Lampkin v. State

6 Citing cases

  1. Wilson v. State

    625 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)   Cited 14 times
    Concurring Opinion on Motion for Rehearing

    Obviously, the indictment alleged the commission of robbery under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 29.02(a)(1), which was aggravated by the causing of serious bodily injury, Id., § 29.03(a)(1), and by using and exhibiting a deadly weapon, Id., § 29.03(a)(2). In Lampkin v. State, 607 S.W.2d 550 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980), it was held that the court's charge was fundamentally defective, inter alia, in authorizing the jury to convict upon proof that the defendant "knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly" caused serious bodily injury to the complainant, when the indictment had alleged only that the injury was committed "intentionally and knowingly." See also Hutchins v. State, 590 S.W.2d 710 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979); Hawkins v. State, 579 S.W.2d 923 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979); Jackson v. State, 576 S.W.2d 88 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979), all of which found fundamental error in a variance between the indictment's allegation of "knowingly and intentionally" threatening and placing the victim in fear of imminent bodily injury or death, the alternative means of committing robbery under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 29.03(a)(2), and a charge which authorized conviction upon a finding that the defendant "knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly" threatened or placed the victim in fear.

  2. Brown v. State

    No. PD-0701-04 (Tex. Crim. App. Jun. 15, 2005)   Cited 1 times

    First, the authority upon which the court of appeals relied is questionable. Second, the State has presented a novel theory not considered by these cases: that in spite of the fact that the punishment for each type of robbery is the same, "knowingly causing bodily injury" constitutes a lesser-included offense of "intentionally causing bodily injury," and therefore may be submitted to the jury pursuant to Articles 37.08 and 37.09. Or, at the least, because "knowingly" is a lesser-included mental state, the defendant whose indictment alleges "intentionally" has notice of the "knowingly" allegation and it may be submitted if raised by the evidence. Wilson v. State, 625 S.W.2d 331, 332-333 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981); Lampkin v. State, 607 S.W.2d 550, 550-551 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); Hutchins v. State, 590 S.W.2d 710, 711 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979); Hawkins v. State, 579 S.W.2d 923, 924-925 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979); Jackson v. State, 576 S.W.2d 89, 89-90 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979); Walton v. State, 575 S.W.2d 25, 25-27 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978); Dowden v. State, 537 S.W.2d 5, 6-7 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976). 117 S.W.3d 260, 264-265 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003).

  3. Reed v. State

    117 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)   Cited 49 times
    Holding the trial court in an aggravated assault case erroneously included in the jury charge the less culpable mental state of recklessness when the indictment only alleged that defendant acted intentionally and knowingly; remanding to the court of appeals to decide whether defendant was harmed by the error in the jury charge

    Second, the inclusion of a lesser culpable mental state may allow conviction for an offense under a theory that was not alleged in the indictment. In Lampkin v. State, 607 S.W.2d 550 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980), the indictment charged the defendant with intentionally and knowingly causing serious bodily injury. The jury instructions also authorized a robbery conviction if they found that he recklessly caused bodily injury or threatened or placed the victim in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.

  4. Garcia v. State

    640 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)   Cited 9 times
    Holding charge was defective because it authorized a conviction on a basis not alleged in the indictment

    The court's charge may not expand upon the allegations in the pleading; where the charge attempts to apply the law to the facts by including one or more unpled mental states, as in this case, fundamental error ensues.Hawkins, supra; Hutchins v. State, 590 S.W.2d 710 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979); Lampkin v. State, 607 S.W.2d 550 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980); Wilson v. State, 625 S.W.2d 331 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981). The information here cannot be recommended, either by grammarians or this court.

  5. Reed v. State

    608 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. App. 2020)   Cited 3 times

    Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the jury charge affected the very basis of the case; thus, we hold that the erroneous charge resulted in Reed suffering egregious harm. SeeStuhler , 218 S.W.3d at 719 ; Sanchez , 209 S.W.3d at 121 ; Almanza , 686 S.W.2d at 171 ; see alsoLampkin v. State , 607 S.W.2d 550, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (holding that it is reversible error, even without objection at trial, when the jury charge allows the jury to convict the defendant on a different theory than what was alleged in the indictment). We sustain Reed's first issue.

  6. Castillo-Ramirez v. State

    No. 04-18-00514-CR (Tex. App. Aug. 21, 2019)

    Because the jury charge affected the very basis of the case and vitally affected Ramirez's defensive theory, we hold the erroneous charge resulted in Ramirez suffering egregious harm. See Ambrose, 487 S.W.3d at 597; see also Lampkin v. State, 607 S.W.2d 550, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (holding it is reversible error, even without objection at trial, when the jury charge allows the jury to convict the defendant on a different theory than what was alleged in the indictment).