Opinion
32574.
DECIDED JULY 14, 1949.
Violating liquor law; motion in arrest of judgment; from Eastman City Court — Judge Franklin. April 19, 1949.
A. Russell Ross, for plaintiff in error.
D. D. Smith, Solicitor, contra.
Where there were two counts in the accusation, count 1 charging the offense of selling intoxicants, and count 2 charging the offense of possessing an excessive amount of tax-paid intoxicants, and where, "upon the call of the case, both the State and the defendant announced ready for trial, the defendant entered a plea of not guilty, a jury was chosen, sworn, and empaneled in the case, the State introduced evidence, and the defendant made a statement in the case, after which the Solicitor of the City Court of Eastman announced in open court that the State was abandoning count No. 2 of the accusation because there was only one pint of tax-paid bonded whisky involved," and the jury returned a verdict of "guilty on count 1," that verdict is not to be construed as a general verdict, impliedly finding the defendant not guilty on the second count, that count having been withdrawn. Hall v. State, 43 Ga. App. 224 ( 158 S.E. 357); Guthas v. State, 53 Ga. App. 362 ( 185 S.E. 837); Davis v. State, 47 Ga. App. 706 ( 171 S.E. 401). In these circumstances, it follows that no question of the verdict on count 1 being void for repugnancy is presented, and the court did not err in overruling the motion in arrest of judgment.
Judgment affirmed. Gardner and Townsend, JJ., concur.