testify and respondent's basis for contending that the conservation easement donations did not meet the four conservation purposes described in section 170(h)(4). With respect to the other 11 interrogatories, petitioner inquires as to respondent's bases for denying petitioner's requests for admissions. For some of these, respondent provided an answer, and we find those answers to be adequate although not necessarily thorough. For others, respondent declined to answer on the basis of the wording. Some of the interrogatories were phrased as "If you denied Request for Admission No. [] … please explain the basis for your denial", but respondent had not denied some of those requests for admission (RFAs). Rather, for some of the RFAs he neither admitted nor denied, citing the need for continued discovery, and for others he objected because petitioner had not previously used informal discovery.
We will deny the motion to compel. Since this motion was filed, the parties have filed their pretrial memoranda and have lodged expert reports. The dispute with respect to the interrogatories is, therefore, moot. Contention interrogatories, as were some of the interrogatories propounded here, are within the bounds of discovery, serving to clarify and narrow the issues in dispute. See, e.g., Zaentz v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 469, 477-78 (1979); Rule 70(b). We agree that respondent's answers were sometimes general and that other times they were very specific in pointing out that he had not denied the particular request for admission. Indeed, respondent had not denied some of the RFAs. And we understood some of respondent's answers to say that he had not yet completed discovery, had not received final reports from experts, and had not finalized his position on certain issues. As pretrial memoranda have since been filed and expert reports have since been lodged, petitioner has received the answers sought.
C. Motion to Review the Sufficiency of Answers or Objection to Request for Admissions
Rule 90(a) allows a party to seek admissions as to factual "statements or opinions" and "the application of law to fact." "However, the Court expects the parties to attempt to attain the objectives of such a request through informal consultation or communication before utilizing the procedures provided in this Rule." Rule 90(a); see also Rule 70(a)(1). Rule 90(c) provides that each matter is deemed admitted unless the party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party: "(1) a written answer specifically admitting or denying the matter involved in whole or in part, or asserting that it cannot be truthfully admitted or denied and setting forth in detail the reasons why this is so; or (2) an objection, stating in detail the reasons therefor." If good faith requires a qualified answer or partial denial, "that party must specify so much of [the requested admission] as is true and deny or qualify the remainder." Rule 90(c). Moreover, Rule 90(c) provides that where a party considers that a request contains a genuine issue for trial, that party may not object to the request but rather may deny the matter or set forth reasons why that party cannot admit or deny it. With these rules in mind we turn to the specific requests at issue.
Petitioner asks the Court to review respondent's answers to RFAs 11-15, 62, 64, 67, 76-82, 84-85, 125, 127, 130, 139-146 and 148-149 and to direct respondent to serve improved answers to these RFAs. Petitioner notes respondent's refusal to answer these RFAs on the basis of Rule 90(a), stating that petitioner did not attempt to attain the objectives of the RFAs through informal consultation and communication. Petitioner further alleges that respondent has information available to admit or deny several of these RFAs.
There is no proper showing in the record that petitioner attempted to obtain the objectives of this Rule informally before resorting to the compulsory procedure. Odend'hal v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 400, 403-04 (1980); see also, International Air Conditioning Corp. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 89, 93 (1976). We will deny the motion.
III. Respondent's Motions
A. Motion for In Camera Review
In his Motion for In Camera Review filed "pursuant to Tax Court Rules 50, 70, and 143 and the Federal Rules of Evidence" on September 8, 2023, respondent contends that "[r]edactions have been made to more than 590 pages to the Plum and Lamstall files that petitioner produced to respondent and petitioner claims all of the redactions are nonresponsive. Respondent believes, most, if not all of the redactions are responsive and should be disclosed." He further states that, "[b]ased on the information respondent has at his disposal, respondent believes the twenty-five work product doctrine claims petitioner made in the Plum privilege log are improper."
Petitioner filed his objection on September 25, 2023, stating: "Respondent's Motion does not identify any instance where the Court has reviewed the sufficiency of documents produced in response to informal requests. Nor does his motion cite any Rule that provides for the type of review he seeks." Without extensively studying the bounds of the Court's substantial flexibility in addressing discovery disputes, we will deny respondent's motion without prejudice as insufficiently supported and at risk of causing delay given the imminent trial date.
B. Motion to Quash or Modify Subpoena
Respondent filed a motion to quash or modify subpoena, addressing subpoenas issued by petitioner to individuals and a firm with whom respondent has contracted to perform expert services in these cases. Respondent describes the subpoenas as unduly burdensome and inappropriate, but it is not clear that every aspect of each subpoena would fit this description. Respondent further argues that the subpoenas are in contravention of Court's Rules of Practice and Procedure and seek privileged and confidential materials, but respondent has not described any particular documents with specificity for the Court to consider these claims. See, e.g., FRCP 45(e)(2); Pacific Mgt. Grp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-97.
We will deny respondent's motion without prejudice to objections that may be raised during the trial if particular witnesses are called and documents are identified.
IV. Third-Party Motion
Third party Kristina Sorenson requests that the Court enter an order quashing a subpoena issued to her, entering a protective order against respondent, and directing respondent to pay related costs and fees. She argues that testifying at trial in Washington, D.C. would be unduly burdensome and that she has faced harassment.
Rule 147(c) provides that a subpoena may command a person to attend a "trial, hearing, or deposition." Rule 147(d)(3) provides that "the Court must quash or modify a subpoena that: (i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply; (ii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or (iii) subjects a person to undue burden." Whether to quash or modify a subpoena lies within the Court's discretion. See Grandbouche v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 604, 617 (1992); Amazon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-245, at *8. In exercising this discretion, the Court must balance the burden upon the subpoenaed party against the value of the information to the serving party. See Durkin v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.1329, 1401-03 (1986), aff'd, 872 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1989); Amazon v. Commissioner, supra at *8-9.
Given Ms. Sorenson's role in the Lamstall transaction, her testimony is clearly relevant. She is the sole member of Conservation Matters, LLC, the entity engaged to write the baseline documentation report in connection with Lamstall's conservation easement donation. This report was attached to Lamstall's Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income, for the tax year ended December 31, 2016. As respondent offered Ms. Sorenson the flexibility to testify remotely, we will offer her the same. The motion will otherwise be denied in all respects.
Upon due consideration, it is
ORDERED that respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed February 17, 2023, and supplemented April 17, 2023, is granted. It is further
ORDERED that petitioner's Motion for Protective Order, filed June 2, 2023, is denied. It is further
ORDERED that third-party Kristina Sorenson's Motion to Quash or Modify Subpoena, filed July 27, 2023, is granted in that she may testify remotely. It is further
ORDERED that respondent's Motion for In Camera Review, filed September 8, 2023, is denied without prejudice. It is further
ORDERED that petitioner's Motion to Compel Responses to Interrogatories filed, September 14, 2023, is denied. It is further
ORDERED that petitioner's Motion to Review the Sufficiency of Answers or Objection to Request for Admissions, filed September 14, 2023, is denied. It is further
ORDERED that respondent's Motion to Quash or Modify Subpoena, filed September 19, 2023, is denied without prejudice to objections that may be raised during the trial if particular witnesses are called and documents are identified. It is further
ORDERED that, upon receipt of this Order, respondent provide a copy of it to Mr. Ryan Pulver, Esq., Counsel for Ms. Kristina Sorenson. It is further
ORDERED that, in addition to regular service on the parties, the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Order on Mr. Ryan Pulver, Esq., Counsel for Ms. Kristina Sorenson, Guilmette Pulver LLC, 1360 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 900, Atlanta, GA 30309.