Opinion
Cause No. 3:05-CV-808 AS.
March 8, 2006
OPINION AND ORDER
Tommy E. Lampley, a pro se prisoner, submitted an amended complaint pursuant to this court's order of January 27, 2006. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, or any portion of a complaint, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Courts apply the same standard under § 1915A as when addressing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). Weiss v. Colley, 230 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 2000).
A claim may be dismissed only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Accordingly, pro se complaints are liberally construed.
In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Supreme Court requires only two elements: First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of the right acted under color of state law. These elements may be put forth in a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). In reviewing the complaint on a motion to dismiss, no more is required from plaintiff's allegations of intent than what would satisfy Rule 8's notice pleading minimum and Rule 9(b)'s requirement that motive and intent be pleaded generally.Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations, quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).
Mr. Lampley alleges that he was attacked by another inmate. Under the Eighth Amendment, "prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (citations and internal punctuation omitted). When one inmate attacks another, the Eighth Amendment is violated only if "deliberate indifference by prison officials effectively condones the attack by allowing it to happen. . . ." Halley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 640 (7th Cir. 1996).
[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the official has acted in an intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily done so.Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
Negligence on the part of an official does not violate the Constitution, and it is not enough that he or she should have known of a risk. Instead, deliberate indifference requires evidence that an official actually knew of a substantial risk of serious harm and consciously disregarded it nonetheless.Pierson v. Hartley, 391 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Deliberate indifference is "something approaching a total unconcern for [the plaintiff's] welfare in the face of serious risks, or a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent harm." Duane v. Lane, 959 F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1992). This total disregard for a prisoner's safety is the "functional equivalent of wanting harm to come to the prisoner." McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 347 (7th Cir. 1991). It is not enough to show that a defendant merely failed to act reasonably. Gibbs v. Franklin, 49 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1995). Deliberate indifference can be inferred only where defendants know there is a strong likelihood rather than a mere possibility that violence will occur. Watts v. Laurent, 774 F.2d 168, 172 (7th Cir. 1985). Prison officials cannot be expected to eliminate the possibility of all attacks because the prison system is always potentially dangerous and sometimes explosive. McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 345 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Prisons are dangerous places"). Thus, the right to reasonable protection does not include the right to protection from random acts of violence. See, McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 348 (7th Cir. 1991) ("some level of brutality . . . among prisoners is inevitable no matter what guards do").
Mr. Lampley alleges that Purney Edwards collaborated with the inmate attacker to facilitate and perpetuate the attack. This states an individual capacity, monetary claim for compensatory and punitive damages.
Additionally, Mr. Lampley filed a motion to compel discovery prior to filing his amended complaint. Currently there are no defendants in this case; therefore this motion to compel must be denied as moot. After the defendant has filed an answer, Mr. Lampley may initiate discovery against him pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
For the foregoing reasons, the court:
(1) DENIES AS MOOT the motion for discovery (docket # 15);
(2) GRANTS Tommy E. Lampley leave to proceed against Purney Edwards in his individual capacity for monetary and punitive damages for violation of the Eighth Amendment for collaborating with an inmate who attacked Mr. Lampley on October 24, 2005;
(3) DISMISSES all other claims;
(4) DIRECTS the clerk to transmit the summons and USM-285 for Purney Edwards to the United States Marshals Service along with a copy of this order and a copy of the amended complaint;
(5) DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to effect service of process on Purney Edwards; and
(6) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Purney Edwards respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. IND. L.R. 10.1, only to the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.