The extent or percentage of disability from the preexisting condition must be ascertained if Section 287.220.1 is to be given any meaning." Id. Lammert v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 968 S.W.2d 720, 725 (Mo.App.E.D. 1998), provides that: Overruled in part, on other grounds, by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 223, app. at 226.
Decisions which are clearly interpretations or applications of law are reviewed without deference to the Commission's judgment. Lammert v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 968 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Mo.App. 1998), overruled in part on other grounds byHampton v. BigBoy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 226 (Mo.banc 2003). Deference is afforded to the Commission on issues concerning credibility and weight to be given to conflicting evidence.
We defer to the Commission when it resolves issues concerning credibility and weight to be given to conflicting evidence.Lammert v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 968 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Mo.App.E.D. 1998). We review questions of law independently. Cahall v. Cahall, 963 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Mo.App.E.D. 1998).
(Mo. App. 1999); Jacobs v. City of Jefferson, 991 S.W.2d 693 (Mo. App. 1999); Davis v. General Elec. Co., 991 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. App. 1999); Reese v. Coleman, 990 S.W.2d 195 (Mo. App. 1999); Flanigan v. St. James Paseo Learning Center, 996 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. App. 1999); Putnam-Heisler v. Columbia Foods, 989 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. App. 1999); Messex v. Sachs Elec. Co., 989 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. App. 1999); Sanderson v. Porta-Fab Corp., 989 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. App. 1999); Van Black v. Trio Masonry, Inc., 986 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. App. 1999); Williams v. City of Ava, 982 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. App. 1998); Bryan v. Summit Travel, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. App. 1998); Breckle v. Hawk's Nest, Inc., 980 S.W.2d 192 (Mo. App. 1998); George-Brewer v. Pen Mar Southwest, 980 S.W.2d 147 (Mo. App. 1998); Moriarty v. City of Kirksville, 975 S.W.2d 215 (Mo. App. 1998); Seyler v. Spirtas Indus., 974 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. App. 1998); DeLong v. Shop 'N Save, 972 S.W.2d 495 (Mo. App. 1998); Circo v. A-Cord Elec., 969 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. App. 1998); Lammert v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 968 S.W.2d 720 (Mo. App. 1998); Knipp v. Nordyne, Inc., 969 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. App. 1998); Wisely v. Sysco Foods, 972 S.W.2d 315 (Mo. App. 1998); Simpson v. Saunchegrow Const., 965 S.W.2d 899 (Mo. App. 1998); Avery v. City of Columbia, 966 S.W.2d 315 (Mo. App. 1998); Crabill v. Hannicon, 963 S.W.2d 440 (Mo. App. 1998); Esquivel v. Day's Inn of Branson, 959 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. App. 1998); Cahall v. Cahall, 963 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. App. 1998); Holaus v. William J. Zickell Co., 958 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. App. 1997); Landers v. Chrysler Corp., 963 S.W.2d 275 (Mo. App. 1997); Feltrop v. Eskens Drywall and Insulation, 957 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. App. 1997); Cooper v. Medical Center of Independence, 955 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. App. 1997); Walsh v. Treasurer of the State of Mo., 953 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. App. 1997); Coloney v. Accurate Superior Scale Co., 952 S.W.2d 755 (Mo. App. 1997); Carlson v. Plant Farm, 952 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. App. 1997); Hunsicker v. J.C. Industries, Inc., 952 S.W.2d 376 (Mo. App. 1997); Cahall v. Riddle Trucking, Inc., 956 S.W.2d 315 (Mo. App.
And again, “The Second Injury Fund is not responsible for progression of preexisting conditions or new conditions that develop after and unrelated to the work injury.” Lammert v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 968 S.W.2d 720, 725 (Mo.App. E.D.1998) (emphasis added) ( overruled on other grounds byHampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. banc 2003)). Here, as set out in our analysis of Employer's first point, there was substantial, competent evidence that the work injury aggravated and worsened Claimant's pre-existing psychological condition.
Claimant's subsequent return to work in May 2003 is particularly significant because “[the Fund] is not responsible for progression of preexisting conditions or new conditions that develop after and unrelated to the work injury.” Lammert v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 968 S.W.2d 720, 725 (Mo.App. E.D.1998) ( overruled on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 223). Considering the whole record, it was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence for the Commission to find, based upon Claimant's return to work after his February 2003 injury (before he sustained two additional injuries between May 9, 2003 and June 10, 2003), that Claimant was not permanently and totally disabled by the combination of his pre-existing disabilities and the February 2003 injury.
To recover permanent disability compensation from the Second Injury Fund, Lewis had to prove that she had “a preexisting permanent partial disability of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to [her] employment or reemployment.” Lammert v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 968 S.W.2d 720, 724 (Mo.App.1998), overruled in part by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 220. “The preexisting disability necessary to trigger Second Injury Fund liability is permanent partial disability existing at the time the work-related injury was sustained.”
The Commission noted that the Second Injury Fund is not liable for the progression of preexisting conditions. Lammert v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 968 S.W.2d 720, 725 (Mo.App.E.D.1998). Unless that condition was a hindrance to Jones' employment before the assault, the Second Injury Fund is not liable.
The Fund is not liable for post-accident progression of pre-existing conditions. Lammert v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 968 S.W.2d 720, 725 (Mo.App. 1998). Claimant testified he had no trouble finding or keeping employment before the accident; he did not feel his PTSD kept him from performing his job duties; and his boss at Wicks had indicated he was doing a good job. Dr. Faitak testified Claimant was satisfactorily coping with his PTSD work-wise in January 2002, and that his loss of employment could have contributed to his later, lower GAF score.
The commission has discretion to decide how much weight to give expert opinions, and we do not superimpose our discretion on review. Rana v. Landstar TLC, 46 S.W.3d 614, 620 (Mo.App. 2001); Reese, 5 S.W.3d at 525; Lammert v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 968 S.W.2d 720, 724 (Mo.App. 1998). We conclude that the commission's decision to deny permanent total disability was supported by competent and substantial evidence and was not contrary to the overwhelming weight of evidence.